The Plaintiff, acting pro se in this appeal, challenged a federal district court's granting his former employer, the Syracuse Regional Airport Authority [SRAA], summary judgment in response to Plaintiff's allegations of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, noting that summary judgment is proper "only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant'" and "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" is the movant entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Further, the Circuit Court said although we “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants", even pro se litigants must do more than offer “purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars,” (See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989].
When a Title VII discrimination claim is based on circumstantial evidence, as was here the case, the court said it applied "the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to determine whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence to survive [a motion for] summary judgment". To do so:
1. Plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] is qualified for [his] position; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.”
2. If the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action.”
3. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show at the third step either that “the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was nothing but a pretext for discrimination,” or that, “even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.”
In this instance, the Circuit Court said it agreed with the district court's granting summary judgment in favor of SRAA based upon Plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden at the first step as it concluded that the Plaintiff "had not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a prima facie case of racial discrimination".
Considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the Circuit Court indicated that "the district court construed [Plaintiff's] briefs and pleadings as asserting two adverse employment actions: the denial of [Plaintiff's] bid for a shift assignment and [Plaintiff's] subsequent termination after [Plaintiff] threatened to assault a co-worker".
With respect to shift assignment issue, the undisputed record indicates that shifts were assigned based on who was more senior – which his co-worker was. In light of this, Plaintiff presented nothing “more than conclusory allegations” that the denial of his preferred shift was on account of his race".
Addressing Plaintiff's termination claim, the Circuit Court said Plaintiff "offers no evidence reflecting that his discharge was based on racial discrimination". And, continued the Circuit Court, "even if we were to assume that [Plaintiff] had made out a prima facie case of discrimination related to his termination, [Plaintiff's] claim would still fail because SRAA offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his firing that [Plaintiff] did not rebut as the record is clear that Plaintiff "made threats of physical violence against [the co-worker] to another employee", stating, among other things, that he was “gonna break [the co-worker's] back if he step[s] out [of] line".
Significantly, Plaintiff admitted that "an employee could be terminated under the City’s policy for making threats" and the Circuit Court, citing Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, noted that regardless of whether a specific policy was in place, “[w]e have held generally that insubordination and conduct that disrupts the workplace are legitimate reasons for firing an employee”.
Addressing Plaintiff's claim of retaliation, the Circuit Court opined that assuming that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, "SRAA articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for [Plaintiff's] termination: [Plaintiff’s] alleged threat to harm [a co-worker]".
Accordingly, the court said the "burden therefore shifted back to [Plaintiff] to prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of his termination" but beyond bald assertions, Plaintiff offered no evidence that he would not have been fired “in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Rather, the court noted that the record reflects that SRAA had already harbored concerns regarding Plaintiff’s previous history of assault and making verbal threats, which is why it “decided to give [Plaintiff] a chance at employment” on a probationary basis.
Again noting that it construed pro se filings liberally, the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Click HERE to access the text of the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.