In this action by certain employees to recover damages for allegedly having to work in an hostile work environment and had been subjected to "retaliation" because the had complained, the Professional Staff Congress [Union] and other named respondents [Defendants] appealed a Supreme Court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint insofar as asserted against them.
Plaintiffs, employees of New York City Kingsborough Community College, had commenced the instant action against the Union and certain officers of the Union representing the Plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for alleged religious discrimination. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that their employer, The City University of New York [CUNY], certain individual coworkers, and the Union had engaged in discrimination against them in the workplace because of the Plaintiffs' religion.
Noting a work environment is generally controlled by the employer, the Appellate Division said "labor unions have 'no affirmative duty' to prevent harassment or discrimination within the confines of the workplace" and the union's obligation not to discriminate arises "only when the union is performing an agency function in a representational capacity". The Appellate Division opined that "A union can only be liable pursuant to Title VII for situations in which the union is responsible for discrimination against or creating a hostile environment because of the member's protected characteristic".
Pointing out that Title VII, the NYS Human Rights Law, and the NYC Human Rights Law all require a plaintiff suing a union for discrimination to demonstrate actions or activities which may be properly imputed to a union such as:
(1) "The Union breached its duty of fair representation to plaintiff:
(2) "[The] Union's conduct was motivated by animus toward the plaintiff's protected status"; and
(3) "[A union representative's] role in causing or attempting to cause a hostile work environment".
Further, the Appellate Division explained that a plaintiff must show not only that the union had actual or imputed knowledge of the improper conduct, but also that the union representative's conduct related to union activity and that in acting in such a manner, the representative breached the union's duty of fair representation.
Observing that in the instant matter "there were no allegations in the [Plaintiffs] complaint that any of the alleged discriminatory acts were undertaken by union representatives acting on behalf of the union or that any of the alleged acts were related to union activity, and no allegations [in the Plaintiffs' complaint] that the union breached its duty of fair representation", the Appellate Division said that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Union's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss allegations of a hostile work environment insofar as asserted against the Union.
As to alleged "retaliation", the Appellate Division noted that "To make out a prima facie case of retaliation by a union, a plaintiff must show that (1) [the plaintiff] was engaged in an activity protected under Title VII and known to the union; (2) [the plaintiff] suffered adverse union action; and (3) there was "a causal connection between the protected activity and the union's actions". In the words of the Appellate Division, "Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the motion of the union defendants which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the causes of action alleging retaliation insofar as asserted against them".
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.