A notice of termination may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act
United States Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, Docket #16-3140
The Second Circuit US Court of Appeals ruled that "a notice of termination itself constitutes an adverse employment action, even when the employer later rescinds the termination."
Citing two decisions by the Supreme Court, Delaware State College v Ricks, 449 U.S. 25 and Chardon v Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, the Second Circuit held that plaintiff's notice of termination in this case may, itself, constitute an adverse employment action notwithstanding its revocation before it became effective for the purpose of litigating an alleged unlawful discrimination or other claim.
Although in this action the court found that the rescission of a notice of termination given to an employee may not constitute an adverse employment action and other facts alleged in the complaint "were insufficient to establish constructive discharge nor a hostile work environment," the court found that the plaintiff did state a plausible claim of "discriminatory termination and interference with her FMLA rights."
The Circuit Court remanded the matter to the district court for the purpose of the lower court reconsidering " ... its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the [plaintiff's] state and city law [unlawful discrimination] claims."
The decision is posted on the Internet at: