The individuals [Plaintiffs] in this action were formerly employed by the School District [District]. Plaintiffs were in a collective bargaining unit. Their Taylor Law representative [Association] had entered into a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] with the District that provided, among other things, that employees in the collective bargaining unit with 10 or more years of service upon retirement would be provided a "terminal leave allowance" calculated at the employee per diem salary at the time of separation "x ½ the number of accrued sick leave days" [emphasis supplied].
A successive CBA contained this same provision. A still later successor CBA, negotiated for the period July 1, 2006 through and including June 30, 2009, however, stated that "terminal leave allowance" would be calculated at "x 2 the number of accrued sick leave days" [emphasis supplied]." This same language, "x 2 the number of accrued sick leave days" [emphasis supplied], was used in the 2009-2013 CBA negotiated by the parties.
By letter dated February 29, 2012, the District advised the then president of the Association that the then operative CBA contained a "misprint" in its "terminal leave allowance" provision and that the "terminal leave allowance" was to be calculated at "x ½ the number of accrued sick leave days." The President agreed and signed a copy of the letter in her capacity as President of the Association and a copy of the letter was provided to the Plaintiffs before they retired, respectively, in April and June 2012.
Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages from the District for breach of contract based upon the District's determination that the Plaintiffs' "terminal leave allowance" would be calculated at "x ½" the number" of their accrued sick leave days rather than "x 2" the number of their accumulated sick leave credits.
In support of its motion for summary judgment the District submitted the affidavits of two former presidents of the Association averring that the Association never negotiated for the "x 2" provision and that no Association members who retired under either the 2006-2009 CBA or the 2009-2013 CBA, including one of the former presidents herself, received payout for sick leave at a rate of "x 2" their accrued sick leave credits.
Plaintiffs submitted a cross-motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of liability on their breach of contract cause of action against the District.
Supreme Court denied the District's motion and granted that Plaintiffs' cross-motion. A judgment was entered that provided for damages in the principal sum of $243,158.27 for the alleged breach of contract. District appealed the Supreme Court's judgment.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's decision, "on the law," with respect to Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on their cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract asserted against Defendant and modified Supreme Court's order accordingly.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's decision, "on the law," with respect to Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on their cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract asserted against Defendant and modified Supreme Court's order accordingly.
The court explained that contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, Plaintiffs were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their breach of contract cause of action insofar as asserted against the District, as Plaintiffs failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding whether the provision for calculating the "terminal leave allowance" at "x 2 the number of accrued sick leave days" was a scrivener's error* that was corrected by the parties to the CBA prior to the Plaintiffs' effective dates of retirement in April and June 2012..
Further, said the Appellate Division, "[i]n light of these triable issues of fact," neither was the District entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for breach of contract claim asserted against it by Plaintiffs.
The Appellate Division's decision also addressed two procedural issues, holding
[1] The District had waived its contention that Plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain this action by failing to assert that defense in its answer or in a pre-answer motion to dismiss the action; and
[2] The District's contention the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, raised for the first time on appeal, was not properly before this Court.
* Courts may correct drafting mistakes or errors, typically referred to as “scrivener's errors,” if the error is clear. In contrast to challenging a provision in a collective bargaining agreement alleging a scrivener's error or an engrossing error, Matter of the Arbitration between City of Plattsburgh and Plattsburgh Police Officers Union AFSCME Local 82, 250 AD2d 327, addresses a situation in which the employer drafted the collective bargaining agreement and later contended it had erroneously included a particular employee benefit advanced by the employee organization in the course of collective negotiations in the collective bargaining agreement but to which it had not agreed to provide after a member of the collective bargaining unit applied for that benefit and grieved its being denied by the employer. Ultimately submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the employee. For NYPPL's summary of Plattsburgh go to: https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/11/claim-of-mistake-does-not-permit-party.html
The decision in the instant appeal is posted on the Internet at: