ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

June 05, 2012

Selected Rulings posted by PERB


Selected Rulings posted by PERB 
Matter of Chemung County Sheriff’s Association, Inc., Decision 44 PERB 3026, U-29007

The Board reversed a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that had found that the Chemung County Sheriff’s Association, Inc. (Association) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it sought interest arbitration of a nonarbitrable proposal under §209.4(g) of the Act.

The Board held that the joint employer’s second amended charge, which alleged for the first time that the Association’s General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c hearing proposal was nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act, was untimely because it did not relate back to the joint employer’s original claim challenging the mandatory nature of the proposal under the Act.

Finally, the Board held that the Association’s GML §207-c hearing proposal to permit a hearing officer to issue a binding decision, subject to review by the courts under CPLR Article 78, was mandatory under City of Watertown v. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 97 NY2d 73, [33 PERB 7007].

June 04, 2012

Recipient of workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer “in its landlord role”



Recipient of workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her employer “in its landlord role”
Weiner v City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 04207, Court of Appeals

Mark Weiner was employed by the New York City Fire Department as an Emergency Medical Technician. Injured in the course of his performing his duties, he applied for, and received, workers' compensation benefits from his employer - the City of New York.

Weiner subsequently sued the City and the New York City Parks and Recreation Department alleging both “common law negligence and a cause of action under General Municipal Law §205-a.” According to Weiner, the City-maintained boardwalk was poorly illuminated, resulting in his being injured.

The Appellate Division, reversing a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, held that Weiner's action was barred by his receipt of workers' compensation benefits and that he could not sue the City “in its landlord role.”

The Court of Appeals, citing Gonzales v Armac Indus., 81 NY2d 1, sustained the Appellate Division’s decision, commenting that worker’s compensation benefits are "[t]he sole and exclusive remedy of an employee against his employer for injuries in the course of employment."

The Court explained that "In exchange for the security of knowing that fixed benefits will be paid without the need to resort to expensive and sometimes risky litigation, … the employee has been asked to pay a price in the form of the loss of his [or her] common-law right to sue his [or her] employer in tort and perhaps to enjoy a more substantial recovery through a jury award."


In the words of the court: “Weiner's principal argument relies on a difference in wording between General Municipal Law § 205-a (pertaining to firefighters) and General Municipal Law §205-e (pertaining to police officers). Section 205-e contains the same statement found in §205-a that the cause of action created by the statute exists "[i]n addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law" (General Municipal Law §205-e [1]).


However, said the Court, in addition §205-e explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be deemed to expand or restrict any right afforded to or limitation imposed upon an employer, an employee or his or her representative by virtue of any provisions of the workers' compensation law."

Although Weiner argued that the omission of this §205-e language concerning workers' compensation law in §205-a was deliberate, the Court said that it disagreed, holding that “Had the Legislature intended to give firefighters, but not police officers, the right to sue as well as receive workers' compensation benefits, this distinction, we are certain, would have been evident in the legislative history.” Rather, concluded the court, “it was not the intent of the Legislature to allow recipients of workers' compensation benefits to sue their employers in tort under §205-a.”*

Noting that it was not addressing the question of whether emergency medical technicians who are employed by fire departments and are not recipients of workers' compensation benefits are entitled to the right of action provided by §205-a, or whether the right of action is limited to firefighters, the Court noted that it has “long refused to condone the circumvention of the Workers' Compensation scheme by means of a theory that would allow an employer to be sued in its capacity as property owner.”

Here, said the court, “[a]n employer remains an employer in [its] relations with [its] employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment" and Weiner's injuries arose from and were connected with his employment as an emergency medical technician.


* See the Governor's "Approval Memorandum" in the "bill jacket" of Chapter 703 of the Laws of 1996.


The decision is posted on the Internet at:


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General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c- a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/for additional information about this electronic reference manual.

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Administrative Law Judge holds that intent is a pre-requisite for a finding of misconduct

Administrative Law Judge holds that intent is a pre-requisite for a finding of misconduct
OATH Index No. 802/12

A sanitation worker was charged with committing misconduct for being absent without leave (“AWOL”).

The worker, however, established that he was absent on the days charged because voices told him he would be killed if he attended in the course of the disciplinary hearing. The worker also submitted medical records documenting a history of his mental disability.*

Because intent is a pre-requisite for a finding of misconduct, OATH Administrative Law Judge Faye Lewis recommended dismissal of the charges.

In the words of Judge Lewis, “Where respondent’s disability caused him to have a sincere belief that he would be killed if he went to work, he cannot be blamed for not doing so. Respondent lacked the intent that is a prerequisite under section 75 of the Civil Service Law for a finding of misconduct. Therefore, his absence without authorization did not constitute misconduct.”

The ALJ also noted that the agency is not precluded from seeking to place the employee on disability leave [see Civil Service Law §72.

* In an administrative disciplinary action the accused “may defend against the charges by showing that he [or she] lacked the requisite intent to commit the charged misconduct because he was mentally incapacitated. Such a defense is in the nature of an affirmative defense which respondent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence.” Health & Hospitals Corp. (Lincoln Medical & Mental Health Ctr.) v. Bruce, OATH Index No. 138/10

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-0802.pdf

Changing payroll-payment mode a mandatory subject of collective bargaining


Changing payroll-payment mode a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
United College Employees of Fashion Institute of Technology and Fashion Institute of Technology, PERB U-27057

The Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ that FIT violated §209a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally changed a past practice of paying day adjunct faculty represented by UCE on the basis of 16 weeks of work, thereby reducing their salaries by one-sixteenth.

Finding that a cognizable past practice of payment for 15 weeks of instruction and one week of registration had existed for almost 30 years established a reasonable expectation that it would continue unchanged, the Board rejected FIT's argument that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the practice.

The amount in the annual budget represented by the 16th week, the actions of management employees in approving both payroll and the budget along with the longevity of the practice were considered by the Board.

The Board also found that the practice involved wages and the method for calculating the payment of salary, both mandatory subjects of negotiations.

Finally, the Board rejected FIT's argument that the payment for the 16th week, during which little or no duties might be performed, was an unconstitutional gift of public monies.

Discrimination complaint dismissed because law did not require an accommodation at the time the request for an accommodation was made

Discrimination complaint dismissed because law did not require an accommodation at the time the request for an accommodation was made
Rappo v NYS Division of Human Rights, 57 AD3d 217

The New York State Division of Human Rights dismissed Frances V. Rappo’s claim that she had been unlawfully discriminated against by her former employer, the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA). Rappo alleged that HRA had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.

The Appellate Division dismissed Rappo’s petition, explaining that at the time she made her request for a reasonable accommodation of her disability Executive Law §292(21) -- New York State’s Human Rights Law -- did not require an employer to provide "reasonable accommodations" of an applicant’s or an employee’s disability.

Further, the court said that substantial evidence supports the determination that HRA was not required to provide Rappo with a job transfer as a reasonable accommodation, since she failed to demonstrate that she could not perform the essential duties of her then present job and that she would be able to perform the essential duties of another job.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09447.htm

June 01, 2012

Failure to designate the §75 disciplinary action hearing officer in writing is a fatal procedural defect

Failure to designate the §75 disciplinary action hearing officer in writing is a fatal procedural defect 
Arthur v  Soares,  2012 NY Slip Op 04255, Appellate Division, 3rd Dept.

The Albany County District Attorney, P. David Soares,  filed disciplinary charges pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law against one of his subordinates, D. Richard Arthur, then serving as the office’s Director of Administration.

The Hearing Officer found Arthur guilty of the charges and recommended that he be terminated from his position. Soares adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation and dismissed Arthur from his position. Arthur file a petition pursuant to Article 78 seeking a court order vacating Soares' action.

The Appellate Division annulled Soares' decision, finding “the record evinces that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction.” and directed that Arthur be reinstated to his former position with back pay and benefits.*

The court noted that Civil Service Law §75(2), provides that a hearing on employee disciplinary charges "shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body in writing for that purpose" [emphasis supplied].

It is well settled, said the Appellate Division, that absent "a written delegation authorizing a deputy or other person to conduct the hearing," the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to conduct the §75 disciplinary hearing,  citing Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 385, among other decisions.

Significantly, the Appellate Division, Third Department had earlier ruled that the requirements of Civil Service Law §75(2) could be satisfied by a written record of such designation such as the minutes of a board meeting at which a resolution was adopted appointing the hearing officer or a letter to the hearing officer advising him or her that the official designation has taken place. In contrast, the court observed that “correspondence to the hearing officer that does not reference the official designation is insufficient, as is written notice to the [accused] of the hearing officer's identity.”

The Appellate Division found that there was no evidence in the record on appeal that the appointing authority had ever designated the Hearing Officer in a writing sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. The court specifically noted that reference to the designation of the hearing officer in the notice of charges sent to Arthur is not sufficient in the absence of any evidence of the written designation itself.”**

In addition, the employee’s failure to object to the absence of such written designation “is of no moment, inasmuch as this jurisdictional defect cannot be waived,” said the court, citing Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 AD3d at 1095. This clearly implies that the individual being disciplined has no duty to inform the appointing authority of this procedural defect.

As the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction to conduct the hearing, his determination and Soares’ adoption thereof are nullities and Arthur, said the court, “must be restored to his former position with back pay and benefits.”

The court also noted that while courts employ the substantial evidence standard of review in resolving challenges to Civil Service Law §75 determinations, the disciplinary hearing officer does not review an employer's disciplinary actions taken against a public employee "to determine whether those actions were undertaken based upon substantial evidence," as occurred in Arthur's disciplinary proceeding; rather," it remains the responsibility of the hearing officer to weigh the evidence and resolve credibility determinations."

Further, said the court, "administrative findings of fact must be made in such a manner that the parties may be assured that the decision is based on the evidence in the record, uninfluenced by extralegal considerations, so as to permit intelligent challenge by an aggrieved party and adequate judicial review."

* The Appellate Division also held that the hearing officer “did not properly weigh the evidence, and failed to adequately detail the specific factual findings and hearing evidence relied upon.”

** Such notice to the accused has been deemed to satisfy the statutory mandate when the appointing authority separately issues a written resolution incorporating the notice by reference (Scharf v Levittown Union Free School Dist., 294 AD2d 508, lv denied 98 NY2d 613).

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The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State. This more than 1500 page e-book is now available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual.

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Employer’s abolishment of a position challenged


Employer’s abolishment of a position challenged
Eugenio v City of Yonkers, N.Y, 2012 NY Slip Op 04006, Appellate Division, Second Department

When the City Council of the City of Yonkers abolished the position of Clerk II Spanish Speaking, the former incumbent filed an Article 78 petition seeking a court order reinstating her to her former position with back pay. Supreme Court denied the petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Appellate Division explained that "[A] public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency." In the event that action is challenged, the challenger “has the burden of proving that the employer did not act in good faith in abolishing the position."

Finding that Supreme Court properly determined that the former incumbent failed to sustain her burden of proving her position was abolished in bad faith, the Appellate Division commented that under the circumstances, the former employee’s request for further inquiry amounted to "no more than an expression of hope insufficient to warrant deferral of judgment"

As to mechanics involved in abolishing a position, the Attorney General has concluded that there must be an actual, official abolishment of a position in order to lawfully remove an employee from his or her position pursuant to these §§80 and 80-a of the Civil Service Law (1976 Opinions of the Attorney General 7).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.
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Changing the employees’ tours of duty and work schedules alleged a violation of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith

Changing the employees’ tours of duty and work schedules alleged a violation of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith
Matter of the Town of Fishkill, Decisions of the Public Employment Relations Board, U-27331, U-27568

The Board affirmed a decision of an ALJ dismissing a portion of an improper practice charge filed by PBA alleging that the Town of Fishkill (Town) violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when the Town changed the tours of duty and work schedules of two PBA officers thereby reducing their total weekly hours of work.

The Board rejected, as meritless, the PBA’s assertion that the ALJ misconstrued the allegations of the charge with the Board citing to the specific allegations of the charge.

The Board also rejected PBA’s claim that the ALJ erred in her conclusion regarding the number of hours worked by the two PBA officers noting that the evidence presented concerning the respective length of tours and workweeks was incomplete and confusing, at best.

Finally, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the Town had satisfied its duty to bargaining under the Act.

Due to the fact that the relevant contractual terms could reasonably be interpreted to have more than one meaning, the Board considered parol evidence in the record in determining that the Town satisfied its duty to negotiate the at-issue subject. 

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