November 20, 2024

The burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination within the meaning of New York States Human Rights Law is on the applicant or the employee, as the case may be

Petitioner, who had been born deaf, appealed a decision by the New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] dismissing her complaint that the New York State Office for People With Developmental Disabilities [OPWDD] had unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of New York State's Human Right's Law [[NYSHRL] when OPWDD rescinded its offer to employ Petitioner "because of her hearing loss without first offering her a reasonable accommodation".

Citing Matter of Abram v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 71 AD3d 1471, the Appellate Division said a judicial review of the Division's determination, which adopted the findings of an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] who had conducted DHR's public hearing of Petitioner's complaint, is limited to the issue whether the DHR's decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

The court then noted NYSHRL requires a petitioner to bear "the burden of establishing a prima facie case ... showing":

(1) the petitioner is a person with a disability within the meaning of the NYSHRL;

(2) an employer subject to the provision of the NYSHR had notice of the petitioner's disability;

(3) with a reasonable accommodation the petitioner could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and

(4) the employer had refused to make such an accommodation.

The court opined that "there was no dispute that the first two elements" were satisfied as Petitioner was born deaf and used interpreters during her interview and physical examination with OPWDD. 

However, said the Appellate Division, DHR's determination as to the third element was not supported by substantial evidence, explaining that "Whether a job function is essential depends on multiple factors, 'including the employer's judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the consequences of not requiring the plaintiff to perform the function, mention of the function in any collective bargaining agreement, the work experience of past employees in the job, and the work experience of current employees in similar jobs'."

Rather than considering such factors and whether Petitioner made a prima facie case that she could undertake the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, DHR adopted the conclusory determination that "[t]he physical requirements for the ... position" as set forth by the New York Department of Civil Service, and specifically the requirement that Petitioner must pass a hearing test, "are based on the essential functions of the job." That, opined the Appellate Division "was error".

Although written job descriptions, including the standards set by the Department of Civil Service, should be given deference in determining essential job functions in a reasonable accommodation analysis, no one factor is dispositive. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, "DHR erred in making its determination based solely on the Department of Civil Service standards". Pointing out that the record established that "Petitioner had previously performed substantially similar work, that she was able to perform that job with an interpreter as an accommodation, and that OPWDD's governing accommodation policy provides that reasonable accommodation includes providing interpreters, the record demonstrates that petitioner met her prima facie burden as to the third element".

Addressing the fourth element, the Appellate Division said DHR determined that Petitioner "did not request a reasonable accommodation from" OPWDD, and then concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case that OPWDD failed to provide reasonable accommodation. However, noted Appellate Division, "even where a petitioner 'did not request any specific accommodation' prior to initiating 'litigation, [NYSHRL] require[s] [employers] to engage in an interactive dialogue regarding possible accommodations once they bec[o]me aware of [a prospective employee's] condition' requiring accommodation."

In the words of the court, "... the implementing regulations specifically state that [t]he employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested".* 

The Appellate Division concluded that Petitioner "met her prima facie burden as to the fourth element", thus shifting "the burden of production ... to [OPWDD] to rebut the presumption with evidence" that it chose not to hire Petitioner "for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"

Noting that the ALJ's determination, "as adopted by DHR, erroneously concluded that [Petitioner] failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, no determination was made whether OPWDD rebutted the presumption", the Appellate Division annulled DHR's decision and remitted the matter to it "for a new determination".

* See 9 NYCRR 466.11[j][4], [Citation emphasized by the Appellate Division in its decision].

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.