By resolution dated April 5, 2023, a New York State Incorporated Village [Village] appointed Petitioner as the Village's clerk-treasurer for a term of office set to expire June 30, 2024. By resolution dated May 24, 2023 the Village rescinded the Petitioner's appointment.
Petitioner brought the instant action in Supreme Court challenging the Village's termination of her employment, alleging that her removal "was not properly effectuated in accordance with Public Officers Law §36".* The Village moved pursuant to CPLR §§3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, arguing, inter alia, that the proceeding initiated by Plaintiff was barred by the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.
A New York State Supreme Court:
1. Granted Plaintiff's petition which was for an award of back pay, entitlements, and benefits from May 24, 2023, to June 30, 2024, and
2. Denied the motion of the Village pursuant to CPLR §§3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss that branch of the petition which was for an award of back pay, entitlements, and benefits from May 24, 2023, to June 30, 2024.
The Village appealed the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order and judgment "insofar as appealed from, with costs".
Citing Joseph v Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 219 AD3d 596, the Appellate Division noted that:
1. "Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), a party may move to dismiss a [petition] based on the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel";
2. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a disposition on the merits bars litigation between the same parties or those in privity with them of a cause of action arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions as a cause of action that either was raised or could have been raised in the prior proceeding"; and
3. "The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and the party against whom preclusion is sought bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination".
Noting that to establish "privity" -- a relationship between parties having legal interest in the same right or property -- the Appellate Division's decision explores the connection between the parties which typically must demonstrate that "the interests of the nonparty can be said to have been represented in the prior proceeding" and privity "does not have a technical and well-defined meaning".
The Appellate Division then observed that privity "is an amorphous concept not easy of application", and privity includes "those who are successors to a property interest, those who control an action although not formal parties to it, those whose interests are represented by a party to the action, and possibly co-parties to a prior action".
Further, the Appellate Division opined that "When the issue of privity is raised, 'courts must carefully analyze whether the party sought to be bound and the party against whom the litigated issue was decided have a relationship that would justify preclusion, and whether preclusion, with its severe consequences, would be fair under the particular circumstances'".
Contrary to the Village's contention, the Appellate Division held that the Village "... failed to demonstrate that the [Petitioner] was in privity with any of the parties [in] a separate proceeding commenced by the clerk-treasurer who preceded the [Petitioner] against, among others, the Village, and that the [Petitioner] was thereby bound by a judgment entered in that proceeding".
Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the Village failed to establish that the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred the instant proceeding and found that "the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the [Plaintiff's] petition which was for an award of back pay, entitlements, and benefits from May 24, 2023, to June 30, 2024, and denied that branch of the Village's motion which was pursuant to CPLR [§§]3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss that branch of the [Plaintiff's] petition".
* Public Officers Law §36 provides as follows: "Any town, village, improvement district or fire district officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed from office by the supreme court for any misconuct [sic], maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office. An application for such removal may be made by any citizen resident of such town, village, improvement district or fire district or by the district attorney of the county in which such town, village or district is located, and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town, village, improvement district or fire district. Such application shall be made upon notice to such officer of not less than eight days, and a copy of the charges upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice".
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.