In a proceeding brought by an employee [Plaintiff] pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking to vacate an arbitration award, Supreme Court granted that branch of the Plaintiff's petition that asked the court to vacate the disciplinary penalty of termination that had been imposed on him. The employer objected and filed an appeal with the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's ruling "on the law," with costs, reinstated the penalty of dismissal from the position imposed by the arbitrator and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for the confirmation of the arbitration award pursuant to CPLR §7511(e).
Citing Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332, the court explained that the arbitration proceeding at issue, which was conducted pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, was consensual in nature and therefor subject to the limited scope of review established by CPLR §7511. Supreme Court, however, had applied the "closer judicial scrutiny standard" which was typically used by courts reviewing an award that resulted from a compulsory arbitration process.
A "preponderance of the evidence" is the standard used in disciplinary actions where arbitration is not mandated and requires that the evidence for one side outweighs evidence for the other side by some degree, however minute, and the preponderance of the evidence standard generally applies only when the penalty of dismissal is accompanied by some added stigma.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the Appellate Division held that the penalty of termination from employment was not irrational, and the penalty, albeit harsh, did not violate any strong public policy or clearly exceed an enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power.
In an Education Law §3020-a disciplinary arbitration, an Educator was served with disciplinary charges of alleging the Educator was guilty certain misconduct. The arbitrator sustained certain of the charges and specifications alleging misconduct brought against the Educator and imposed the penalty of termination from his position. Educator appealed,* contending that the arbitrator's determination was arbitrary and capricious because the arbitrator did not resolve issues of credibility in his favor.** The Appellate Division sustained the arbitrator's ruling, pointing out that where the obligation to arbitrate arises as the result of a statutory mandate, as is the case in Education Law §3020-a disciplinary procedures, the arbitrator’s determination is subject to "closer judicial scrutiny" -- i.e., greater scrutiny than it might otherwise receive where submitting the matter to arbitration is a decision of the parties. Indeed, said the Appellate Division, "An award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious."
Further, a court in reviewing a decision that resulted from compulsory arbitration inquires as to “whether the decision was rational or had a plausible basis," but otherwise accepts the arbitrators' credibility determinations, even where, as noted above, there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists."
Accordingly, the Appellate Division rejected Educator’s appeal, explaining that in the event "the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists," a court may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the arbitrator.
* See Powell v Board of Educ. of Westbury Union Free School Dist., 91 AD3d 955, affirmed 30 NY2d 889.
** In Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, the Court of Appeals held that when reviewing §3020-a compulsory arbitrations proceedings court should accept the hearing officer's credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: