November 02, 2010

Criminal conviction may bar teaching if the applicant cannot satisfy the relevant criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law

Criminal conviction may bar teaching if the applicant cannot satisfy the relvant criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law
Arrocha v NYC Bd. of Education, 93 NY2d 361

Sometimes an individual who has been convicted of a crime applies for a license to teach or for employment as a teacher.

The Correction Law protects individuals from unlawful discrimination based on his or her conviction of a crime. In other words, an individual may not be automatically barred from teaching because of his or her previous conviction. Instead, the school board should examine the individual’s application in light of the eight criteria set out in Section 753 of the Correction Law:

a. The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses.

b. The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought.

c. The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities.

d. The time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.

e. The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.

f. The seriousness of the offense or offenses.

g. Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.

h. The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”

In the Arrocha case, the Court of Appeals -- New York’s highest court -- overturned lower courts’ rulings and said the New York City Board of Education properly considered all eight factors when it refused to grant a teaching license to a person with a criminal record.

Jose Luis Arrocha asked the New York City Board of Education for a license to teach high school Spanish in 1996. He noted in his application form that he had been convicted in 1987, at age 36, of criminal sale of a controlled substance (a B felony) for selling a $10 bag of cocaine to an undercover officer, and subsequently served the minimum of a two-to-six year prison term.

Arrocha submitted a certificate of relief from disabilities. Courts have discretion to issue such certificates to ex-convicts, which are intended to remove any automatic bar to employment or licensure (Correction Law Section 701). Arrocha also submitted letters of recommendation attesting to his skill as a teacher.

His application was rejected on the grounds that his criminal conviction was “serious in nature” and that employment as a teacher “would pose a risk to the safety and welfare of the student population and Board of Education employees.”

Arrocha sued, contending that (1) it was arbitrary and capricious of the board to block his application because of a nine-year old conviction, and (2) the board’s decision violated the Correction Law.

The Court of Appeals said that as a general rule, the courts “cannot interfere [with an administrative decision] unless there is no rational basis for the exercise of discretion” by the administrative agency.

The court pointed out that Section 752.1 of the Correction Law allows an employer to reject an applicant without running afoul of the law where “a direct relationship between [the previous criminal offense] and the specific license or employment sought” exists. Also, Section 752.2 allows such a decision where granting the license or employment would “involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.” It observed that the school board detected a “direct relationship” and an “unreasonable risk,” and it was reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the board.

The Court of Appeals said the board appeared fair in its deliberations. The record showed that the board had considered all eight of the factors in reaching its conclusion, balancing elements that favored granting Arrocha a license against others that tended to mitigate against such an action.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the board was not obligated to rebut the presumption of Arrocha’s rehabilitation and was entirely justified in considering the nature and seriousness of this particular crime, a B felony cocaine sale “committed by Arrocha at the mature age of 36...” The court said Arrocha’s age when apprehended was legitimately viewed as being “of overriding significance when issuing a high school teaching license.”

The decision suggests that it is consistent with public policy of New York State to refuse to employ a person convicted of drug dealing as a teacher. Support for this view may be found in Section 3020-a of the Education Law.

Section 3020-a(2)(b) bars the suspension without pay of a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed, unless otherwise permitted under an alternate disciplinary procedure negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law, except in cases where the individual has been convicted of a felony involving illegal drugs. The inclusion of this exception suggests the legislature is deeply troubled by the prospect of schoolchildren being exposed to teachers with felony drug convictions. Section 3020-a(2)(b) also allows a school district or BOCES to suspend a teacher against whom disciplinary charges have been filed without pay if he or she has been convicted of a felony involving the physical or sexual abuse of a minor or a student.
NYPPL