ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

March 13, 2012

Termination recommended as the penalty to be imposed on employee found guilty of theft of employer’s funds

Termination recommended as the penalty to be imposed on employee found guilty of theft of employer’s funds
NYC Department of Education v Hendricks, OATH Index #153/12

A custodian engineer [custodian] employed by the New York City Department of Education was charged with theft of funds from the custodial bank account, and fraud.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison sustained the charges based on testimony from the director of school facilities, who was the custodian’s supervisor, an investigator with the Special Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District, and documentary evidence which included copies of checks drawn against the custodial account which the custodian had issued to himself and others.

Judge Addison found that the evidence established that the employee withdrew over $17,000 from the custodial bank account for non-school expenses, including tuition fees for his children’s private school, life insurance premiums and a political contribution. The evidence revealed that the individual had forged endorsements on checks and accepted kickbacks from others he had hired.

The employee, said the ALJ, also violated the Chancellor’s regulations and the City Conflicts of Interest Law by hiring and supervising his sister. ALJ Addison noted that the funds the custodian stole were intended to enhance the learning environment of children by ensuring that the school was safe and clean.

Because a custodian has unfettered access to the custodial bank account solely for those uses, the position demands someone whose honesty is beyond reproach and who is extremely ethical. Accordingly, for the proven charges, ALJ Addison recommended that respondent be terminated from his employment.  

The decision is posted on the Internet at:   
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-153.pdf

March 12, 2012

Revised APPR Provisions New York State Teacher and Principal Evaluation 2012-13

Revised APPR Provisions New York State Teacher and Principal Evaluation 2012-13
Source: New York State Department of Education 

A Summary of revised APPR provisions captioned "New York State Teacher and Principal Evaluation 2012-13 and Beyond", and reflecting the anticipated changes resulting from enacting amendments to Education Law §3012-c proposed in February 2012 in the Executive Budget and the "Settlement of Litigation," has been posted on the Internet at:

http://engageny.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/nys-evaluation-plans-guidance-memo.pdf


N.B.: The posting states that "To the extent that the language in this memo differs from the regulatory language ultimately adopted to conform to the statute, the language in the Regulation controls."

Disclosing FMLA medical information to supervisors, human resource personnel and union representative

Disclosing FMLA medical information to supervisors, human resource personnel and union representative
Copyright © 2011. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.

Joanne Holland was employed as a nurse at the Dallas Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("Dallas VA").  She requested FMLA leave for a variety of stress-related ailments incident to her filing an EEO complaint against her supervisor, Cathy Clellan.  Holland supported her request for FMLA leave with medical documentation.  Holland made the request to Associate Director of Patient Care Services Sandra Griffin.  Griffin notified Dallas VA personnel, including McClellan, of Holland's request for FMLA leave. 

Holland had asked that Griffin not be involved with her request for FMLA leave.  It was subsequently determined that Griffin, as her immediate supervisor, had to approve of Holland's request for FMLA leave.  Holland subsequently submitted her FMLA leave request to McClellan.  Griffen held two telephonic conferences with Holland and other members of the Dallas VA staff to discuss Holland's request, which was approved. 

Holland sued, alleging that the disclosure of her medical information to McClellan and other Dallas VA personnel violated the FMLA's medical confidentially requirements of 29 CFR 825.500(g).  In relevant part, the regulation states that "[r]ecords and documents relating to certifications, recertifications or medial histories of employees or employees' family members, created for purposes of FMLA, shall be maintained as confidential medical records."   The federal district court disagreed.

The court initially noted that it is not entirely clear whether an aggrieved individual can file a civil lawsuit for violation of the medical confidentially provisions.  Assuming, without deciding that a private right of action does exist, in awarding summary judgment in favor of the Dallas VA, the court found that Holland had failed to establish a violation.  While the Dallas VA did release and discuss her medical information supporting her request for FMLA leave, the court found that such disclosure fit within the regularly exception that "[s]upervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of an employee and necessary accommodations."  29 CFR 825.500(g)(1). 

The court noted that the discussion regarding Holland's FMLA leave request was limited to McClellan, Griffin, Mariamma Kurian, Holland's second-line supervisor, Holland's Human Resource representative, Chris Seaton, and Richard Shaw, Holland's union representative.  

Mr. Bosland comments:  The decision reminds employers that FMLA medical information is confidential and should be shared only with those individuals with a legitimate need to know.  In this case, the court found that the employer had the right to share Holland's FMLA medical information with her initial and second-line supervisors and a company human resource representative in order to consider her leave request. That is, these managers and supervisors had a legitimate reason for the information.  The limited exception allowing disclosure confidential FMLA medical information would not, for example, apply in the event one of these managers and supervisors were to share the information with a colleague as idle gossip.    

Interestingly, the decision included disclosure of Holland's medical information with her union representative.  As written, the exception to the medical confidentially provisions of the FMLA include "supervisors and managers," not union officials.  Unfortunately, the decision does not address whether the union official was part of the conversation at Holland's request, which would likely be construed as a limited waiver of the FMLA's confidentiality requirements.   

Query whether an employer could disclose confidential FMLA medical information to the union over the objection of an employee without violating the FMLA?  A union may have an independent contractual and legal right to be present at a management-employee interview, and to demand relevant information for purposes of a grievance and/or to "police" the collective bargaining agreement regardless of an employee's wishes. Because of the obvious Hobson's choice facing employers - of violating the FMLA, the CBA, or federal/state labor laws by releasing or not releasing requested medical information - courts will likely permit an employer to disclose FMLA medical information to the union provided such disclosure is required by the CBA and/or labor laws. 

Needless to say, employers should exercise great care when discoursing FMLA medical information to the union even where it is required.  While it likely can't be required as a condition, the employer might ask the union to sign a confidentiality provision prior to releasing the information.  Alternatively, the employer could provide the information with a memorandum emphasizing the highly confidential nature of the information being provided and the union's need to keep the information confidential.  The employer may also want to address how the information will be stored, returned or disposed of.  The union might tell the employer that is none of their business, but at least the employer is on record of addressing the issue in the event the matter results in a jury trial.   

The union receiving the information would be well-advised to treat FMLA medical information as highly confidential.  Simply tossing the information into an unsecured grievance file would likely be a "bad" move.  While a union's mishandling of FMLA medical information secured from an employer would not give rise to an FMLA violation, it may be the basis for a costly and embarrassing lawsuit on alternative grounds.  The proper handling of confidential employee medical information, including FMLA certifications, is an area where the union and employer should seriously consider reaching agreement. 

The decisions is Holland v. Shinseki, No. 3: 10-CV-00908 B (N.D. Tex.), https://ecf.txnd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/sHWo_PUbliC_DoC?2010cv0908-55

March 09, 2012

Unsatisfactory performance of assignments does not always equate to misconduct for the purposes of disqualifying an individual for unemployment insurance benefits

Unsatisfactory performance of assignments does not always equate to misconduct for the purposes of disqualifying an individual for unemployment insurance benefits
Matter of Marc (Commissioner of Labor), 2012 NY Slip Op 01726, Appellate Division, Third Department

Andre F. Marc was employed as a head teacher but was terminated for failure to complete overdue paperwork, despite prior warnings. An Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge upheld the initial determination finding that Marc was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he had lost his employment through misconduct.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reversed that decision, concluding that Marc’s job performance, while unsatisfactory, did not rise to the level of misconduct that would disqualify him for unemployment insurance benefits.

Commenting the "Whether a claimant lost his or her employment through disqualifying misconduct presents a factual issue for the Board, and its resolution thereof will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence," the Appellate Division said that in Marc’s case the Board found that he:

1. Was only afforded a minimal period of time during the week to complete his paperwork;  

2. He did not fall significantly behind until he had to take on the additional paperwork responsibilities of a fellow employee who was on vacation; and

3. The Board noted that he still managed to complete a significant amount of the backlog prior to his termination.

Thus, said the court, while the proof of claimant's inefficiency may have justified his discharge, there is, nonetheless, substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that claimant's poor work performance did not rise to the level of misconduct.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_01726.htm

March 08, 2012

Employees served with disciplinary charges alleging time and attendance violations

Employees served with disciplinary charges alleging time and attendance violations
NYC Department of Sanitation v Alves, OATH Index #402/12
NYC Department of Corrections v Sharon Jackson-Crawford, OATH Index #2710/11

The Alves Case

OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti recommended a 47 day suspension without pay as the penalty to be imposed after finding a NYC Sanitation Department worker guilty of being AWOL on 15 occasions in about a one-year period and being habitually late in violation of Department rules.

Although the tardiness was typically less than four minutes, Judge Zorgniotti noted that the Department’s rules did not allow any “grace period” with respect to lateness. While the employee contended that clock used to record the 6:00 a.m. start time was not accurate, the ALJ said that the employee “was on notice that her timeliness was being monitored and should have synchronized her time piece to that clock.”

As to the penalty recommended, Judge Zorgniotti said although the Department seeks to terminate the individual or, in the alternative ten days for each AWOL and three to five days for each lateness, despite the employee’s very poor record, “I find that the penalty of termination is excessive under the circumstances.” Also, said the ALJ, “a suspension of 140 days would be disproportionate to the misconduct and would also be shocking to one’s sense of fairness.”

Still, the Judge agreed that a stern penalty is warranted, hence her recommendation that the employee be suspended without pay for 47 days.

The ALJ also commented that “The Department has a right to a work force that it can rely on. There can be no doubt that if [the employee] continues to have time and leave issues, [the employee] will be terminated from her employment.”


The Jackson-Crawford case


In another “time and attendance” case, Department of Corrections v Jackson-Crawford, OATH Index #2710/11, OATH Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner recommended the termination of employment of a correction officer who had spent 250 days on sick leave since September 2009.

The officer testified that the absences were due to a work-related injury. ALJ Spooner, however, found that the connection between the absences and a work-related injury was tenuous and that the number of absences violated department rules by a substantial margin. The ALJ also noted that the officer had a pattern of using excessive sick leave for a number of years, including 95 days in 2006, 199 days in 2007, and 171 sick days in 2008.

The NYS Sanitation Department decision is posted on the Internet at:

The NYC Department of Correction decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-2710.pdf


===================
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 =======================


March 07, 2012

Appeal seeking removal of interim school superintendent from that position survives his or her appointment as the school district’s superintendent of schools

Appeal seeking removal of interim school superintendent from that position survives his or her appointment as the school district’s superintendent of schools
Application of Sally Stephenson seeking the removal of the Hamburg Central School District’s Interim Superintendent of Schools and President of its Board of Education, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,330

In two separate applications, Sally Stephenson asked the Commissioner of Education to remove the Hamburg Central School District’s interim superintendent and the School District’s board president. Both appeals were consolidated for decision.

One of the issues concerned the interim superintendent’s assertions that Stephenson’s application for his removal must be denied as moot because he is no longer the interim superintendent. 

Although the Commissioner stated that he would “only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest,” he ruled that such was not the case here.

Noting that it was correct that the interim superintendent was no longer employed by the School Board as its interim superintendent, the Commissioner said that he had appointed to the position of superintendent of schools and thus is a school officer as defined in Education Law §306. Accordingly, said the Commissioner, Stephenson’s application would not be denied on this ground.

Ultimately the Commissioner dismissed both applications after finding that they had not been properly served and for other procedural reasons.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 06, 2012

A body electing to go into executive session must indicate the precise reasons for its so doing and not merely recite the statutory categories for doing so

A body electing to go into executive session must indicate the precise reasons for its so doing and not merely recite the statutory categories for doing so
Zehner v Board of Educ. of Jordan-Elbridge Cent. School Dist., 91 AD3d 1349

The basic rule is that every meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public, except that an executive session of such body may be called and business transacted thereat in accordance with Section 105 of the Public Officers Law.

An executive session is not open to the general public, but the subjects that may be discussed in such a session are limited by §105 of the Open Meetings Law.* Those set out the statute include matters involving public safety, proposed, pending or current litigation, collective bargaining, and matters concerning the appointment or employment status of a particular person.

In this instance, said the Appellate Division, Supreme Court properly determined that the School Board violated the Open Meetings Law on three occasions when it merely recited the statutory categories for going into executive session without setting forth a precise reason or reasons for doing so.

Citing Daily Gazette Co. v Town Bd., Town of Cobleskill, 111 Misc 2d 303, the Appellate Division said that §105 of the Open Meetings Law is to be strictly construed and that the “real purpose of an executive session will be carefully scrutinized.” This, court explained, was to make certain that the mandate of the Open Meetings Law would not be thwarted “by thinly veiled references to the areas delineated thereunder."

Noting that §107(5) of the Open Meetings Law provides that "costs and reasonable attorney fees may be awarded by the court, in its discretion, to the successful party," the Appellate Division said that it did not perceive any abuse of Supreme Court's discretion in awarding attorney fees to Zehner.

* Section 105 of the Public Officers Law provides that “A public body may conduct an executive session for the below enumerated purposes only, provided, however, that no action by formal vote shall be taken to appropriate public moneys:
 a. matters which will imperil the public safety if disclosed;
 b. any matter which may disclose the identity of a law enforcement agent or informer;
 c. information relating to current or future investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense which would imperil effective law enforcement if disclosed;
 d. discussions regarding proposed, pending or current litigation;
 e. collective negotiations pursuant to article fourteen of the civil service law;
 f. the medical, financial, credit or employment history of a particular person or corporation, or matters leading to the appointment, employment, promotion, demotion, discipline, suspension, dismissal or removal of a particular person or corporation;
 g. the preparation, grading or administration of examinations; and
 h. the proposed acquisition, sale or lease of real property or the proposed acquisition of securities, or sale or exchange of securities held by such public body, but only when publicity would substantially affect the value thereof.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 05, 2012

Applying an employer’s anti-fraternization policy

Applying an employer’s anti-fraternization policy
Source: Portland [Maine] Press Herald news report

OATH Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner sustained charges that a correction officer engaged in undue familiarity with an ex-inmate and made false statements about the relationship and recommended that the correction officer be dismissed. [See http://www.publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/hearing-officer-recommends-correction.html ]

The arbitrator in another “prohibited association” case came to a different conclusion and ruled that a State of Maine Bureau of Insurance insurance examiner who married a woman who worked for an insurance company should not have been terminated from his position.

According to Portland [Maine] Press Herald, the examiner told his supervisor that “he might want to date” a woman that he had noticed while performing an audit of an insurance company. His supervisor told the examiner not to socialize with the woman while he was conducting the audit. The examiner complied with his superior’s instruction but after completing the audit the examiner contacted the woman and ultimately they married.

When his supervisor directed the examiner to conduct another audit of the insurance company he declined, contending that it constitute a conflict of interest for him to do so. Ultimately Anne Head, commissioner of the Maine Department of Financial and Professional Regulation wrote the examiner, stating that "Your marriage to an insurance company manager represents a conflict of interest. As a result of this determination, your employment with the Bureau of Insurance will cease."

The arbitrator ruled that “the State did not have grounds to fire [the insurance examiner] simply because he got married.” The arbitrator found that there was no evidence that “the bureau considered any alternatives to termination, in terms of assignment of other duties.” Ruling that the examiner should not have terminated from his employment by the Bureau, the arbitrator directed that the examiner be reinstated to his former position with back pay.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedy held a bar to seeking judicial relief

Failure to exhaust administrative remedy held a bar to seeking judicial relief
Holzman v Commission on Judicial. Conduct, 2012 NY Slip Op 01577, Appellate Division, First Department

Surrogate Court Judge Lee L. Holzman sought a stay of disciplinary proceedings brought against him by the Commission on Judicial Conduct pending the resolution of the criminal prosecution of a witness to the disciplinary proceedings.

Supreme Court denied issuing the stay and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that the denial of the petition and dismissal of the proceeding was warranted because Judge Holzman had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy available to him pursuant to Judiciary Law §44(7).*

Further, said the court, Judge Holzman “has not demonstrated that doing so would be futile or that irreparable harm would occur absent judicial intervention,” commenting that the "possibility of reputational harm" claimed by Judge Holzman “does not constitute irreparable injury warranting the relief sought by him.”

* The history to date of these proceedings is posted on the Internet at:

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Confusion regarding date of return from FMLA leave decided against the employer

Confusion regarding date of return from FMLA leave decided against the employer
Copyright © 2011. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.

Carl Thom worked as a molder for American Standard for 36 years before his discharge on June 17m 2005.  Prior to his discharge, Thom requested and was approved FMLA leave for the period April 27, 2005 through June 27, 2005 for shoulder surgery.  Because his shoulder healed more quickly than anticipated, Thom submitted medical documentation indicating that he could return to work on "light duty" on May 31, and set June 13 as the date Thom could return to full duty.  American Standard denied Thom's request to return to work earlier than approved, albeit on light duty as against company policy.  Thom did not return to work on June 13.

When contacted the next day, Thom explained that he did not return to work because he was experiencing increased shoulder pain, but would return on June 27, the end date of his approved leave.  American Standard discharged Thom for unexcused absences from June 13-17.

Thom sued alleging that his discharge violated the FMLA.  The district court awarded partial summary judgment in favor of Thom on his FMLA interference claim.  Thom argued that American Standard failed to adequately notify him of its method for calculating FMLA leave because it did not notify him in writing or otherwise that company policy was to use a "rolling" method of leave rather than the calendar method. 

Under the rolling period method, the 12 weeks of leave is calculated "backward from the date an employee uses any FMLA leave.  Under this method, Thom's FMLA leave would have expired on June 13.  Under the calendar year method, Thom's leave would have extended through July 14.  The only written document Thom received from the company stated that his leave would expire on June 27.  American Standard firs notified Thom that it had accelerated his return-to-work date on June 14, a day after it had elapsed.  American Standard first notified Thom that it used the "rolling period" method for calculating the 12-month FMLA leave year after Thom filed his lawsuit.

American Standard argued that it had always used the "rolling period" method of calculating FMLA leave, and that Thom should have known this fact.  It further argued that Thom was on constructive notice through its union that the company used the rolling" method.   

The Sixth Circuit held that, even if notice to the union of the employer's method for calculating the FMLA leave-year can be imputed to an employee, that is not the case where, as here, American Standard officially approved Thom's leave through June 27- 10 work days in excess of what would have been permitted by the "rolling" method.  In short, the Court opined that "actual notice of a particular return-to-work date trumps constructive notice of another." The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court that American Standard interfered with Thom's FMLA rights.  The Court also affirmed the award of $104,354.85 in back pay, and an equal amount in attorney fees and costs.

Mr. Bosland comments: Employer's can choose one of four methods for determining the 12-month period in which the 12 or 26 weeks of must be taken: (1) calendar; (2) other fixed leave year; (3) rolling back method; and (4) measured forward method.  See 29 CFR 825.200.  Employers are also required to notify the employee of the applicable method for calculating the 12-month leave year as part of the rights and responsibilities notice.  29 CFR 825.300(c)(1).  The case reminds employers that they need to clearly notify their employees of the FMLA leave year method they have selected.  

 The case is interesting as it leaves open the possibility of imputing notice to the union of the leave year method selected to the employee. Arguably, the DOL's requirement that employer's include notice of the method of leave year calculation in the rights and responsibilities notice should foreclose the viability of such constructive notice.  Employer's would be well advised to publish clear notice of the FMLA leave year method they have selected to all employees and avoid the much riskier constructive notice argument altogether.   
  
The decision, Thom v. American Standard, Case No. 09-3507/3508  (6th cir. January 20, 2012), is posted on the Internet at: http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0016p-06.pdf

The Sixth Circuit covers Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Michigan.

March 02, 2012

Contract between State and NYSCOPBA law enforcement members ratified

Contract between State and NYSCOPBA law enforcement members ratified
Source: Office of the Governor

On March 2, 2012 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association (NYSCOPBA) President Donn Rowe announced the ratification of the contract between the state and NYSCOPBA law enforcement membership. The contract was ratified by NYSCOPBA members by a vote of 996 to 62.

The contract includes zero percent wage increases for 2011-2013, ensures protections against layoffs, and offers health benefits commensurate with other state bargaining units. The contract provides for a 2% increase in both 2014 and 2015, 9 days of deficit reduction leave, and adjustments to the health insurance premium.

"The contract that was overwhelmingly ratified by NYSCOPBA ensures competitive benefits and protects the jobs of New Yorkers in law enforcement, all while helping to secure the financial future of our state," Governor Cuomo said. "By continuing to work together, we will emerge from these difficult financial times with a stronger New York. I congratulate NYSCOPBA for the success of the contract ratification and I thank President Rowe for his leadership."

Donn Rowe, President, New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), said, "Our law enforcement members perform some of the most dangerous jobs in New York, and they have never asked for more than their fair share. The overwhelming vote in favor of this contract clearly shows that these members also recognize New York's fiscal situation. Governor Cuomo deserves credit for acknowledging the difficult job our law enforcement members have and the valuable service they perform for the public everyday."

NYSCOPBA represents over 26,000 New York State employees and retirees from the Security Services Unit. The contract applies to law enforcement members who are not eligible for arbitration.

The agreement follows the pattern of contracts negotiated over the past year and includes:
· Zero percent wage increases for 2011-2013, a 2% increase in both 2014 and 2015
· The agreement includes 3% and 4% wage increases for 2009-2010, the same pattern as other units; these increases were previously reserved for in the state financial plan
· A $1,000 retention bonus paid out $775 in the third year and $225 in the fourth year
· Deficit Reduction Leave of five days this fiscal year and four days next fiscal year, saving $4.3 million; the total deduction for the days comes from the retro pay for 2009-11
· Employees will be repaid the value of 4 days in equal installments starting at the end of the contract term
· Retroactive payments that are scheduled to be paid in two installments next fiscal year
· A 2% increase in health insurance premium contributions for Grade 9 employees and below, making the share 12% for individuals and 27% for family premiums; and 6% increase for Grade 10 employees and above, making the share 16% for individuals and 31% for family premiums
· A health plan opt-out so officers can opt-out through a spouse/partner to a non-state health plan
· All changes to health benefits, including premium shifts, will save $8.2 million over the contract period and $2 million annually after 2016
· A labor/management committee to review all leave taken by officers, including annual, personal, sick, workers compensation, and the manner of such use; recommendations will be made to the President of NYSCOPBA and the GOER Director for implementation
· Officers will receive broad layoff protection; workforce reductions due to management decisions to close or restructure facilities authorized by legislation, SAGE recommendations, or material or unanticipated changes in the state's fiscal circumstances are not covered by this limitation

If there is no statutory, constitutional or public policy bar to arbitrating a contract grievance, the arbitrator decides whether the grievance is arbitrable

If there is no statutory, constitutional or public policy bar to arbitrating a contract grievance, the arbitrator decides whether the grievance is arbitrable
Mariano v Town of Orchard Park, 2012 NY Slip Op 01026, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Supreme Court denied the Town of Orchard Park's motion to stay the arbitration of a grievance filed by the Orchard Park Police Benevolent Association [PBA] that alleged that the Town’s changing health care coverage for retired Town police officers was a violation of the relevant collective bargaining agreement.

In opposing the PBA's motion to compel arbitration of a grievance it had filed on behalf of the affected retired members; the Town argued that as the retired members were no longer members of the PBA they had no right to file a grievance, much less seek to arbitrate the grievance.

Supreme Court denied the Town’s cross-motion to stay the arbitration and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court decision.

The Appellate Division said that when determining whether a claim is arbitrable in the public sector, courts must conduct a two-step inquiry.

First, a court must determine "whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance." If it decides that there is no such bar, the court then determines if the parties agreed, by the terms of their particular arbitration clause, to refer their dispute to arbitration.

Finding that the question had passed the first test, the court, in applying the second test, held that the fact that the retirees are not members of the PBA or represented by it in collective bargaining negotiations “is not determinative in a threshold arbitrability analysis.”

Rather, said the court, “issues concerning the PBA's relationship to retired employees, issues concerning whether retirees are covered by the grievance procedure, and issues concerning whether the clauses of the contract support the grievance are matters involving the scope of the substantive contractual provisions and, as such, are for the arbitrator” to determine.

Commenting that New York's public policy encourages arbitration of labor disputes involving public employees, the Appellate Division decided that Supreme Court “ did not err in granting [the Union’s] cross motion to compel arbitration.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Return to work evaluations and Civil Service Law Section 72 Due Process procedures

Return to work evaluations and Civil Service Law Section 72 Due Process procedures
Source: New York State Department of Civil Service

The New York State Department of Civil Service has issued its Advisory Memorandum #12-01 which addresses processing employees seeking to return from leaves of absences not related to injury or disease incurred on the job [Workers' Compensation Leave situations] in consideration of the recent ruling by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Sheeran v New York State Dept.of Transp., 18 NY3d 61, [Decided with Birnbaum v NYS Department of Labor].


 ============================================

The Department of Civil Service’s advisory reads as follows:

To: Department and Agency Personnel, Human Resources Directors
From: Mark F. Worden, Acting Counsel
Subject: Return to Work Evaluations and Civil Service Law Section 72 Due Process Procedures
==============================
On November 17, 2011, the New York State Court of Appeals decided two cases, Sheeran v. New York State Department of Transportation, and Birnbaum v. New York State Department of Labor (__NY3d __) which held that the procedural safeguards provided in Civil Service Law (CSL) section 72 apply when an employee who is voluntarily on leave due to personal illness is prevented from returning to work by the appointing authority. The Court held that a refusal to allow the employee to return to work converts a voluntary leave to an involuntary leave, which requires the appointing authority to follow the procedures under CSL section 72. Accordingly, all appointing authorities must review their return to work procedures to ensure that they are consistent with these Court of Appeals decisions and the following guidance.

Appointing authorities may continue to have any employee seeking to return to work from a voluntary leave due to personal illness evaluated by the Employees Health Service (EHS) to verify the employee's fitness for duty, consistent with section 21(e) of the Attendance Rules, the applicable collective bargaining agreements and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). (*An employee seeking to return to duty from an approved FMLA leave may be prevented from returning to work only in exceptional circumstances. Please refer to your FMLA guidance).

If a return to work evaluation results in a recommendation from EHS that the employee is not fit to return to duty and the appointing authority determines that it will seek to place the employee on an involuntary leave, the appointing authority must send that employee written notice that the agency proposes to place him or her on involuntary leave under CSL section 72(1) and the employee must be allowed to return to work pending a hearing on the issue of fitness for duty. Unless there is probable cause to believe that returning the employee to duty would represent a potential danger to persons or property or would severely interfere with agency operations, consistent with section 72(5), the employee must be returned to duty.

It is essential that any employee denied a return to duty pending a hearing be provided with written notice that such action is being taken pursuant to CSL section 72(5) and notified of the reasons for such action.

The effect of these court decisions is to give an employee seeking to return from a voluntary leave for illness or injury the same due process rights as an employee who is at work and referred for a section 72 evaluation by the appointing authority.

Appointing authorities should follow the procedures, as outlined below:

A. Written notice to employee of agency intent to place employee on involuntary §72 leave based on the determination of EHS that the employee is unfit to perform the duties of his or her position. Notice should include the employee's right to return to work pending a hearing on the issue of unfitness for duty (or that the agency will keep the employee out of work pursuant to CSL §72(5) if there is probable cause to believe that a return to duty would pose a potential danger or disrupt agency operations); served in person or by first class, registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.


B. Agency provides EHS with copy of the written notice to the employee. EHS provides agency with all data supporting certification of unfitness (diagnoses, test results, observations, etc.) which must be transmitted to employee or representative.


C. Due process hearing conducted by mutually agreed upon independent hearing officer. (If parties are unable to agree, the hearing officer must be selected by lot from a list established by the Department of Civil Service.) Employee has right to be represented by counsel or recognized employee organization and may present medical experts and other witnesses. Burden of proof is on person alleging unfitness. Technical rules of evidence shall not be followed. Record of hearing and recommendations to be provided to employee and to agency. Upon request, employee is to be given free copy of transcript.

Must be afforded within 30 calendar days of employee's receipt of notice.
D. Written notice to employee of agency's final decision with notice of right to appeal to Civil Service Commission.
Within 10 working days of receipt of hearing officer's report, * but no later than 75 calendar days from receipt of appeal.

E. Pursuant to CSL section 72(5), involuntary leave begins upon employee's receipt of notice if section 72(5) is invoked.


The following is a Sample Notice for use in such situations. This may be modified to fit the particular circumstances applicable to any specific case:

Sample Notice of Conversion to Involuntary Leave for Ordinary Disability

Dear _________

EHS) has advised that, in their opinion, you are not fit to perform the essential duties of your position. Accordingly, pursuant to section 72 of the Civil Service Law, this agency proposes to convert your present leave status to an involuntary leave based on the results of such medical evaluation(s). We propose to convert your leave to an involuntary leave effective on (date at least 10 working days from service of the Notice).

You have the right to object to this proposed involuntary leave and are entitled to request a hearing to contest this determination. If you object to the proposed leave, you also have the right to be immediately returned to duty pending the hearing and a final determination. You have the right to be represented at the hearing by an attorney or a representative of a recognized employee organization. To object, request a hearing and be immediately returned to duty, you must apply in writing to this office at (ADDRESS, PHONE#) within 10 working days of receiving this letter. A copy of the medical report on which this determination is based will be forwarded to you or your representative if you file a timely objection. (ANY OTHER RECORDS ON WHICH A REFUSAL TO RESTORE TO DUTY WAS BASED SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED).

As required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New York State Human Rights Law (HRL), it is policy of this agency to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified employee with a disability. If you are an individual with a disability as defined by the HRL, you may be entitled to an accommodation to enable you to perform the essential duties of your position. If you believe you would be able to perform the duties of your position with a reasonable accommodation, please contact this office at the address noted above for an application for requesting such an accommodation or for further information concerning the ADA or the HRL.

A copy of Civil service Law section 72 is attached for your information. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office at - ADDRESS -, - PHONE.

(Note: If an appointing authority proposes to place the employee on an immediate involuntary leave pursuant to CSL section 72(5), the notice must be altered to comply with that provision).

In addition to this update to the SPMM, the Department will be modifying the Attendance and Leave Manual to reflect the changes resulting from these Court decisions. If you have any questions regarding the new procedures, please feel free to contact the Attendance and Leave Unit of the Department of Civil Service at (518) 457-2295.

March 01, 2012

Employee found to have violated employer's domiciliary policy terminated

Employee found to have violated employer's domiciliary policy terminated
Adrian v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 2012 NY Slip Op 01293, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Roxanne Adrian sued to annul the School Board’s determination terminating her employment with Niagara Falls City School District based on her failure to comply with the District's residency policy. The District’s policy required District employees to be domiciliaries of the City of Niagara Falls.

The Appellate Division vacated Supreme Court’s granting Adrian’s petition, stating that . “it is well established that a "domicile means living in [a] locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home. "

The court said that the evidence presented to the Board was sufficient to establish that Adrian was not a domiciliary of the City but rather was domiciled in Williamsville.

The evidence considered by the Board included proof that Adrian maintained a phone line at the Williamsville residence but not at the Niagara Falls residence that Department of Motor Vehicles records indicated that she lived at the Williamsville address.*

The court also noted that “a surveillance company observed petitioner on six separate occasions, during different time periods, and found that [Adrian] she never went to the Niagara Falls residence and always left from and returned to the Williamsville residence.

While Adrian submitted some evidence “demonstrating that the Niagara Falls residence may have been her domicile” such as her voter registration card, rent payment receipts, driver's license and cable statements, that evidence was not so overwhelming as to support Supreme Court's determination granting Adrian’s petition.

The Appellate Division, citing O’Connor v Board of Education, Niagara Falls City School District, 48 AD3d 1254, leave to appeal dismissed 10 NY3d 928, also rejected Adrian’s claim the District improperly failed to conduct a hearing before terminating her, explaining that such a hearing was not required by law.

In Gigliotti v Bianco, 82 AD3d 1636, the court said that assuming that the District had provided Gigliotti with an opportunity, in contrast to a hearing, to show that the educator satisfied the District’s requirement regarding domicile, the court disagreed with the District’s conclusion that Gigliotti was not domiciled in Niagara Falls.

Significantly, the court commented that although the District did not conduct a hearing before terminating Gigliotti’s employment, such a hearing was not "required by statute or law," citing Colton v Berman, 21 NY2d 322

Typically courts have viewed employees who lack required licenses as being “unqualified,” in contrast to being “incompetent,” to perform the duties of the position. In
Adrian failing to meet the school district’s domiciliary requirements apparently was similarly viewed.

* Although an individual may have, and maintain, a number of different residences simultaneously, he or she can have, and maintain, only one domicile at a given time. New York courts and the Department of Education have consistently interpreted residence as akin to domicile. Domicile requires bodily presence in a place with an intent to make it a fixed and permanent home (Matter of Newcomb, 192 NY 238 at 250 [1908]

The Adrian decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_01293.htm

Town Law’s shorter statute of limitation to bring an Article 78 action challenging an adverse disciplinary determination trumps longer Civil Service Law’s statute of limitations

Town Law’s shorter statute of limitation to bring an Article 78 action challenging an adverse disciplinary determination trumps longer Civil Service Law’s statute of limitations
Robida v Ziemba, 2012 NY Slip Op 01041, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Town of Cheektowaga police officer David K. Robida was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to both Civil Service Law §75 and Town Law §155. A hearing was held in accordance with those statutes.

Ultimately the Town Board adopted a resolution that terminated Robida pursuant to Town Law §155.

Town Law §155 specifically provides that a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination pursuant to the statute must be commenced within 30 days of the determination; §76 of the Civil Service Law provides that such a proceeding must be commenced within four months after the determination becomes final. *

The Appellate Division said that it was undisputed that Robida commenced his action more than 30 days after the Town Board's determination. Accordingly, said the court, “it is time-barred.”

The court rejected Robida’s argument that the time limits set out in §75 controlled and thus his petition was timely, ruling that “the 30-day limitations period set forth in Town Law §155 is not limited to those disciplinary proceedings that were brought solely pursuant thereto.”

The Appellate Division explained that the statute of limitations for a CPLR Article 78 proceeding pursuant to which Robida sought to annul th Board's determination is governed by CPLR §217(1), which provides that, "u]nless a shorter time is provided in the law authorizing the proceeding," the proceeding must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final.

As in this instance the "shorter time" was set out in Town Law §155, which authorized the disciplinary proceeding, Robida was required to file his petition challenging the Town’s determination within 30 days of the Board's decision becoming final.

* §76.1 of the Civil Service Law provides that an appeal from an adverse disciplinary decision made pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law may be made to the civil service commission having jurisdiction within twenty days after service of written notice of the determination to be reviewed or in accordance with the provisions of Article 78 of the CPLR. An even shorter statute of limitations is set out in §3020-a.5 of the Education Law for appealing a disciplinary arbitration decision pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR – 10 days. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_01041.htm

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