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October 12, 2010

Court said dismissal too harsh a penalty after considering employee’s personnel file

Court said dismissal too harsh a penalty after considering employee’s personnel file
Schnaars v Copiague UFSD, 275 AD2d 462

Is dismissal too severe a penalty for a school employee who uses a school computer to find pornographic web sites? Yes, both a Supreme Court Judge and the Appellate Division ruled in the Schnaars case.

A student at Copiague High School turned on a school computer and was immediately confronted by a pornographic image. Schnaars, Copiague UFSD’s head custodian, took responsibility. Schnaars admitted that, with his subordinates, he accessed pornographic web sites during two night shift tours of duty.

The district filed disciplinary charges against him, alleging that he had used the district’s computers without authorization and neglected his duty. The hearing officer found Schnaars guilty of the charges and recommended that he be demoted to a lower grade position.

Although the board adopted the hearing officer’s findings as to guilt, it rejected the penalty recommended by the hearing officer and voted to terminate Schnaars instead.*

Schnaars sued, contending that board’s rejection of the hearing officer’s recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and disproportionate to the offense for which he was found guilty.

New York State Supreme Court Judge Marquette L. Floyd of Suffolk County said that where the finding of guilt is confirmed and punishment has been imposed, the test is whether such punishment is “so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness,” citing the so-called Pell Standard [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222]. Although courts rarely find that an administrative penalty violates the Pell Standard, in this instance Judge Floyd decided that dismissing Schnaars was a shockingly disproportionate penalty.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, commenting that Schnaars’ actions did not involve “moral turpitude, gross injury to the agency involved or [gross injury] to the public weal.”

Noting that “access to the school’s computers can be curtailed through adequate passwords and by ‘filtering’ software, which may also be complicated by First Amendment issues,” the Appellate Division said that although it “does not condone [Schnaars’] individual or supervisory behavior, his termination is so disproportionate to the facts that it may not be permitted to stand.”

What are some of the factors that should be considered in settling a disciplinary penalty? The Appellate Division said that where there is no “grave moral turpitude” and no grave injury to the agency or to the public weal,” the following should be considered:

1. The length of employment of the employee;

2. The probability that a dismissal may leave the employee without any alternative livelihood;

3. The employee’s loss of retirement benefits; and

4. The impact upon his innocent family.

In contrast, the court said that no such consideration of “mitigating circumstances” is required in situations involving such actions as a “deliberate, planned, unmitigated larceny, or bribe taking, or [a] demonstrated lack of qualification for the assigned job.”

The decision observed that Schnaars “candidly acknowledged his violation of District policy and sought to correct [the] same by informing his subordinates that ‘this has got to stop.’” Another consideration, said the court, was Schnaars “otherwise 13 year unblemished record with the District with many letters of recommendation and accolades that exhibit faithful and loyal service.”

What penalty would be appropriate in this case? The court said that the district should reinstate Schnaars to his position as Head Custodian with back salary and then impose “an appropriate penalty” suggesting either “demotion and/or suspension without pay for a reasonable period, said period not to exceed ninety (90) days.”

The Appellate Division also said that the district “shall be entitled to a credit of any of [Schnaars’] earned income from the time of his termination to the date of reinstatement.”

However, Civil Service Law Section 77 -- compensation of officers and employees reinstated by court order -- currently authorizes such adjustment only for “unemployment insurance benefits.” In 1985, Section 77 was amended to eliminate the clause allowing adjustments for “compensation which [the individual] may have earned in any other employment or occupation...” [Chapter 851, Laws of 1985].

On another area of concern: the decision sets out the penalty that the court said could be imposed: demotion and/or suspension without pay not to exceed ninety days.

This suggests that the district could demote Schnaars or it could suspend him without pay or it could impose both penalties. Courts, however, have ruled that only one of the several penalties set out in Section 75 may be imposed on an individual found guilty of Section 75 disciplinary charges -- the imposition of multiple penalties is not authorized. In other words, cumulative penalties are not permitted in such cases.

In Matteson v City of Oswego, 588 NYS2d 472, the Appellate Division overturned the penalties imposed by the appointing authority and remanded the matter for the imposition of a new, appropriate penalty.

Oswego had imposed the following penalties on Matteson: (1) suspension without pay for 30 days; and (2) demotion to a lower grade position; and (3) restitution of $3,699.48.

The Appellate Division held that the penalty meted out was contrary to law in that "the imposition of multiple penalties was improper" under 75.3 of the Civil Service Law.

In contrast, in cases involving the imposition of a penalty by an arbitrator pursuant to a "contract disciplinary procedure" the courts have held that the only limitations on the penalty to be imposed is the sound judgment of the arbitrator. Rarely are arbitrators limited as to the penalties or combination of penalties they can assign.

* Demotion or termination are among the penalties an appointing authority may impose on an employee found guilty of misconduct or incompetence pursuant to Section 75.
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