Oct 15, 2026

The federal Portal-to-Portal Act does not bar the payment of compensation when the employee is prevented from clocking in and beginning to work by the employer?

Below is the introductory statement to the instant decision by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, setting out the genesis of this litigation.

"This case requires us* to consider whether the Portal-to-Portal Act bars an employee’s claim for compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for time spent waiting for work to begin when an employer requires the employee to report for work at a specific time but the employee is prevented from clocking in and beginning to work for reasons attributable to the employer.

[*Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.]

"Plaintiff-Appellant Sandra Santos appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Azrack, J.) dismissing her claims against Defendant-Appellee Lidl US, LLC (“Lidl”) for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).

"Santos alleges that Lidl required her and similarly situated employees to report to work fifteen minutes before the listed start time of their store opening shifts, and that opening managers regularly didn’t arrive until the listed start time. Because employees couldn’t clock in for work until they accessed the time clock machines located inside stores, on the days when managers were not there to let them in, the employees didn’t get paid for time spent waiting for managers to grant them entry. As relevant here, Santos seeks compensation for that unpaid waiting time.

"The district court dismissed Santos’s time-shaving claims as barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, which generally shields employers from FLSA liability for time workers spend on activities “preliminary” or “postliminary” to the principal activities they are employed to perform.

"On appeal, Santos argues that the district court overlooked that waiting time can be compensable when an employer engages an employee to wait for work. We agree. Waiting time is compensable under the FLSA when an employer requires an employee to report to the worksite at a certain time to be ready to work and, for reasons beyond the employee’s control, there is no work to be done. 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(h)."

The Court of Appeals then vacated the dismissal of Santos’s FLSA and NYLL time-shaving claims by the Federal District Court and remanded the matter to the District Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion", Judge Sullivan dissenting in a separate opinion.

Click HERE to access the majority and dissenting opinions in this action posted on the Internet.