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December 02, 2010

Employment status as an employee determines an employer liability

Employment status as an employee determines an employer liability
Rudder v City of New York, Appellate Division, 254 AD2d 115

There is a saying that a police officer is “always on duty.” While there is a great deal of truth in that exaggeration, it does not follow that the police officer’s employer is liable for all off-duty acts or omissions by the officer. The Rudder case shows that the employer is liable only for off-duty acts involving the performance of official duties.

Rudder was involved in an automobile accident with Scott V. Thompson, an off-duty New York City police officer. Thompson had been driving to the office of the Police Surgeon “for an unscheduled visit” when the accident occurred.

Thompson was driving a vehicle owned by another officer, and that vehicle was uninsured, unregistered and uninspected at the time of the accident. In addition, Thompson’s driver’s license had been suspended.

Rudder sued the City of New York on the theory that the city was liable for Thompson’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior (“let the master answer”). Rudder argued that a police officer “is always on duty” and Thompson’s trip to the police surgeon’s office constituted “official business.”

After a State Supreme Court judge disagreed and dismissed the city as a party in the action, Rudder appealed to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division said that “given this set of circumstances ... Thompson had not during the relevant time frame been acting in the course of his employment” as a police officer. It sustained the lower court’s determination severing the City of New York as a respondent in the lawsuit.
If the court had declared that Thompson had been acting in the scope of his employment, the city would have faced significant legal bills. Typically, a public employer is required to provide for the defense and indemnification of its officers and employees held liable in lawsuits involving the performance of, or their failure to perform, their official duties.

A similar case was Sanchez v NYC Transit Authority, 254 AD2d 345. Christopher Huwer, an off-duty Transit Authority police officer, was involved in an altercation in the course of a traffic dispute. The Appellate Division rejected Huwer’s demand that the Transit Authority provide for his defense and indemnification as mandated by Section 18 of the Public Officers Law.

The Appellate Division said that the record supported the “corporation counsel’s conclusion that the altercation underlying [Sanchez’s] action was personal in nature, and that [Huwer] was not acting within the scope of his employment.”

It is worth noting that a different rationale is applied when considering off-duty misconduct by law enforcement personnel for the purposes of disciplinary action as opposed to employer liability.

Employers may discipline officers for off-duty misconduct, even if remote from their official duties, if the action brings disrepute upon the employer. For instance, a New York City firefighter was fired after he participated in a September 7, 1998 Labor Day parade was held in the Broad Channel neighborhood of Queens County. As part of the parade, a float appeared that was said to have been intended as a “parody” of African-Americans. Participants rode on a decorated flatbed truck wearing ‘black face’ and wigs.” The firefighter unsuccessfully claimed he was unable to get a fair hearing because Mayor Rudy Guiliani had publicly vowed to fire any police or fire officers who were on the float..*

Similarly, the Appellate Division upheld the imposition of a 20-day suspension without pay when the police commissioner found that a police officer, while off-duty, “wrongfully and without just cause, harassed and threatened one of his neighbors” [Hogan v Bartton, Appellate Division, 254 AD2d 110].

Police officer Richard Hogan “warned the neighbor to ‘watch her back’ and [to have] used racial slurs while in a tirade....” The court said the penalty imposed did not “shock its sense of fairness,” and sustained the commissioner’s determination.

* See Von Essen v NYC Civil Service Commission, 3 A.D.3d 115 and Von Essen v. New York City Civil Service Com'n, 4 N.Y.3d 220, concerning other, jurisdictional, aspects of the underlying disciplinary action.
NYPPL

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