Courts are to determine the appropriate balance between personal privacy and public interests in considering the appeal of a denial of a Freedom of Information [FOIL] request

Courts are to determine the appropriate balance between personal privacy and public interests in considering the appeal of a denial of a Freedom of Information [FOIL] request

Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2013 NY Slip Op 01026, Appellate Division, First Department

Noting that the Legislature declared in enacting Public Officers Law §84, "[t]he people's right to know the process of governmental decision-making and to review the documents and statistics leading to determinations is basic to our society and that access to such information 'should not be thwarted by shrouding it with the cloak of secrecy or confidentiality,'" the Appellate Division rejected the New York City Department of Education General Counsel’s denial of Michael P. Thomas’ administrative appeal challenging the refusal of the Central Record Access Officer [CRAO] to provide him with records demanded in his FOIL request.

The General Counsel had concluded that CRAO's determination denying Thomas’ request fell "well within the bounds" of the “Committee on Open Government's published advisory opinions denying FOIL requests in the context of unsubstantiated complaints, and that redaction of identifying details would not protect the personal privacy of the subject individuals” because Thomas had filed the underlying complaint and therefore knew the identity of the persons even were their names redacted.

The Appellate Division disagreed, holding that under FOIL government records are presumptively available to the public unless they are statutorily exempted by Public Officers Law §87(2) and "Those exemptions are to be narrowly construed, with the burden resting on the agency to demonstrate that the requested material indeed qualifies for exemption" citing Hanig v State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehicles. 79 NY2d 106.

Finding that Thomas’ complaint pertained to certain administrators' performance of their official duties when applying for and using federal funds, the Appellate Division remanded the matter to the lower court “for an in camera inspection of the documents to determine if redaction could strike an appropriate balance between personal privacy and public interests and which material could be properly disclosed.”

In addition, the Appellate Division directed the lower court to determine whether portions of the documents may be exempt from disclosure as intra- or inter-agency records that are not statistical or factual data under Public Officers Law §87[2][g].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01026.htm

Was the decision supported by substantial evidence is the judicial standard of review of a decision made after an administrative hearing required by law

Was the decision supported by substantial evidence is the judicial standard of review of a decision made after an administrative hearing required by law

The Westchester County Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Facilities adopted the report and recommendation of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75, finding the individual guilty of certain disciplinary charges, and terminated the individual's employment.

The Appellate Division sustained the Commissioner’s decision, explaining that “The standard of review of an administrative determination ‘made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law’ is whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.”

Finding that substantial evidence in the record supported the determination that the individual was guilty of the disciplinary charges, the court said that in this instance the penalty imposed, termination, was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.

In contrast, in Christopher v Phillips, 160 A.D.2d 1165, motion to appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 706, the Appellate Division, Third Department, decided a case in which the due process implications of a “non-mandatory” disciplinary hearing were considered.

In Christopher the court ruled that “if a hearing is not required by law, the substantial evidence standard of review does not apply....” Instead, said the Appellate Division, “the appropriate standard for the purpose of judicial review [in such a situation] is whether the determination is arbitrary or capricious.” The fact that a hearing was held even when not required by law does not alter the applicability of that standard.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_02071.htm

The appeal of a grievance challenging disciplinary action taken against an employee is controlled by the appeal procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement

The appeal of a grievance challenging disciplinary action taken against an employee is controlled by the appeal procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement
State of New York - Unified Ct. Sys. v Association of Surrogate's & Supreme Ct. Reporters within the City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 02155, Appellate Division, First Department

In Unified Court System the Appellate Division considered the viability of demanding that an appeal of a grievance challenging disciplinary action taken against an employee be submitted to arbitration. Its conclusion: the availability of arbitration to challenge an employer’s disciplinary decision is controlled by the appeal procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement.

Although the typical collective bargaining agreement [CBA] provides that an appeal of a grievance challenging disciplinary action taken against an employee is ultimately to be submitted to arbitration, in this instance the Appellate Division unanimously reversed a Supreme Court order compelling the arbitration of a disciplinary termination of an employee in the collective bargaining unit and “permanently stayed” the arbitration.

The court explained that although it did not find any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition barring the arbitration of this dispute involving the termination of an employee, the relevant CBA did not provide for the arbitration of the employer's disciplinary determination.

The Appellate Division said that its review of the CBA indicated that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate such a dispute. Rather, said the court, the CBA provided that an employee aggrieved by a disciplinary penalty or punishment “may appeal from the determination by petition to the Chief Administrative Judge or by an application pursuant to CPLR Article 78.”

Accordingly, the arguments presented in support of the Association's demand for arbitration to consider the matter as a contract grievance or, in the alternative, as a non-contract grievance, were deemed irrelevant and the Article set out in the CBA that the Association contended provided for the arbitration of this dispute was held inapplicable in this instance.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_02155.htm