Increasing workday hours held to adversely affect employee leave credits

Increasing workday hours held to adversely affect employee leave credits
Nagy v Board, Sup. Ct., Conn, #16003

Connecticut’s Supreme Court ruled that increasing the workday hours of state employees from seven hours to eight hours per day “devaluates” their accrued annual and sick leave credits. The remedy: increase the value of the employees’ annual and sick leave credits pro rata to the increase in their workday.

Two state assistant attorney generals, Robert A. Nagy and Hugh Barber, sued Connecticut contending that their standard seven-hour workday had been gradually lengthened to eight hours and this resulted in the devaluation of their previously earned leave accruals. The basic argument advanced by Connecticut: the relevant law provided for granting, and using, vacation and sick leave in “hour units” and therefore employees were to be charged on an “hour for hour” bases regardless of the employees’ rate of leave credit accumulation.

Nagy and Barber, on the other hand, contended that Connecticut’s interpretation resulted in their having to use eight hours of credit to cover a day of absence despite the fact that they had previously been limited to accruing credits based on a seven-hour workday: that is, they had accrued a day of credit equated to seven hours of leave time but were now required to use eight hours of leave time credit if they were absent for a day.

The court agreed and in effect held that Nagy and Barber were being “overcharged” leave credits for each “eight-hour day” of absence under the circumstances. It directed Connecticut to correct the situation.
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Governor Paterson names New York State’s Chief Diversity Officer

Governor Paterson names New York State’s Chief Diversity Officer
Source: Office of the Governor

N.B. On October 1, 2010 Governor David A. Paterson announced that Carra Wallace has declined the appointment to the position of Chief Diversity Officer of New York State.

The Governor has asked Charlotte Hitchcock, his Chief of Staff, to assume the duties of this statutory role until December 31. In conjunction with the Governor's Counsel's office, Ms. Hitchcock was the point person for negotiations with the Legislature on the successful passage of this bill.

Governor Paterson had initially appointed Carra Wallace as the State’s first Chief Diversity Officer effective October 15, 2010. This position in the Executive Chamber was established pursuant to §4-a of the Executive Law.*

The Chief Diversity Officer is one of three positions in the Executive Chamber created by law. The other two are the “Secretary to the Governor” and the “Counsel to the governor.”**

According to the Office of the Governor, the Chief Diversity Officer's responsibilities include:

• Advising the Governor and the agencies regarding any measures necessary to ensure full compliance with Article fifteen-a of the Executive Law, the statute governing contracting with minority and women's business enterprises;

• Engaging in other actions assigned to him or her by the Governor relating to diversity in hiring or promotion of the State workforce and in encouraging diversity practices;

• Advising and assisting the Governor in formulating policies relating to workforce diversity and minority and women's business enterprises;

• Working with the director of the Division of Minority and Women's Business Development to prepare an annual plan for ensuring full compliance with article fifteen-a;

• Serving as a member of the State procurement council;

• Serving as the Governor's liaison with organizations representing minority and women-owned business enterprises and other organizations related to diversity in the State workforce and in State contracting;

• Serving as the Governor's liaison to the small business advisory council for issues related to the creation of a diverse workforce and State procurement practices relating to minority and women-owned business enterprises; and

• Reviewing and consulting with the director of minority and women's business development regarding policies relating to minority and women-owned business enterprise contract specialists at State agencies.

* §4-a of the Executive Law takes effect October 13, 2010.

** See §4 of the Executive Law.
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OATH hearing officer denies 9-month postponement of disciplinary hearing while individual is on §72 disability leave

OATH hearing officer denies 9-month postponement of disciplinary hearing while individual is on §72 disability leave
New York City Department of Consumer Affairs v Santamaria, OATH Index #2455/10
NYPPL
The New York City Department of Consumer Affairs filed §75 disciplinary charges against Randi Santamaria alleging various acts of insubordination and “carelessness.” After several adjournments by both parties, Consumer Affairs asked the Administrative Law Judge to go forward with the disciplinary hearing scheduled for August 19 and 20, 2010.

Santamaria, however, had earlier requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act based upon her mental health, her second request for such leave within the last two years. Consumer Affairs then had Santamaria evaluated by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist found Santamaria “mentally unfit to work” and Consumer Affairs placed her on “a one-year involuntary leave under §72 of the Civil Service Law” effective May 13, 2010.

Prior to the scheduled disciplinary hearing Santamaria’s attorney asked for a stay of the §75 action based on Santamaria being place on §72 leave by the agency. Santamaria's attorney also stated that he was requesting a stay pending “the resolution" of the §72 proceedings and suggested that "should [Santamaria] not be able to return to work within the year, she could be terminated under §73 and the §75 case would be rendered moot.”*

Although OATH’s Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner said that he was “skeptical of the legal soundness” of Consumer Affair’s decision “to proceed with a §75 proceeding immediately after finding an employee unfit and placing her out on involuntary leave, based upon the same acts charged in the misconduct case … nevertheless, [Santamaria's] request for a nine-month stay is problematic and cannot be granted.”**

Noting that an OATH Administrative Law Judge “possesses the power to adjourn an action ‘for good cause,’ lengthy adjournments due to another pending action have not been found to constitute sufficient cause and have generally been denied.”

Judge Spooner cited Department of Correction v. Noriega-Harvey, OATH Index No. 575/93, (“pendency of related litigation has apparently never been sufficient basis for grant of an indefinite adjournment of an OATH trial.”) and Department of Environmental Protection v. Bellach, OATH Index No. 1574/08 (denying respondent’s request for a stay of a disciplinary hearing during the pendency of criminal proceedings)” in support of his determination.

* This is not entirely accurate as an individual terminated from §72 leave pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law has the right to reinstatement to his or her former position in the event he or she applies for such reinstatement with the responsible civil service commission within one year after the termination of such disability. In the event the commission’s medical examiner certifies that the individual is physically and mentally fit to perform the duties of his or her former position, he or she is to be reinstated if a suitable position is available or place on a preferred list, depending on the situation.

** On this point ALJ Spooner said that at “the very least, the medical officer’s finding of unfitness in May 2010 would appear to significantly undermine the agency’s ability to establish, at a §75 hearing, that [Santamaria's] actions constituted intentional misconduct. At worst, seeking to punish an employee for conduct caused by a disability could arguably defy the entire policy underlying the legislature’s enactment of Civil Service Law §72 as an alternative to §75,” citing Dep’t of Housing Preservation & Development v. Chambart, OATH Index No. 380/84..

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/10_Cases/10-2455md.pdf