Interpreting any statute, first and foremost, requires paying heed to the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the plain language of the statute
Samuelsen, as president of
Local 100, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York v New York City Tr. Auth. et al, 2012 NY Slip Op 08780, Appellate
Division, First Department
Local 100, Transport Workers Union of
Greater New York [Union] is the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of approximately 32,000 workers employed by various subordinate bodies and
affiliates of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority. One of
its component units is the New York City Transit Authority (TA).
The Manhattan and Bronx Surface
Transit Authority (MaBSTOA) was created by the Legislature in 1962 after the
City of New York seized several privately owned and operated bus lines through
its eminent domain power.*
Public Authorities Law §1203-a, in
pertinent part, provides: "[MaBSTOA] officers and employees shall not
become, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the [TA] and shall not
acquire civil service status or become members of the New York City Employees'
Retirement System" (NYCERS). Although this arrangement was originally intended to operate "for a temporary period"
(Public Authorities Law 1203-a[2]), it has continued until the present. Although the two authorities have remained
separate legal entities, they nevertheless developed, as a practical matter,
functional overlap such as sharing common office facilities and a personnel
department.
Certain differences, however, were
maintained with respect to personnel matters. For example, the terms of
employment for both TA and MaBSTOA employees were governed by a collective bargaining
agreement [CBA], with certain exceptions such as the CBA providing that any layoffs of MaBSTOA employees would occur in reverse order
of seniority, based upon date of hire. However there was no similar provision in that
agreement concerning TA workers as the layoff of TA workers was controlled by
the §§80 and 81 of the Civil Service Law. Another difference: set out in the CBA addressed “job selection.” MaBSTOA employees could pick only jobs associated with the bus
lines operated by MaBSTOA while TA employees could pick only jobs associated with
bus lines and subways operated by TA.
In December 2002, the TA and MaBSTOA
executed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Union (MOU) that
modified the CBA to provide for the consolidation of MaBSTOA and TA surface
transit operations whereby "The Authority and the Union agree to the
elimination of the artificial distinction between MaBSTOA and the Transit
Authority….” To effectuate the MOU, the
parties established a joint job pick procedure that allowed MaBSTOA and TA
employees, subject to certain limitations, to "pick into" TA jobs and
TA employees to "pick into" MaBSTOA jobs in accordance with a single,
integrated seniority list, known as the "Consolidated Seniority
List."
Asserting that this directly violates
the prohibition in Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b) against MaBSTOA
employees becoming, "for any purpose, employees of the city or of the
[TA], the Union alleged that "as a result of" the MOU and the
consolidation agreement, "employees of MaBSTOA are, for almost all
purposes, employees of [the TA]. The Union further alleged that “MaBSTOA
employees regularly work in [TA] facilities” and other than not having civil
service status or participating in a different pension system, “MaBSTOA
employees working for [TA] are for all purposes indistinguishable from [TA]
employees."
The Union sought a judgment declaring
that:
1. “No MaBSTOA employee may be treated
as an employee of the TA for any purpose, and that the MOU and consolidation
agreement are void and unenforceable to the extent that they have effectively made
employees of MaBSTOA into employees of the TA.” and
2. Prohibiting the MaBSTOA from
taking any action in accordance with the 2002 MOU and 2003 consolidation
agreement that is prohibited under the Public Authorities Law, or that
adversely affects the employment of any employee of MaBSTOA.
Supreme Court dismissed the Union’s
complaint “for failure to state a cause of action.” The Appellate Division reversed the
lower court’s ruling “on the law.”
As to Supreme Court’s finding that the
Union’s compliant “failed to state a cause of action because nothing in the MOU
or consolidation agreement indicated that MaBSTOA employees would gain civil
service status or become members of NYCERS,” the Appellate Division explained
that “[i]n interpreting any statute, we are required, first and foremost, to pay
heed to the intent of the Legislature, as reflected by the plain language of
the text,” citing Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577.
In addition, said the court,
"[i]n construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must
be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a
definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no
room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that
meaning."
Noting that a plaintiff’s pleading is
to be afforded a liberal construction, the Appellate Division held that “the
facts alleged in the complaint are to be accepted as true, and plaintiff is to
be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference,” citing Leon v
Martinez, 84 NY2d 83.
In the words of the court “… the
language we are required to interpret is as follows: ‘[MaBSTOA] officers and
employees shall not become, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the
[TA] and shall not acquire civil service status or become members of [NYCERS]’
(Public Authorities Law 1203-a[3][b]). In our view, this plainly means that
three separate prohibitions apply to MaBSTOA employees: (1) that they ‘shall
not become, for any purpose,’ employees of the TA; and (2) that they shall not
acquire civil service status; and (3) that they shall not become members of the
NYCERS. Accordingly, we agree with the Union that, to the extent that the MOU
and consolidation agreement, by merging many of the policies of the two
authorities, such as probationary employment rules, disciplinary rules, and
sick-leave rules, transform MaBSTOA employees into employees of the TA, the
agreements violate the first prohibition.”
The Appellate Division rejected the City Transit Authority’s argument that "[t]he plain and obvious meaning of the 'for any
purpose' language is to ensure that a MaBSTOA employee cannot, simply by virtue
of employment by MaBSTOA, even in a contractually agreed upon commingled work
force, acquire civil service status or membership in NYCERS."
The most glaring problem with this
interpretation, said the court, is that “it is decidedly not what the statute
says.” Rather, said the Appellate Division, “[t]he way the provision is written,
the ‘and’ creates a separation between the ‘for any purpose’ clause and the
rest of the sentence. It does not signal a modification to the ‘for any
purpose’ clause or in any way refer back to it. Furthermore, defendants'
interpretation renders the first prohibition superfluous, a result which ‘is to
be avoided,’ [citing] Matter of Branford House v Michetti, 81 NY2d 681.”
In other words, said the court,
“defendants argue that if a MaBSTOA employee cannot, under any circumstances,
be subject to the Civil Service Law or participate in NYCERS, they simply
cannot be considered TA ‘employees,’ rendering the first clause meaningless if
not considered in the manner they urge. This approach is too narrow, for it
pays no heed to the notion that different people working under the same
employer can be classified differently.”
"In other words, not every employee in an organization is similarly
situated. Here, the statute recognizes that MaBSTOA workers could become so
integrated into the TA organization that they could be seen as TA employees,
albeit without the protections of the Civil Service Law and the benefit of
NYCERS participation. We simply discern nothing in the statutory language which
confirms, as the dissent insists, that Civil Service Law protection is the distinguishing'
or hallmark' quality of TA employment."
The majority, in response to a comment
in the dissent, also observed that its approach was not in conflict with other
provisions in the Public Authorities Law that might be interpreted as
encouraging some standardization of the two agencies' operations.
Agreeing with the Union’s
interpretation of Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b), the Appellate Division
held that complaint sufficiently alleged facts establishing that the MOU and
consolidation agreement had the effect of conferring on MaBSTOA workers
qualities of "employment" by the TA, it ruled that Supreme Court
“erred in dismissing the complaint as not having stated a cause of action.”
* MaBSTOA became a subsidiary corporation of the TA.
The decision is posted on the Internet
at:
