An entity making an administrative decision should not be
permitted to create or rely upon reasons for its denial not stated at the time
of the denial should the decision be challenged
White v County of Sullivan, 2012 NY Slip Op 09131, Appellate
Division, Third Department
Supreme Court granted Earl White’s CPLR Article 78 to
partially vacate Sullivan County’s determination denying White benefits
pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c.
White, a correction officer with the Sullivan County
Sheriffs’ Department, was injured in the performance of his duties and filed
for, and received, disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c.
White’s physician subsequently cleared him to return to work in a light duty
capacity, and White began working full time as a control room officer.
Some time later White again suffered an injured in the
course of his employment and again filed for benefits pursuant to General
Municipal Law §207-c. White’s superior at the Sheriff's Department approached
him with a disability retirement application, but White refused to sign it or
related medical releases.*
The County denied White's application for General Municipal
Law §207-c benefits due to a lack of medical evidence. In response to White’s
petition challenging the County’s decision, Supreme Court, concluding that the
county's determination was arbitrary and capricious, remanded the matter and
directed the County to hold a hearing.
The Hearing Officer determined, among other things, that
White had established his eligibility to receive §207-c benefits beginning at
the time of his injury but that he was able to resume light duty work. The
Hearing Officer also found that White's eligibility for benefits ended
effective July 24, 2009 due to his refusal to cooperate with County's attempts
to file retirement paperwork on his behalf.**
The County adopted the Hearing Officer's determination.
The Sheriff, however, preferred charges of misconduct
against White pursuant to Civil Service Law §75, alleging that his refusal to
sign retirement forms constituted misconduct. The disciplinary hearing officer
found White guilty and the Sheriff adopted the hearing officer’s findings,
imposing the penalty of termination from his position effective in January
2011.
White then initiated this action, challenging [1] the
determination one denying him benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c
and [2] the Sheriff’s decision finding him guilty of misconduct and terminating
his employment. Supreme Court partially granted White’s petition, vacating the
County’s determination that White was ineligible for benefits after July 2009
and vacated Sheriff’s decision terminating White from his position.***
As to that part of White’s appeal concerning the County’s
termination of his §207-c benefits, the Appellate Division noted that Sullivan
County Local Law No. 1 (1989) vested in the County’s “insurance administrator
the exclusive authority’ to make determinations of eligibility for General
Municipal Law §207-c benefits for Sheriff's Department staff.
Noting that both State Law and Sullivan County Local Law
provided that the payment of §207-c salary benefits "shall be
discontinued" for any officer "who is permanently disabled" as a
result of the injury occurring in the performance of his or her duties if that
officer is granted a disability retirement and in the event such an officer
does not apply for a disability retirement, “the head of the police force may
apply on behalf of the officer,” citing General Municipal Law § 207-c [2] and
the relevant collective bargaining agreement with White's union, governing its
procedure for compliance with General Municipal Law §207-c” pursuant to Local
Law No. 1.
Local Law No. 1, provides that in the event the County’s
insurance administrator determines that an officer is permanently disabled, the
administrator "shall" notify [the County's] personnel officer, who
then "shall request that the [officer] make application for" a
disability retirement (Local Law No. 1 § 210). "If application for such
retirement is not made by the [officer], application therefor[] may be made by
the Sheriff or [p]ersonnel [o]fficer," again citing Local Law No. 1.
The court then explained that initially the County’s denied
White benefits based on a lack of medical proof, without mentioning
petitioner's refusal to sign retirement documents.
The Hearing Officer found that medical proof did exist,
rejecting the basis relied upon by the County for its denial of benefits.
Noting that the county “is not now challenging that finding,” said that the
County “should not be permitted to create or rely upon different reasons for
the denial that were not raised and stated at the time of that denial” and "judicial review of an administrative
determination is limited to the grounds presented by the agency at the time of
its determination."
Further, said the court, even were County permitted to rely
on White's refusal to sign retirement documents despite not having included
that reason in its denial letter, the County concedes that its personnel
officer never requested White to apply for disability retirement. Accordingly,
the Appellate Division granted that portion of White’s petition seeking the
annulment of the County’s determination finding White ineligible for General
Municipal Law §207-c benefits as of July 2009.
The Appellate Division then observed that White was entitled
to §207-c benefits beginning at the time of his injury in June 2009 but that
“No end period for those benefits has been established, as that may depend on
the outcome of the remittal regarding the Sheriff's termination of [White’s]
employment.”
* See GML §207-c.2.
** The County contended that Retirement and Social Security Law §605 provides an alternate basis upon which it could apply for retirement benefits on White's behalf, but it did not make an application pursuant to that section. See, also, GML §207-c.2.
** The County contended that Retirement and Social Security Law §605 provides an alternate basis upon which it could apply for retirement benefits on White's behalf, but it did not make an application pursuant to that section. See, also, GML §207-c.2.
*** The Appellate Division,
noting that the Sheriff was not named as a respondent in the action before
Supreme Count with respect to White’s dismissal from his position, said that
the Sheriff was a necessary party and “join the Sheriff as a respondent” in the
action. The Sheriff, however, was not a necessary party with respect to that
portion of White’s action challenging the County’s discontinuing his §207-c
benefits.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
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General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder and other disability retirement issues is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.
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