May 10, 2023

Applying the Doctrine of Laches barring a party from seeking judicial or quasi-judicial relief because such action is determined to be untimely

If a petitioner fails to demand for relief within a reasonable time after the right to make it occurs, or knows or should know of facts indicating a clear right to relief, the petitioner's claim can be barred by the Doctrine of Laches. This was the situation in the instant CPLR Article 78 action in which Petitioner commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement of her employment with the Manchester-Shortsville Central School District [District].

During the 2019-2020 school year, Petitioner was employed by the District as a full-time English Language Arts (ELA) teacher. However, in June 2020, Petitioner's position was changed from full to part time. Petitioner's name was placed on a "preferred eligible list of candidates for appointment to a vacancy" pursuant to Education Law §3013(3)(a).* Subsequently the District posted an opening for a full-time ELA teacher. Petitioner applied for the opening and went through the formal application process, but when she was offered the position, she rejected the offer.

After the District hired an individual to fill the vacancy, Petitioner submitted a demand that she be recalled to her prior position pursuant to Education Law §3013(3)(a). The District refused Petitioner's demand and Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding by filing a petition on November 10, 2021. Supreme Court effectively granted the District motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition and Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division, however, sustained Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's petition as untimely. The Appellate Division opined that, where, as here, a proceeding is in "the nature of mandamus to compel, it [is] required to have been commenced within four months after the refusal by [the] respondent, upon the demand of [the] petitioner, to perform its duty", citing Matter of Speis v Penfield Cent. Schs., 114 AD3d 1181.

The Appellate Division explained that;

1. "The term laches, as used in connection with the requirement of the making of a prompt demand in mandamus proceedings, refers solely to the unexcused lapse of time and does not refer to the equitable doctrine of laches", citing Granto, 148 AD3d at 1695"; and

2. "[T]he four-month limitations period of CPLR Article 78 proceedings has been treat[ed] ... as a measure of permissible delay in the making of the demand", citing Matter of Norton v City of Hornell, 115 AD3d 1232, lv denied 23 NY3d 907.

The Appellate Division conclude that under the circumstances, Petitioner knew or should have known of facts that gave her a clear right to relief as of April 19, 2021, when the District posted the opening for the full-time ELA teacher position. Petitioner, however, did not demand that she be recalled to her prior position until August 31, 2021, beyond the relevant four-month limitations period and thus "the proceeding is barred by the doctrine of laches."

* Petitioner was offered, and accepted, the position of a part-time ELA teacher, from which position Petitioner subsequently resigned for financial reasons.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.