A former volunteer firefighter [Firefighter] with the Fire District [District] appealed the grant of the District's motion for summary judgment by a United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Firefighter had suffered injury to his foot while traveling aboard a ship owned by the District to the reported site of a boat fire on the Hudson River when Firefighter extended his leg to fend off a collision with another vessel.
Having previously obtained compensation under New York State’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, Firefighter filed the instant claim in response to the District’s petition in the United States District Court seeking to limit its liability to the value of the vessel pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §30523, and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims.
Firefighter's claim alleged (i) negligence and unseaworthiness pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104; (ii) unseaworthiness under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); and (iii) negligence under general maritime law.
A Federal District Court had granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Firefighter was not eligible to bring claims pursuant to the Jones Act or Sieracki, and that Firefighter's exclusive remedy were those provided by New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, and that Firefighter was prohibited to bring a general maritime law claim. Firefighter appealed the District Court’s ruling, with the exception of the District's Court's denial of the Firefighter's Jones Act claim.
The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in granting the District's motion for summary judgment after finding that Firefighter was not entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness extended to a Sieracki seaman and in ruling that New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law barred Firefighter's federal negligence claim under general maritime law.
In the words of the Second Circuit, "Although only a small part of [Firefighter's] employment took place on the navigable waters, and he therefore was not a seaman under the Jones Act, on the occasions when he was engaged in a firefighting mission on the waters aboard the [District's ship] his work was distinctly maritime. This case is unlike the cases of injuries to land workers, whose presence on a ship was only for transportation to their land-based jobs". "If [Firefighter's] job, when joining a firefighting mission on [the District's vessel] was to do waterborne firefighting and rescue, that job was no less maritime while he was doing it than it would have been if he had been permanent crew to a firefighting vessel. [Firefighter] asserts that he was in the bow preparing to secure the vessel and that when he extended his foot, his purpose was to avoid a collision, both tasks being seaman’s jobs carrying seaman’s risks. Neither the Fire District nor the [District Court] has advanced a persuasive reason for granting summary judgment dismissing [Firefighter's] claims."
The Second Circuit said it concluded that the reasons giving effect to the State’s exclusive remedy provision so as to deprive Firefighter of whatever maritime remedies he can prove would “work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, [and] interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”
While the Second Circuit said it disavowed any automatic conclusion that “wherever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing and significant,” the Circuit Court said it read the Supreme Court precedents "as protecting the applicability of maritime remedies, as against conflicting state law, when, federal maritime tort policy engages sufficiently with the facts, so that displacement of the federal remedy because of a state’s exclusivity provision would impair uniformity of the federal maritime law".
The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the District Court for further consideration, stating that "We leave it to the proceedings in the district court on remand to determine whether this evidence should be believed and whether [Firefighter] was doing seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards".
Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's ruling posted on the Internet.