Exhausting administrative remedies

Exhausting administrative remedies
Ross v Blake, USSC, Docket No. 15-339

This decision by the United States Supreme Court considered an appeal involving the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act [PLRA], 42 USC 1997e(a) requirement that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s “unwritten 'special circumstances’ exception” to the exhaustion of administrative remedy as being inconsistent with the text and history of the PLRA,” explaining that “[m]andatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA foreclose judicial discretion.”*

Of special interest to public employers and employees not operating in a penal environment was the Supreme Court’s observation that “that there are certain circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not available.”

The court then provided the following examples of an administrative procedure being illusory or unavailable:

1. Where the procedure operates as a dead end;

2. Where the appointing authority or the employee organization is unable or consistently unwilling to provide relief;

3. Where the administrative scheme is so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use; and

4. Where a grievance process is rendered unavailable should an appointing authority thwarts the employee from taking advantage of it through misrepresentation, or intimidation. 

Courts, as a general rule, will not consider lawsuits filed by public employees protesting some administrative determination unless the individual has exhausted his or her administrative remedies. The major exception to this rule: any attempt to exhaust the available administrative remedy would constitute an exercise in futility. Typically the courts apply this exception when it is decided that the administrative decision "is a foregone conclusion."

The exhaustion rule, however, is not inflexible and need not be followed where an agency's action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power [Watergate II Apartments v Buffalo Sewer, 46 NY2d 52] or where it is alleged that the administrative agency or process followed by the administrative agency violates the individual's constitutional rights to due process [Levine v Board of Education, 173 A.D.2d 619].

However, questions involving proper statutory interpretation and the reasonable interpretation of an agency's own regulations must first be raised within the agency's own administrative review process before being presented to the courts [Crumb v Broadnax, 178 A.D.2d 781].

An employee’s withdrawnal of his or her grievance has the effect of exhausting his or her administrative remedy. [Vega v Department of Correctional Services, 186 A.D.2d 340].

In Wilbur v Town of Rockland, 53 F.3d 542, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, said an employee suing the Town for alleged violations of her freedom of association under the First Amendment pursuant to 42 USC 1983 was not required to exhaust her state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to commencing a federal action, the general rule being that federal courts may not require exhaustion of administrative remedies as a "condition precedent" to 42 USC 1983 litigation.

From time to time courts are asked to settle questions about which officials or bodies have "primary jurisdiction" and should be turned to first to resolve employment disputes. In Hessney v Tarrytown Public Schools, 228 A.D.2d 954, we learn that the Commissioner of Education "is uniquely suited" to resolve questions concerned with the similarity of the duties of teaching positions and failing to initially submit the issue to him could be fatal to an individual's claim.

In any event, in cases in which the employee is alleged to have failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedy,” the employee typically has the burden of proving his or her seeking a judicial remedy falls within the ambit of one or more of the “exceptions to the rule,” frequently a difficult task.

* The court explained that PLRA contains its own, textual exception to mandatory exhaustion. Under §1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the "availab[ility]" of administrative remedies. Thus there must exhaust available remedies, but one need not exhaust unavailable ones.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://casetext.com/case/ross-v-blake

Selected reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending June 11, 2016

Selected reports issued by the Office of the State Comptroller during the week ending June 11, 2016

Click on text highlighted in color to access the entire report

New YorkState Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following audits have been issued:

City University of New York (CUNY): Medgar Evers College: Controls Over Bank Accounts (2015-S-92)

CUNY officials provided auditors with a list of 24 bank accounts at Medgar Evers. Fourteen accounts were opened after CUNY’s bank authorization policy was established in 2008. However, CUNY did not have any of the required notification forms for these accounts. Additionally, auditors found an additional two accounts that were not on the list. These findings point to weaknesses in the monitoring of bank accounts, which increase the risk that college personnel could conduct transactions using unauthorized accounts. Of 54 payments (totaling $810,608) paid from six selected bank accounts, 26 (totaling $118,782) were either improper or were unsupported. 

Higher Education Services Corporation: Tuition Assistance Program Wagner College (2015-T-3)

Auditors determined Wagner was overpaid $97,947 because school officials incorrectly certified students as eligible for state financial aid awards. Incorrect certifications include eight students who received awards but had not met the good academic standing requirements and three students who were not enrolled at Wagner for the semesters in question. 

Higher Education Services Corporation: Tuition Assistance Program at Vaughn College (2015-T-6)

Vaughn's certification procedures for state financial aid substantially complied with the governing law and regulations. Auditors found that of the 50 awards tested, only two (totaling $3,945) were certified in error. As such, auditors concluded there is a low risk that a significant number of students certified for state financial aid were not eligible for awards. 

Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS): Contracted Programs With Puerto Rican Organization to Motivate, Enlighten and Serve Addicts Inc. (PROMESA) (2015-S-24)

Auditors found that despite two relatively recent audits by OASAS, claims submitted by PROMESA for the two years ended June 30, 2014 continued to include costs that were not valid or consistent with state guidelines. PROMESA reported about $23 million in costs associated with contracted OASAS programs during the period. The audit examined about $9 million of these expenses and identified problems with over 90 percent – $8.2 million. 

Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services (OASAS): Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program: Provider Claiming of Depreciation Expenses (2015-S-84) 
OASAS is not effectively monitoring Drug and Alcohol Treatment program contracts to ensure provider claims do not include state reimbursement for depreciation expenses. Auditors found providers inappropriately claimed $2.7 million in depreciation expenses, of which $2.2 million was funded by OASAS. Also, OASAS could potentially use the remaining $454,238 for inappropriate increases to providers’ future program budgets. 

Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation (OPRHP): Controls Over Cash Advance Accounts (Follow-Up) (2016-F-3)

An initial audit report issued in December 2014 found OPRHP advance accounts received little scrutiny and made recommendations to improve internal controls over these accounts. In a follow-up report, auditors determined the agency made significant progress in correcting the problems identified in the initial report. Of the eight prior audit recommendations, seven have been implemented and one recommendation has not been implemented. 

State Education Department (SED): League for the Handicapped, Compliance with the Reimbursable Cost Manual (2015-S-89)

For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, auditors identified $4,354 in costs that were charged to the preschool special education programs that did not comply with SED’s requirements for reimbursement. The non-reimbursable costs included insufficiently documented expenses, costs for services that were not directly related to the programs, unallowable working capital interest and credit card late fees.

State University of New York (SUNY): Compliance With Payment Card Industry Standards (2015-S-65)

SUNY schools were generally knowledgeable about PCI compliance and the need to protect credit card data from unauthorized access; however, auditors identified areas where system and data controls need to be improved to meet certain compliance standards. Among a range of issues, auditors identified weaknesses in the completeness of the systems’ component inventories, network segmentation, the resolution of compliance deficiencies and the oversight of affiliated campus organizations. 

State University of New York Downstate Medical Center: Review of Collecto Inc. (2016-BSE4-02)

Auditors examined Downstate contracts with Collecto for debt collection services. Under the $2.5 million contract, Downstate pays Collecto various commission rates based on the amount collected by account type and size. Of the $29,288 examined, auditors found overpayments of $14,355 and additional potential overpayments of $2,664. The remaining $12,269 was appropriate and properly supported.

Department of Taxation and Finance: Personal Income Tax Refunds (2015-1A-001)

The department processes all New York state personal income tax returns. During the audit period, the department processed almost 7.5 million refunds totaling over $8.6 billion. From this population, auditors examined 31,978 refunds totaling almost $516.5 million. Of those, auditors identified and returned 11,469 questionable refunds totaling about $53.3 million.

New York’s Freedom of Information Law does not permit the custodian of the records to routinely charge for employee time spent searching for documents responsive to a FOIL request

New York’s Freedom of Information Law does not permit the custodian of the records to routinely charge for employee time spent searching for documents responsive to a FOIL request

Ripp v Town of Oyster Bay, 2016 NY Slip Op 04226, Appellate Division, Second Department

In a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to compel the production of certain documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law Article 6) [FOIL], the Town of Oyster Bay [Town], appealed that part of the Supreme Court decision that barred the Town requiring the petitioner, Robert O. Ripp, to prepay certain estimated costs as a condition of producing the requested documents for inspection.

Ripp had requested that the Town make certain documents available for inspection pursuant to FOIL. The Town conditioned the disclosure of the documents upon Ripp prepaying $1,920 to cover the estimated costs associated with producing the documents.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s order explaining that:

1. FOIL requires state and municipal agencies to make available for public inspection and copying all records, subject to certain exemptions;

2. Where an agency conditions disclosure upon the prepayment of costs or refuses to disclose records except upon prepayment of costs, it has the burden of "articulating a particularized and specific justification" for the imposition of those fees;

3. The agency must demonstrate that the fees to be imposed are specifically authorized by the cost provisions of FOIL; and

4. The custodian of the records must meet this burden "in more than just a plausible fashion."

In this case the Appellate Division found that the Town had failed to satisfy these requirements, noting that the only evidence in the record justifying the imposition of costs was a letter to Ripp stating that it would take a Town employee a minimum of eight weeks, at $240 per week, to review 2,500-3,000 files to identify the records available for inspection.

While an agency may charge for employee time spent extracting or segregating data from an electronic database, the court distinguished electronic “records” from “hardcopy” records and explained that FOIL does not permit an agency to charge for employee time spent searching for paper documents.*

The Appellate Division opined that the Town had failed to demonstrate that the prepayment costs it demanded were properly based upon employee time related to retrieving electronic files, rather than a manual search of hard copies for which the Town's recoupment costs are limited to 25¢ per photocopy.**

Accordingly, said the court, the Supreme Court properly directed the Town to make the paper records or documents sought available for Ripp’s inspection without the prepayment of the estimated costs.

* Weslowski v Vanderhoef, 98 AD3d 1123, provides a comprehensive review of the elements involved in the custodian of the records lawfully requiring payments attributed to complying with a FOIL request.

**The person requesting the documents may avoid this $.25 per page charge by simply inspecting the documents "on site" rather than ordering photocopies of the documents of interest.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04226.htm

If an employee engaged in repeated acts constituting disloyalty to the employer, forfeiture of compensation and benefits is warranted under the Faithless Servant Doctrine

If an employee engaged in repeated acts constituting disloyalty to the employer, forfeiture of compensation and benefits is warranted under the Faithless Servant Doctrine

City of Binghamton v Whalen, 2016 NY Slip Op 04289, Appellate Division, Third Department

John C. Whalen had been employed by the City of Binghamton[City] as its Director of Parks and Recreation and, in that capacity, was entrusted with the collection of various fees and funds on behalf of the City. In April 2014, Whalen pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the third degree, admitting that he stole more than $50,000 from the City between January 2007 and November 2012.

The City subsequently sued Whalen seeking [1] to recover all compensation it had paid to him during the period of the theft and [2] a judicial declaration that it is under no obligation to furnish him with health insurance earned through his employment. The City moved for summary judgment in its favor.

Supreme Court granted the City’s summary judgment on the issue of liability. However Supreme Court concluded that in view of Whalen’s “otherwise ‘unblemished’ 35 years of service to [the City]" and notwithstanding his over a half a "decade of thievery," there were issues of fact raised as to whether forfeiture of compensation was warranted under the faithless servant doctrine. The City appealed.

The Appellate Division said the Supreme Court’s ruling that there were issues of fact to be considered with respect to the faithless servant doctrine was error and ruled that the City was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of damages and a declaration that it is relieved of its obligation to provide Whalen with health insurance benefits.

The court explained that New York law with respect to the disloyal or faithless performance of employment duties has developed for well over a century and, citing Western Elec. Co. v Brenner, 41 NY2d 291, said that "an employee is to be loyal to his [or her] employer and is 'prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent with his [or her] agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty in the performance of his [or her] duties.'" 

In the words of the Appellate Division, “[u]nder what is commonly referred to as the faithless servant doctrine, ‘[o]ne who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal and who is faithless in the performance of his [or her] services is generally disentitled to recover his [or her] compensation, whether commissions or salary.’ Thus, where an employee ‘engage[s] in repeated acts of disloyalty, complete and permanent forfeiture of compensation, deferred or otherwise, is warranted.’"*

Clearly there was no dispute that Whalen’s admission to stealing more than $50,000 from the City over the course of a nearly six-year period constitutes conclusive proof of such facts and established the City's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of Whalen's liability. Further, said the Appellate Division, “[t]he Court of Appeals has made clear that forfeiture of compensation is required even when some or all of ‘the services were beneficial to the principal or [when] the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity by the agent.’"

Thus, said the Appellate Division, what Supreme Court characterized as Whalen's “exemplary performance of his duties when he was not stealing from [the City] does not insulate him from the application of the faithless servant doctrine” with respect to his  persistent pattern of disloyalty over the six-year period during which he stole from the City.

As to the damages claimed by the City, it submitted documentary evidence establishing that it paid Whalen $316,535.54 in compensation between January 2007 and November 2012, and Whalen failed to submit any competent proof to dispute that figure. Accordingly, the Appellate Division awarded the City damages in the amount of $316,535.54 and declared that the City was relieved of its obligation to provide Whalen health insurance benefits earned through his employment.

* See William Floyd Union Free School Dist. v Wright, 61 AD3d 856.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04289.htm

An eligible list found to be invalid prior to its "expiration" had no legal existence and thus it could not have "expired," permitting the establishment of a "corrected' list"

An eligible list found to be invalid prior to its "expiration" had no legal existence and thus it could not have "expired," permitting the establishment of a "corrected' list"

Crociata v Cassano, 2016 NY Slip Op 04212, Appellate Division, Second Department

New York City Fire Commissioner Salvatore J. Cassano declining to promote Anthony L. Crociata to the rank of Fire Marshal. Crociata sued the Commissioner and Supreme Court ordered that Crociata’s name be placed “on a special eligible list for promotion to the rank of Fire Marshal” and that that he be reconsider for such promotion.

In response to Cassano’s appeal of the Supreme Court's ruling the Appellate Division vacated the lower court's order and dismissed the proceeding in its entirety.

Although noting that “[t]he only available remedy to a Civil Service examinee who is determined to have been improperly passed over for an appointment or promotion is a judicial direction for reconsideration,” the court said that in this instance the relief awarded by the Supreme Court -- directing Cassano to reconsider Crociata’s application for promotion -- was improper, as the eligible list on which his name had appeared had expired by operation of law.

The court explained that although Crociata had commenced his lawsuit before the date on which the list had expired, “he failed to adequately allege that the list itself was constitutionally invalid,” citing Pena v NYC Civil Service Commission, 27 AD3d 293. 

In the Pena case the Appellate Division found that Pena had not challenge the validity of the original eligible list, but sought to have her name placed on a "special list," pursuant to Civil Service Law §56(3).* However, said that court, “in order to be placed on a special eligible list, [Pena] was required first to successfully challenge the validity of the list itself prior to its expiration."

The Pena court, citing City of New York v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 93 NY2d 768, said that only if Pena’s challenge to the list itself was successful would she have a remedy that comports with Article V, §6 of the New York State Constitution, in that the original list would have had no legal existence and thus could not have expired, allowing for extension of a 'corrected' list.”

In Crociata’s situation the court held that Supreme Court “erred in directing [Cassano] to place [Crociata’s] name on a special eligible list for promotion to the rank of fire marshal and reconsider him for such promotion. 

* Civil Service Law §56.3 addresses situations where the individual was disqualified and such disqualification has been reversed, or the individual's rank order on an eligible list has been adjusted, as the result of an administrative or judicial action or proceeding. In contrast, Civil Service Law §56.4 is triggered where a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that an eligible list is invalid and provides that the court may order the creation of a special eligible list having a duration of not less than one nor more than four years commencing at the time the corrected list is published.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04212.htm

Responding to a Freedom of Information Law request by neither confirming nor denying the existence of such information or data

Responding to a Freedom of Information Law request by neither confirming nor denying the existence of such information or data

Abdur-Rashid v New York City Police Dept., 2016 NY Slip Op 04318, Appellate Division, First Department 
Samir Hashmi v New York City Police Department, et al., 2016 NY Slip Op 04318, Appellate Division, First Department

A governmental agency’s response to a Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] request stating it would “neither confirm nor deny” it had information concerning focus of the FOIL request in its possession is characterized as a “Glomar response” -- the Central Intelligence Agency’s response to a FOIL request for information concerning the activities of the Glomar Explorer, a salvage vessel allegedly built at the request of the CIA in an effort to salvage a sunken submarine.

Supreme Court denied the petition brought by Talib W. Abdur-Rashid pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking to compel the New York City Police Department [Department] to disclose documents requested pursuant to FOIL. The Department's response to Abdur-Rashid's FOIL request was that it "would neither confirm nor deny" such records or documents existed. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling.*

The Appellate Division explained that FOIL does not prohibit the Department from giving a Glomar response to a FOIL request where, as here, the Department "has shown that such confirmation or denial would cause harm cognizable under a FOIL exception."

Citing Hanig v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehicles., 79 NY2d 106, the court said that although Abdur-Rashid contends that a “Glomar response is impermissible in the absence of express statutory authorization," the Glomar Doctrine is "consistent with the legislative intent and with the general purpose and manifest policy underlying FOIL,” as it allows an agency to safeguard information that falls under a FOIL exemption.

Addressing the Supreme Court's ruling in Samir Hashmi v New York City Police Department,** the Appellate Division, after considering the differences between the two statutes identified by the Hashmi court,  concluded that they do not justify rejecting the Glomar doctrine in the context of FOIL.

The Appellate Division noted that while federal case law regarding FOIA is not binding on it, it is "instructive" when interpreting FOIL provisions and the application of the Glomar doctrine to FOIA requests has been widely approved by federal circuit courts. 

Further, said the court, the Department met it burden to "articulate particularized and specific justification" for declining to confirm or deny the existence of the requested records. In this instance the records sought information related to Department investigations and surveillance activities, including showing that answering the inquiries “would cause harm cognizable under the law enforcement and public safety exemptions of Public Officers Law §87(2).”

The Appellate Division, referring to Wilner et al,v NSA,*** then cautioned that by its ruling in these two actions it was not suggesting that any FOIL request for Department records would justify a Glomar response, opining that "An agency resisting disclosure of the requested records has the burden of proving the applicability of [a FOIL] exemption" and must submit "a detailed affidavit showing that the information logically falls within the claimed exemptions" and "the basis for [the agency's] claim that it can be required neither to confirm nor to deny the existence of the requested records."

* The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, on the law, the same Supreme Court’s denial of the Department’s motion to dismiss the Article 78 petition filed by Samir Hashmi seeking to compel it to disclose documents requested by Hashmi pursuant to FOIL and to submit an answer to the petition.

**See Samir Hashmi, et al v New York City Police Department, 46 Misc 3d 712, 722-724

*** USCA, Second Circuit, Docket No. 08-4726-cv, [Petition for writ of certiorari denied, US Supreme Court]

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04318.htm

A General Municipal Law §207-a(2) salary supplement becomes payable by the employer upon a firefighters retirement with accidental or line of duty disability benefits

A General Municipal Law §207-a(2) salary supplement becomes payable by the employer upon a firefighters retirement with accidental or line of duty disability benefits

Masullo v City of Mount Vernon, 2016 NY Slip Op 04225, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Fire Commissioner of the City of Mount Vernon adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer, made after a hearing, and denied disabled firefighter Michael Masullo’s application for supplemental salary benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(2).

Masullo appealed the City’s action and Supreme Court held that Masullo was obligated to submit an application in the manner prescribed by the City of Mount Vernon and City of Mount Vernon Fire Department for §207-a(2) salary supplement payments and that the eligibility review process imposed by the City of Mount Vernon and City of Mount Vernon Fire Department was not improper. Masullo appealed the Supreme Court’s determination.

The Appellate Division overturned the Supreme Court’s decision, essentially holding that the language in §207-a(2) providing for supplemental salary payments to a firefighter retired on accidental or line of duty disability retirement mandates such payments upon the retirement of the firefighter because of such disability and is initiated by operation of law. Thus no “procedure” or “request” to grant or obtain such payments involving the employer appears to be required.

In the words of the Appellate Division, “General Municipal Law §207-a(2) guarantees the payment of benefits to a firefighter who is permanently disabled in the line of duty, including the continued payment of the firefighter's regular salary until the mandatory retirement age, less certain amounts received from other sources.”

The court noted that Masullo’s appeal “presents an issue of first impression for this Court: whether the provisions of General Municipal Law §207-a(2) authorize a municipality to terminate permanent disability retirement benefits previously awarded to a firefighter pursuant to that subsection, and require the firefighter to submit a formal application for those benefits pursuant to an application procedure that was adopted by the municipality subsequent to the firefighter's retirement.”

The court ruled that “a municipality is not authorized to terminate such previously awarded §207-a(2) benefits or require the submission of a formal application for such benefits after the firefighter has retired, as this essentially amounts to an improper reconsideration of an award of benefits based on improved medical condition, a procedure which is not authorized by General Municipal Law §207-a(2).”

The decision reports that the New York State Comptroller had approved both an accidental disability retirement allowance pursuant to the Retirement and Social Security Law §363, and a performance-of-duty disability retirement allowance pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law §363-c for Masullo. In addition, the decision notes that Masullo "had simultaneously retired from the fire department."

In accordance with General Municipal Law §207-a(2), the City commenced paying Masullo §207-a(2) benefits, consisting of the  difference between his regular salary and those retirement allowances. In April 2004, the City adopted an application procedure for firefighters to request and receive §207-a(2) benefits.

The genesis of this litigation was a letter Deputy Fire Commissioner Deborah Norman sent to Masullo advising him that the City had recently reviewed his eligibility to receive §207-a(2) benefits and determined that there was no record that he had ever requested or applied for those benefits. Norman also advised Masullo that, "in the absence of a request or application for [Section] 207-a(2) benefits," she had determined that Masullo had been erroneously paid these benefits. Norman then directed the City to immediately cease paying Masullo §207-a(2) benefits, and included an application form with the letter should Masullo wish to apply for those benefits.

Masullo’s attorney wrote to the City the expressing his view that the Masullo was entitled to continue receiving §207-a(2) benefits. The City agreed to resume paying §207-a(2) benefits to Masullo on the condition that he submit an application in full compliance with the Fire Department’s recently implemented application process. Masullo did so and the City’s physician who examined Masullo opined that he “did not find any pathology that would represent a causally related disability, and determined that there was nothing which would prevent [Masullo] from returning to full-duty status.” Ultimately the City discontinued Masullo’s §207-a(2) supplemental payments.

Citing McGowan v Fairview Fire District, 51 AD3d 796,  the court said that it had addressed the question of whether a fire district was authorized to review a firefighter's medical condition for the purpose of determining whether it had improved to such an extent that the firefighter was no longer entitled to supplemental benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(2).

The court said in McGowan it had held that General Municipal Law §207-a does not contain any language authorizing a municipality to terminate General Municipal Law §207-a(2) benefits on the basis of improved medical condition.

In contrast, GML §207-a(3) expressly grants municipalities the authority to terminate benefits being paid pursuant to GML §207-a(1) upon a finding that the employee has experienced an improvement is his or her medical or physical condition under certain circumstances.

Subdivision 3 of General Municipal Law §207-a provides as follows: “If such a [firefighter] [i.e., a firefighter receiving §207-a(1) benefits] is not eligible for or is not granted such accidental disability retirement allowance or retirement for disability incurred in performance of duty allowance or similar accidental disability pension and is nevertheless, in the opinion of such health authorities or physician, unable to perform his [or her] regular duties as a result of such injury or sickness but is able, in their opinion, to perform specified types of light duty, payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages, as provided by subdivision one of this section, shall be discontinued with respect to such [firefighter] if he [or she] shall refuse to perform such light duty if the same is available and offered to him [or her], provided, however, that such light duty shall be consistent with his [or her] status as a [firefighter] and shall enable him [or her] to continue to be entitled to his [or her] regular salary or wages, including increases thereof and fringe benefits, to which he [or she] would have been entitled if he [or she] were able to perform his [or her] regular duties.”*

The Appellate Division concluded that the absence of a similar provision in General Municipal Law §207-a with respect to retirees receiving §207-a(2) salary supplements to their retirement benefits indicates that the Legislature did not intend to grant municipalities the authority to terminate benefits paid §207-a(2) on the basis of the retiree’s improved medical condition.

The Appellate Division determined that the Masullo [1] was not obligated to submit an application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(2) in the manner prescribed by the City of Mount Vernon and City of Mount Vernon Fire Department; [2]  the eligibility review process imposed by the City of Mount Vernon and City of Mount Vernon Fire Department was improper; [3] directed the City of Mount Vernon to reinstate Manullo’s§207-a(2)  benefits retroactive to February 13, 2009, plus statutory interest; and [4] awarded Masullo “one bill of costs.”

* GML §207-a(5) provides “The appropriate municipal or fire district officials may transfer such a [firefighter] to a position in the same or another agency or department where they are able to do so pursuant to applicable civil service requirements and provided the [firefighter] shall consent thereto.” See, also, GML §207-a(6) which provides for the forfeiture of a firefighter’s GML §207-a(1) entitlement to such benefits under certain circumstances.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04225.htm

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The Disability Benefits E-book: - This e-book focuses on disability benefits available to officers and employees in public service pursuant to Civil Service Law §§71, 72 and 73, General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c, the Retirement and Social Security Law, the Workers’ Compensation Law, and similar provisions of law. For more information click on: http://booklocker.com/3916.html

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An appointing authority is not required to assign an individual to the position he or she desires or prefers

An appointing authority is not required to assign an individual to the position he or she desires or prefers
Webb v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 04307, Appellate Division, First Department

Dawn Webb, a tenured teacher with a 15 year career, did not challenge the findings made in the course of a disciplinary arbitration hearing that she committed forty acts of misconduct, including insubordination, dereliction of duty, and incompetence, over a two-year time period at numerous different schools. Neither did she deny that she ignored the efforts of numerous supervisors and administrators to remedy her pedagogical deficiencies.

Notwithstanding Webb’s contention that she “became demoralized when she was assigned to the absent teacher reserve pool and did not have permanent assignment at one school,” the penalty imposed by the arbitrator was dismissal from her employment.

Webb filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking a court order vacating the penalty of termination imposed by the arbitrator. Supreme Court dismissed her petition, which ruling was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.

Citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, the Appellate Division said that “a court must uphold a sanction imposed [following a disciplinary hearing] unless it is so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the conscience and therefore, constitutes an abuse of discretion.”

In this instance the court concluded that the penalty of termination of Webb’s employment was not unduly harsh or excessive given her failure to conform her behavior to the requirements of the job and her unwillingness to accept assistance or improve her performance.

As to Webb’s claim that her malfeasance or misfeasance in performing her duties were the result of her not having permanent assignment at one school, the Appellate Division observed that the appointing authority was not required to assign her to the position she desired.

Further, said the court, the record reflects that Webb was warned many times that her conduct would result in disciplinary action. Despite these warnings Webb failed to take steps to correct the deficiencies noted by numerous supervisors and administrators.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04307.htm

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A Reasonable Penalty Under The Circumstances - a 618-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html

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Complying with procedural requirements in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education critical to the Commissioner’s considering the merits of the appeal

Complying with procedural requirements in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education critical to the Commissioner’s considering the merits of the appeal

Matter of the Board of Education of the Oceanside Union Free School District

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,907

In this appeal the Petitioners asked the Commissioner of Education to remove each of the seven board members of the Board of Education of the Oceanside Union Free School District [Board] for alleged violations of School Board policies, breaches of their fiduciary duties as members of the Board, and of having conflicts of interest.  

The Commissioner addressed a number of significant procedural defects and critical jurisdictional issues in adjudication this appeal.

Although Petitioners did not provide an affidavit of service establishing service upon the Board, the affidavits of the district clerk indicated that she had accepted service on behalf of the Board. As there was no assertion that the appeal should be dismissed as to the Board for lack of proper service, the Commissioner declined to dismiss the appeal with respect to allegations against the Board.

Such was not the case, however, with respect to the Commissioner exercising jurisdiction over the individual members of the Board. Petitioners had failed to name any board member in the caption of the notice of petition or petition. Petitioners' failure to name each such board members constituted a failure to properly join as respondents each individual board member whose removal was sought, warranting dismissal of the application as against each such Board member. The Commissioner explained that “It is the notice of petition which alerts a party that he or she is required to appear and answer the allegations contained in the petition.”

Another defect noted by the Commissioner: Petitioners failed to personally serve any individual board members with a copy of the petition and notice of petition.

Service of pleadings and supporting papers set out in 8 NYCRR §275.8(a), of the Commissioner’s regulations, are applicable to proceedings seeking the removal of a school officer  [see 8 NYCRR §277.1] They provide, in pertinent part, that “A copy of the petition, together with all of petitioner’s affidavits, exhibits, and other supporting papers, except a memorandum of law or affidavit in support of a reply, shall be personally served upon each named respondent, or, if a named respondent cannot be found upon diligent search, by delivering and leaving the same at respondent’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion ... or as otherwise directed by the Commissioner.”

Although the record contained seven affidavits of service indicating that seven copies of the petition in this matter were served on the district clerk in an attempt to effectuate service on each of the seven individual board members, the affidavit of the district clerk stated that she accepted service only on behalf of the board and that she was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the individual board members. 

Although Petitioners submitted an affidavit from their process server stating that the district clerk gave “specific assurance” that she was authorized to accept service on behalf of the individual board members, in a sur-reply the School District submitted a second affidavit from the district clerk indicating that she never informed the process server that she was authorized to accept service on behalf of the individual board members. 

As in an appeal to the Commissioner the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which petitioner seeks relief, the Commissioner said that in the light of the conflicting affidavits, she could not conclude that there was valid service on the individual board members. Further, said the Commissioner, the record does not indicate that any request for "alternate service" was made by the Petitioners.

As to the individual board members, as they were not personally served, the applications for their removal was denied. Notwithstanding this, if service upon the individual board members is deemed defective, the Commissioner said that she could “proceed with this petition as against the Board as an entity pursuant to Education Law §[310]” and as noted above, she declined to dismiss Petitioners’ appeal with respect to allegations against the Board.

As to the School District’s claim that Petitioners’ appeal should be dismissed as untimely as it was commenced more than 30 days after the actions to which Petitioners object, and Petitioners acknowledge that their appeal is untimely, Petitioners argued that “they were not advised that they had the right to appeal [the Board’s] determination and that they filed multiple complaints with Office of Civil Rights Compliance [OCR], erroneously believing that OCR was the only remaining option to address [the Board’s] alleged misconduct.  They then argued that “as pro se litigants, they are entitled to a liberal interpretation of the Commissioner’s regulations.”* 

The Commissioner commented that “except in unusual circumstances,” ignorance of the appeal process does not afford a sufficient basis to excuse a delay in commencing an appeal and that the record contains no evidence that any unusual circumstances are present here.

Thus, ruled the Commissioner, “the appeal must be dismissed as untimely.”

Additionally, Petitioners contended that the Board’s was made in retaliation for Petitioners’ earlier complaint to the Office of Special Education Quality Assurance [SEQA], which, said the Commissioner, raised the identical issues and incidents in a complaint filed with OCR. OCR determined that the “district proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” for the School District's decision and that “the proffered reason was not a pretext for retaliation because the district’s actions were consistent with its policies.” Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled that having chosen that forum in which to litigate their claims, Petitioners have made an election of remedies and may not relitigate the same issues in a proceeding instituted pursuant to §310 of the Education Law.

Finally, the Commissioner noted that, as stated above, in an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which petitioner seeks relief.  

In addition to their request for removal of the board members, discussed above, Petitioners sought only that “The Commissioner exercise authority to review and approve all manner of business proposed by the Board until such time as the Commissioner is satisfied that the board is acting rationally and prudently and fulfilling its fiduciary responsibilities to protect public assets and promote the educational needs of the District....”

However, an appeal to the Commissioner is appellate in nature and does not provide for investigations, nor does the Commissioner have the authority to act as an overseer over all board business or to appoint such an overseer with the power to substitute his or her opinion and determination for that of the board.

* On this point the Commissioner noted that Petitioners are both practicing attorneys and thus are held to a higher standard than non-attorney pro se litigants.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume55/d16907

Absent a statutory or negotiated administrative hearing procedure, an appointing authority may delegate decision-making authority to the hearing officer

Absent a statutory or negotiated administrative hearing procedure, an appointing authority may delegate decision-making authority to the hearing officer

McKay v Village of Endicott, 2016 NY Slip Op 04085, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Village of Endicott had been paying Firefighter Joseph W. McKay General Municipal Law §207-a(1)* benefits while he was unable to work after he had suffered an "on the job" injury to his lower back.

In March 2010, McKay underwent  surgery. The Village told McKay that because his "neck condition" was "not related to the work injury," his General Municipal Law §207-a benefits were "terminated." McKay appealed and ultimately the hearing officer appointed by the Village determined that McKay was entitled to GML §207-a(1) benefits because there was a causal relationship linking the lower back injury to the accident and no evidence that McKay’s lower back had improved to the point that, but for the intervening cervical spine injury, he would have been able to return to work as a firefighter.

While that hearing was pending, McKay retired and commenced receiving performance of duty disability retirement benefits and the Village discontinued McKay’s GML §207-a(1) benefits. In November 2011, at the Village's request, McKay applied for supplemental benefits authorized by GML §207-a(2).**

In March 2012, McKay was examined by an orthopedist retained by the Village. The orthopedist opined that McKay’s 2008 back injury "would not have prohibited [him] from performing his duties as a firefighter and EMT." In May 2012, the Village denied McKay's "application" for GML §207-a(2) benefits. McKay then commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Village’s determination. Supreme Court “partially granted [McKay’s petition] finding that the Village could not terminate his General Municipal Law §207-a benefits without a hearing. The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling.***

In August 2012, the Mayor of the Village wrote to the Hearing Officer to confirm his appointment "in the [GML] §207-a(2) appeal case." At the subsequent 2013 hearing to consider McKay's November 2011 application for §207-a(2) benefits, the parties testified and in February 2014, the Hearing Officer issued a decision in which he characterizing the "issue presented" to be whether McKay was entitled to General Municipal Law §207-a(2) benefits as a result of the April 2008 lower back injury.

Noting that he was obligated to "uphold" the Village's determination to deny the benefits as long as it was supported by substantial evidence, the Hearing Officer issued "findings" that McKay was entitled to General Municipal Law §207-a(2) benefits based on the "volume of medical evidence" that supported the conclusion that McKay  [1] was "permanently incapacitated from performing his duties, [2] that his disability [was] permanent, and [3] that his disability [was] causally related to the performance of his duties."

Specifically, the Hearing Officer "determin[ed] that [McKay's] workplace injury on April 8, 2008 [was] the cause of his permanent inability to work." The Mayor, however, rejected the Hearing Officer's awarding McKay GML §207-a(2) benefits, finding that substantial evidence supported the Village's May 2012 determination denying McKay with such benefits.

McKay then commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order annulling the Mayor's determination. Supreme Court determined that the Village was not bound by Hearing Officer's decision and then transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division said that core issue was whether the Hearing Officer's February 2014 decision was a final and binding determination, noting that "it has long been recognized that . . . General Municipal Law §207-a . . . [was] enacted for the benefit of firefighters . . . who sustain disabling injuries in the line of duty, [and] the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed."

However, said the court, the statute does not set out any administrative procedure for determining a firefighter's entitlement to benefits and a municipality may promulgate or negotiate such a procedure provided that it comports with administrative due process. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, the initial question presented is what procedure, if any, did the Village promulgatge.

The Appellate Division observed that [1] there was no negotiated procedure in place nor [2] was any written policy that governed the termination of existing General Municipal Law §207-a benefits was introduced at the hearing. Rather, said the court, the record indicated that the Village “simply opted to appoint a hearing officer — first, in 2010 to decide [McKay’s] entitlement to General Municipal Law §207-a(1) benefits, and then, in 2012, to decide [McKay’s] entitlement to General Municipal Law §207-a (2) benefits.”

Considering the record, the Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court's initial finding that the Village was not bound by the Hearing Officer's determination was in error. The court explained that contrary to the Village’s argument, without any statutory or negotiated prohibition or direction, the Village was authorized to delegate its decision-making authority to the Hearing Officer.

Further, said the court, that the Mayor did, in fact, appoint the Hearing Officer to make a final determination and not a recommendation "is apparent from the record before us." Neither the 2010 nor the 2012 appointment was in any way qualified so as to limit the respective Hearing Officers to an advisory role, i.e., to make and submit findings of fact and a recommendation to the appointing authority regarding the disposition of these matters.

Referring to its earlier decision in which it determined that the Village could not terminate benefits payable to McKay pursuant to GML §207-a(2) without a hearing, the court said that “Given this procedural due process protection,” it considered such a hearing to be a de novo assessment of whether McKay sustained a permanent disability as a result of the 2008 work incident.

The court then opined that the Hearing Officer's observation that he was required to uphold the Village's decision if that decision was supported by substantial evidence misstated the standard for, as a matter of due process, in this instance it was the Hearing Officer's charge to decide the permanency issue in the first instance based on a fully developed record. The Appellate Division said that the Hearing Officer did so, after assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the testimony. Further, the hearing transcript before the Hearing Officer and the post-hearing submissions further confirmed that neither the Hearing Officer nor the parties considered the Hearing Officer to be serving in an advisory capacity.

As the Mayor elected to "unilaterally and abruptly" change the Hearing Officer's decision to a recommendation, rather than comply with the protocol outlined in the appointment letter, the Appellate Division concluded that the Mayor's February 2014 determinations must be annulled. 

The court then observed that “[i]f dissatisfied with the Hearing Officer's determination, the Village's remedy was to challenge that determination in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

* General Municipal Law §207-a(1) provides for the payment of full wages and medical expenses until a disability has ceased.

** General Municipal Law §207-a(2), in pertinent part, provides that [1] the payment of the firefighter’s full amount of regular salary or wages pursuant to §207-a(1) shall be  discontinued upon the firefighter receiving a retirement benefit for disability incurred in performance of duty pursuant to RSSL §363-c and [2]  the employer shall supplement such the disability retirement allowance by paying the firefighter the difference between the amount of such disability retirement allowance and the amount of his or her regular salary or wages, including longevity pay and negotiated salary increases, if any, until such time as the firefighter shall have attained the mandatory service retirement age applicable to him or her or shall have attained the age or performed the period of service specified by applicable law for the termination of his or her service.

*** McKay v Village of Endicott, 113 AD3d 989, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 23 NY3d 1015.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04085.htm

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The Disability Benefits E-book – 2016 Edition: This 810 page e-book focuses on disability benefits available to officers and employees in public service pursuant to Civil Service Law §§71, 72 and 73, General Municipal Law §207-a and §207-c, the Retirement and Social Security Law, the Workers’ Compensation Law, and similar provisions of law. For more information click on:

http://section207.blogspot.com/

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An individual wishing to withdraw or rescind his or her resignation after delivery to the appointing authority must fully comply with all relevant rules and regulations

An individual wishing to withdraw or rescind his or her resignation after delivery to the appointing authority must fully comply with all relevant rules and regulations

Vaccaro v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2016 NY Slip Op 04116, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court granted Gaetano Vaccaro’s Article 78 petition seeking [1] the annulment of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York’s [Board of Education] determination discontinuing Vaccaro’s probationary employment and [2] a declaration that Vaccaro was a tenured teacher at the time his employment as a probationary employment was terminated. Supreme Court also denied the Board of Education’s cross motion to dismiss Vaccaro’s petition.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s ruling “on the law” and dismissed the Article 78 proceeding brought by Vaccaro.

Citing Springer v Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, 121 AD3d 473, affirmed 27 NY3d 102*, the Appellate Division explained that Vaccaro had not complied with the provisions set out in New York City Department of Education's Chancellor's Regulations C-205(28) and C-205(29), which provisions govern with respect to the withdrawal of a resignation by an individual and the restoration of the tenure previously enjoyed by that individual.

As noted in NYPPL’s summary of the Springer decision, while Springer’s position was in the Unclassified Service,** in the event "a permanent employee in a position in the Classified Service*** of the State as the employer resigns from his or her position and subsequently wishes to withdraw his or her resignation he or she must obtain the approval of the appointing authority to do so. Rules for the Classified Service promulgated by the New York State Civil Service Commission, 4 NYCRR 5.3(c) provide that “A resignation may not be withdrawn, cancelled or amended after it is delivered to the appointing authority, without the consent of the appointing authority.

“Further, 4 NYCRR 5.4, Reinstatement following resignation provides, in pertinent part, that a former permanent State employee who has resigned from his or her position may be reinstated without examination within one year of the effective date of the resignation in the position from which he or she resigned, if then vacant. This rule, then further provides that “In an exceptional case, the commission may, for good cause shown and where the interests of the government would be served, waive the provisions of this section to permit the reinstatement of a person to his [or her] former position more than one year after resignation.

“Many local Civil Service Commissions have adopted rules similar to 4 NYCRR 5.4.”

* The Springer decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_02553.htm

** See, generally, Civil Service Law §35.

*** See, generally, Civil Service Law §§40-45

The Vaccaro decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04116.htm