Federal District Court granted the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973* and related state and municipal laws submitted by the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, et. al. [NYCHHC] and Plaintiff appealed.
The Circuit Court of Appeal said that the significant questions presented in this appeal are:
(1) whether an employee alleging a failure‐to‐accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act has carried his initial burden to make a prima facie case where the employer allegedly has notice that the employee is on extended disability leave, but the employee never requests an accommodation; and
(2) whether rights established by the Rehabilitation Act are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The Circuit Court conclude that an employee cannot make a prima facie case against his employer for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under such circumstances. The court also explained that the rights established by the Rehabilitation Act are not enforceable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Accordingly, it affirmed the District Court's and dismissed Plaintiff's appeal.
The decision notes that where “the disability is obvious, that is the employer knew or reasonably should have known that the employee was disabled,” the employer is obligated to engage in “an interactive process with their employees and in that way work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.”
Although this duty is triggered when the employer knows, or have had sufficient notice such that the employer reasonably should have known, that the employee has a disability within the meaning of the Act in contrast to a having mere impairment, in this instance the District Court concluded that Plaintiff failed to state a reasonable accommodation claim because, by neither responding to the NYCHHC's communications nor appealing its personnel decision, Plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.
Plaintiff did not allege that he ever requested an accommodation from NYCHHC, either formally or informally. Although NYCHHC was aware that Plaintiff was on an extended disability leave from work‐related injuries, such knowledge, alone, is insufficient to plausibly allege notice that those injuries constituted a disability within the meaning of the Act as Plaintiff took work‐related disability leave on multiple prior occasions for conditions that did not prevent him from returning to work without any accommodations.
Finally, noted the Circuit Court, although Plaintiff alleged that NYCHHC received “regular updates from his doctor on his condition and ability to work,” Plaintiff failed to allege facts about the content of those updates "from which it could plausibly be inferred that Plaintiff’s disability was 'obvious' to NYCHHC."
As Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that NYCHHC knew or should reasonably have known he was disabled, NYCHHC was under no obligation to initiate "the interactive process," and Plaintiff’s failure to affirmatively request an accommodation is a sound basis for dismissal of his complaint.
* Plaintiff also filed a Title VII complaint [42 U.S.C. §1983] for the same alleged violations he advanced under the Rehabilitation Act.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c81e66a1-6d73-4cac-bb70-4dcf70ac25db/1/doc/18-2816_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c81e66a1-6d73-4cac-bb70-4dcf70ac25db/1/hilite/