Arbitrator ordered employer to pay a portion of the employee’s costs in defending himself against disciplinary charges characterized as frivolous
Board of Education of Florida Union Free School District v DePace, et al.,
301 A.D.2d 521; appeal denied, 99 NY2d 511
The Board of Education of Florida Union Free School District served disciplinary charges on Ronald DePace pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law.
The §3020-a disciplinary hearing officer, after a hearing, dismissed 13 of the 14 charges filed against DePace as frivolous and ordered the school district to pay 80% of the costs incurred by DePace and the New York State Department of Education in connection with the hearing.
Florida an appeal pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking a court order modifying the hearing officers determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition insofar as it purportedly was asserted against the New York State Department of Education and denied the petition insofar as asserted against Ronald DePace, confirmed the Hearing Officer's determination.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s determination “with one bill of costs.”
The court said that “ss the Supreme Court correctly determined, the amended petition insofar as it purportedly was asserted against the New York State Department of Education was a nullity because [the school district] failed to comply with the requirements of CPLR 401.
Holding that the Hearing Officer's determination that the school district should pay 80% of the costs incurred by Ronald DePace had a rational basis and was supported by the evidence in the record, the Appellate Division dismissed Florida UFSD’s appeal.
Randall Comments: Another case involving a court awarding attorney fees to the employee in the context of disciplinary action is Perez v Department of Labor, 244 AD2d 844.
Athough Hilton Perez was found guilty of misconduct and terminated from his position following a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law, Supreme Court annulled the determination, finding that was no evidence that the hearing officer who presided over Perez’s disciplinary hearing had been so designated in writing by the appointing authority as mandated in §75.2 of the Civil Service Law.
The court directed the department to reinstate Perez to his former position with back salary and benefits. Perez was also awarded legal fees and expenses totaling $19,907.84, $9275 of which reflected his legal expenses attributable to the Section 75 disciplinary action.*
The Department of Labor appealed. However, the Appellate Division rejected the Department’s claim that its failure to designate the disciplinary hearing officer in writing was “a mere technicality” as Perez’s termination was otherwise “substantially justified.”
The Appellate Division also affirmed the lower court’s award of attorney fees and expenses. In addition, the Appellate Division ruled that Perez was entitled to the fees and expenses incurred in connection with the department’s appeal to the Appellate Division challenging the underlying Supreme Court’s decision. It returned the case to Supreme Court for further action concerning this aspect of the case.
* Section 8601 (a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules provides, in relevant part, that [A] court shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.