Impartiality of discipline panel members
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 99-21
The impartiality of a disciplinary tribunal is a critical element in any disciplinary action. Further, even the appearance of any impropriety must be avoided. Would it be appropriate for an individual to serve on a disciplinary panel if there was a possibility that his or her son might be called as a witness in the proceeding?
David A. Menken, the Village Attorney, Village/Town of Mount Kisco, asked the Attorney General for his views with respect to such participation after the chief of police advised the board of trustees that disciplinary charges might be filed against one or more Mount Kisco police officers and the son of a trustee, who was a member of the police force, might be called as a witness.
The Attorney General commenced his analysis by noting that Section 5711-q(1) of the Unconsolidated Laws provides that such disciplinary charges must be heard by “at least a majority” of the Board of Trustees and that “even the appearance of impropriety should be avoided in order to maintain public confidence in government.”
The Attorney General concluded that the trustee should recuse herself because “the trustee may not be able to make an impartial judgment solely in the public interest if her son is called as a witness.” While state law does not bar members of the same family from serving in the same governmental unit, public officers have a responsibility to exercise their duties “solely in the public interest.”
The Attorney General said that the difficulty here was that “there was no objective way to verify” that the trustee was able to weigh the credibility of her son fairly and reached an impartial judgment. Under the circumstances, the Attorney General concluded, “there is at least an appearance of impropriety” and thus the trustee should recuse herself and “should not participate in or be present at the hearing, any deliberations, including deliberations conducted during an executive session of the board of trustees, or the determination of the disciplinary proceeding brought by the Mount Kisco Police Department.”
The designation of panel members by the district and the employee should not be viewed as the selection of a partisan representative. Rather they are impartial, quasi-judicial officials.
This point was made in Syquia v Harpursville Central School District, 568 NY2d 263, an "old law" Section 3020-a case. In Syquia, the court observed that a school board and a teacher have a statutory right to select a panel member to serve on the three-member board.
However, the court rejected the argument advanced by the attorney for the Harpursville School District suggesting that "a Section 3020-a hearing is, and is intended to be, something other than a fully impartial fact finding hearing...." The court clearly stated that the panel members selected by the Board of Education and by the teacher are not advocates for the party respectively selecting them, with only the chair of the hearing panel intended to be impartial.
The court said that it was taking its opportunity in this case to dispel any such "misapprehension in educational circles, if such in fact exists." It is likely that the same rationale would be applied to the selection of panel members by employers and employees under the new law.
In contrast to the Syquia decision, the Appellate Division decided in Meehan v Nassau Community College, 243 A.D.2d 12,[motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 814] that "a party-designated arbitrator may in fact be 'partial'" and that by itself this is not grounds for vacating an arbitration award.*
The case involved Nassau County Community College's attempt to overturn two arbitration awards under Article 75. One member of a three-person arbitration panel selected by the parties had direct personal knowledge of the disputed facts underlying the grievances and that this arbitrator actually testified concerning these facts during the arbitration. The Appellate Division had no problem with a panel member testifying at the hearing, holding that "dual capacity of arbitrator and witness may serve as a basis for vacatur only if his behavior in this regard can be properly characterized as constituting 'corruption, fraud, or misconduct' (CPLR 7511[b][1][i])."
* Related cases involving the same parties and issues: Mehan v Nassau Community College, 251 A.D.2d 415; Mehan v Nassau Community College, 251 A.D.2d 416; and Mehan v Nassau Community College, 251 A.D.2d 417.
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