ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

June 01, 2020

Duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to injuries resulting from hazards that are inherent in the work the employee is to perform

The plaintiffs [Plaintiff] in this action to recover damages for personal injuries "suffered on the job" was employed as a sanitation worker by the City of New York [City]. Plaintiff claimed that he was injured while he and a coworker were working "on the job" lifting a heavy bag of garbage as the result of his coworker's losing his grip on the bag. 

Plaintiff sued the City claiming, among other things, "common-law negligence and loss of consortium" as the result of [a] his coworker's negligence and [b] the City's negligence in the coworker's training and supervision. City moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending, among other things, that the injury was caused by an inherent hazard of the job for sanitation workers and that the injured Plaintiff's coworker was not negligent. 

Supreme Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and Plaintiff appealed from those branches of the City's motion that resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiffs causes of action alleging common-law negligence and loss of consortium.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's determination, explaining that although employers in New York State generally "have a common-law duty to provide their employees with a safe place to work," there is an exception to that rule whereby the duty "does not extend to hazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the employee is to perform". In this instance, said the court, "The hazard of being injured as a result of lifting a heavy garbage bag and loading it into a sanitation truck is inherent in the work of a sanitation worker," citing Marin v San Martin Rest., 287 AD2d 441.

The court ruled that City had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the injured Plaintiff"s coworker was not acting negligently or differently than a reasonably prudent sanitation worker would, and that Plaintiff"s injury resulted from a risk inherent in his assigned work as a sanitation worker.

Finding that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the Supreme Court's determination to grant those branches of the City's motion that were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and loss of consortium.

Presumably Plaintiff would be eligible for workers' compensation benefits otherwise available to him.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
https://www.leagle.com/decision/innyco20200520293


May 29, 2020

Modifying or vacating an arbitration award after a consensual arbitration

In this action brought pursuant to CPLR Article 75 the employee [Employee] in this appeal sought to have Supreme Court vacate or modify an arbitration award. Employee appealed Supreme Court's denial of his petition and dismissal of the proceeding.

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court ruling, pointing out that the arbitration award was rendered after a consensual arbitration process pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Citing Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332, the court explained that such an award may not be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his or her power unless it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power. 

The court held that Employee failed to demonstrate that the arbitration award violated this standard, "or that any other grounds for vacatur stated in CPLR 7511(b) apply."

Addressing Employee's challenge to the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division opined that award suspending the Employee, a bus driver, for 15 days without pay "as a result of an accident which occurred between a bus he was operating during the course of his employment and a motorized bicycle" was not irrational, and "did not violate any strong public policy or clearly exceed an enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_02789.htm
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May 28, 2020

A public employer's motion seeking qualified immunity in the course of litigation must satisfy certain tests

The employee [Plaintiff] sued his former employer, [Defendants] contending [1] that he was dismissed from his position by Defendants without due process and [2] that his termination was an act of retaliation against him by Defendants in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §1983, because he had filed a complaint against Defendants alleging racial discrimination . 

Although Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action contending they were entitled to a qualified immunity, the federal District Court determined that they were not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's "18 U.S.C. §1983" claims "at the summary judgment stage" as "genuine issues of fact existed as to whether Defendants acted 'objectively reasonably' with regard to both claims — as Defendants must do in order to obtain qualified immunity." Defendants appealed.

The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, said that the first issue to be resolved was whether it had jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendants' appeal. 

Conceding that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not . . . appealable” except when “the summary judgment motion is based on a claim of qualified immunity,” the court pointed out that there was an exception to this exception. Citing Catone v. Spielmann, 149 F.3d 156, the Circuit Court then explained that “a defendant may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order — even one addressing the availability of a qualified immunity defense — insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.”*

In the event the District Court finds that the evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue, as it did in this instance, the Circuit Court said "that is the end of our review" as Defendants’ argument on appeal amounts to a challenge of whether the evidence was sufficient and, in the words of the Circuit Court, "we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity."

Here the District Court concluded that there disputed facts that could lead reasonable jurors to different conclusions about whether Defendants acted “objectively reasonably” and thus deserved qualified immunity. 

Further, observed the Circuit Court, "in assessing Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity on [Plaintiff's] retaliation claim, the District Court noted several additional issues of material fact to be resolved, particularly about whether Defendants acted with a retaliatory motive. As Plaintiff and Defendants differ on this factual issue of intent that is the basis of such a claim, the District Court once again concluded that there were facts were for the jury to consider and decide. 

As the District Court denied Defendants motion for qualified immunity and denied their motion for summary judgment on these claims, finding genuine issues of fact to be resolved at trial, the Circuit Court found that the lower court's ruling was not appealable and dismissed Defendants' appeal.

In addition, the Circuit Court pointed out that it may not “entertain an interlocutory appeal in which a defendant contends that the district court committed an error of law in ruling that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to create a jury issue on the facts relevant to the defendant’s immunity defense,” citing Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86. An interlocutory appeal is an appeal of a ruling by a trial court while other aspects of the litigation are still proceeding.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/3f7e2016-107a-4218-bded-98fc8f826c58/5/doc/19-2392_so.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/3f7e2016-107a-4218-bded-98fc8f826c58/5/hilite/

May 26, 2020

The anatomy of the resolution of an alleged failure of a party to negotiate a mandatory subject of collective bargaining in good faith

The New York State Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] found that the Police Benevolent Association of New York State, Inc. [PBA], as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain employees in a negotiating unit, and the State of New York [State] had entered into a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] covering unit personnel that included contract articles addressing winter work schedules, summer work schedules and, as pertinent here, provisions concerning seniority and vacancies, modifying unit members' shifts, and contract grievance procedures. 

State and the PBA met to discuss the winter schedule for the 2012-2013 season during which State proposed a new winter work schedule while the PBA proposed an alternate schedule. State ultimately implemented the winter work schedule it had originally proposed and the PBA filed an improper practice charge with PERB alleging that State had violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(a) and §209-a(1)(d) by unilaterally implementing a new winter work schedule.

PBA contended that the winter work schedule imposed by State constituted new terms and conditions of employment and demonstrated a failure to negotiate in good faith over a mandatory subject of  collective bargaining within the meaning of Article 14 of the Civil Service Law. 

State, in rebuttal, argued that [1] PBA had waived its right to bargain by agreeing to language in the CBA that expressly allowed State to unilaterally set unit members' work schedules, [2] it had had satisfied its duty to negotiate the challenged work schedule and [3] PERB lacked jurisdiction to hear PBA's improper practice claim in view of contract grievance procedures set out in the CBA.

A PERB hearing officer [Hearing Officer] found that State had violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d) as there was a duty to negotiate the winter work schedule and ordered the restoration of the prior schedule.* The hearing officer also determined that: 

[1] The parties had engaged in the past practice of reaching an agreement on the work schedule prior to its implementation; 


[2] The record did not support State's claim that PBA had waived its right to negotiate the settling of work schedules; and


[3] State had not satisfied its duty to negotiate the winter schedule. 


PERB's affirmed the Hearing Officer's findings and decision, whereupon State initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court challenging PERB's decision, which Supreme Court transferred to the Appellate Division.

Addressing State's claim that PERB lacked jurisdiction over this dispute as its subject — State's resolution of the work schedule issues — under color that the CBA provided PBA with a right enforceable through the CBA's grievance procedure, the Appellate Division, citing Matter of City of New Rochelle v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 101 AD3d 1438, conceded that PERB and courts have interpreted the Civil Service Law to deprive PERB of jurisdiction when the dispute between an employer and an employee organization was "essentially contractual" in nature and when the agreement "provides the charging party with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject matter of the charge." 

In contrast, however, the Appellate Division pointed out that a charge that an employer has violated its statutory duty to bargain in good faith over a matter outside the terms of a CBA is a matter within PERB's jurisdiction," citing Matter of County of Erie v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14.

Considering the provisions in the CBA relied on by State to preclude PERB from hearing the dispute, the Appellate Division concluded that State's reliance on its "assertion that [provisions in the collective bargaining agreement] provide the PBA with a reasonably arguable source of right or a contractual remedy to challenge State's unilateral decision to set the schedule" was misplaced. In the words of the Appellate Division, "As the dispute centered on matters outside of the CBA, we find that "PERB's jurisdictional limitation was not triggered."

The court also rejected State's contention that certain determinations made by PERB were not supported by substantial evidence. Reading the articles in the CBA relied on by State "as a whole," the Appellate Division opined that they do not indicate that the parties "reached an accord" on the subject of the setting of the schedules for each season allowing State to unilaterally implement the schedule and substantial evidence supported PERB's determination that GOER did not satisfy its duty to negotiate the work schedules at issue.

The court also sustained PERB's determination that the PBA did not waive its rights to negotiate the setting of the schedule, as the CBA did not include a waiver that is "clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity," revealing an intent by PBA to relinquish its right to negotiate the work schedules.

With respect to State's challenging PERB's determination that there was an established past practice whereby the parties would reach an agreement on the work schedule prior to its implementation, the Appellate Division observed that "[A] binding past practice is established where the practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected bargaining unit employees that the practice would continue." 

Based on the testimony presented at the hearing, the Hearing Officer concluded that the parties had engaged in the past practice of negotiating work schedules and reaching an agreement prior to the implementation of such schedules. PERB similarly credited the testimony of the witnesses for both State and the PBA, finding that their testimony "did not materially differ as to what had in fact happened in their meetings." The Appellate Division, based on its review of the record, said it was satisfied that substantial evidence supported PERB's determination and declined to disturb it.

Finally, the Appellate Division considered PERB's counterclaim seeking enforcement of its remedial order.** Noting that PERB's issuing remedial orders "are peculiarly matters within its administrative competence" and "should be upheld if [they] can be reasonably applied," the Appellate Division concluded that PERB's determination sought to stop an improper employer practice, a function that was within its purview. 

Determining that the remedies ordered by PERB can be reasonably applied  by State and are not unduly burdensome,  the Appellate Division held that "PERB is entitled to a judgment of enforcement of its remedial order." 


The court then confirmed PERB's determination with respect to PBA's improper practice charge, without costs and dismissed State's petition seeking to vacate PERB's decision.

* The ALJ dismissed the charge alleging a violation of Civil Service Law § 209-a (1) (a), finding no record evidence to support this charge.

** The remedial order required State to "[c]ease and desist from unilaterally implementing the work schedules and required that affected employees be made "whole for wages and/or lost benefits, if any."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_02963.htm

Imposing a wage freeze on certain employees of a political subdivision of the State

In March, 2011, the Nassau County Interim Finance Authority [NIFA] imposed a year-long wage freeze on Nassau County employees. 

Fifteen unions representing these employees sued NIFA, its directors, and other County officials, contending that the wage freeze, because it was a legislative act that was not reasonable and necessary to achieve NIFA’s purported goal of fiscal soundness, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution* to the extent the freeze obviated the relevant compensation provisions set out in various collective bargaining agreements between Nassau County and the several employee organizations then in place.

Federal district court granted NIFA's motion for summary judgment. The court held that NIFA’s implementation of the wage freeze was administrative, in contrast to being legislative, and, therefore, "did not implicate the Contracts Clause."

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, assuming, without deciding, that NIFA’s imposition of the wage freeze was legislative in nature, concluded that the wage freeze was a reasonable and necessary means to achieve NIFA’s asserted end of "ensuring the continued fiscal health of the County."

For that reason, said the court, NIFA's action "did not violate the Contracts Clause," and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1e649443-151b-448e-a6b8-0d08ae00804d/1/doc/18-1587_complete_opn.pdf#xml=https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/1e649443-151b-448e-a6b8-0d08ae00804d/1/hilite/


CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com