ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

December 06, 2013

Termination follows employee’s refusal to participate in training in a new position


Termination follows employee’s refusal to participate in training in a new position
2013 NY Slip Op 08115, Appellate Division, First Department

Employer filed disciplinary charges against Employee alleging misconduct after Employee refused to comply with orders to participate in training for a new position after being reassigned to a different department and absenting himself from work for more than 11 months. Found guilty of the charges and specifications, Employee was terminated from his position.

The Appellate Division sustained Employer’s action, holding that substantial evidence supported its determination. The court also stated that the penalty imposed, termination, was not so disproportionate to Employee’s offense as to shock its sense of fairness, explaining that the evidence established that Employer’s requirement that Employee participate in processing training was not in excess of its authority.

In addition, the court mentioned that Employee had not observed the rule of "work now, grieve later" and that Employee had failed to show that any exceptions to the rule applied in Employee’s situation, citing Ferreri v New York State Thruway Authority, 62 NY2d 855.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_08115.htm
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December 05, 2013

Transgender client of New York City's HIV/AIDS Service Administration sue after agency refused to change its records to reflect her legal name and change of gender



Transgender client of New York City's HIV/AIDS Service Administration sues after agency refused to change its records to reflect her legal name and change of gender
Doe v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 23403, Supreme Court, New York County 


A transgender female client of the New York City Human Resources Administration's (HRA) HIV/AIDS Services Administration (HASA) sued HASA after her request that HASA update its records to reflect her legal name change and change of gender information and provide her with a benefits card to reflect this was denied.

Supreme Court Judge Margaret A. Chan ruled that, accepting the allegations as true for the purposes of HASA’s motion to dismiss Doe’s action, HASA’s purposeful use of masculine pronouns in addressing plaintiff, who "presented as female" and the insistence that she sign a document with her birth name despite the court-issued name change order is laden with discriminatory intent. 

The court, rejecting HASA's motion to dismiss Doe's complaint, said that HASA employees knew of Doe's "convertive surgery" and yet did not treat her accordingly or appropriately and thus Doe has sufficiently stated a cause of action.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_23403.htm
 

December 04, 2013

Powers of the arbitrator set out in a collective bargaining agreement may not be enlarged without the informed agreement of the parties



Powers of the arbitrator set out in a collective bargaining agreement may not be enlarged without the informed agreement of the parties
Town of Babylon v Carson, 2013 NY Slip Op 07980, Appellate Division, Second Department

In this Article 75 action, the Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court ruling that vacated an arbitration award that provided a lesser penalty than the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, granting the union’s motion to confirm the arbitration award.

Following a “workplace incident,” the Town of Babylon told one of its employees [Employee] that she was suspended without pay for up to 30 days, pending a disciplinary hearing on four charges of alleged misconduct. The hearing officer sustained all four charges and recommended that Employee be suspended for 30 days without pay and placed on probation for a period of six months.

Employee’s union filed a grievance and demand for arbitration. At the initial meeting of the parties the arbitrator stated that "the first item of business is to stipulate the issue." The Town's attorney and the union’s attorney agreed that the issue to be determined was:

1. Was there just cause to suspend [Employee] for 30 days and to impose a six-month probationary period for her conduct …and 30-day suspension is without pay? and

2. Was progressive discipline considered when imposing that sanction?

3. And if not, what shall the remedy be?

The parties then proceeded with the arbitration. Ultimately the arbitrator concluded that the hearing officer properly determined that although there was just cause to impose a penalty upon Employee, the Town did not apply the principles of progressive discipline.

Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that the imposition of a less severe disciplinary penalty was warranted and directed that 10 days' pay be restored to Employee, and that the term of probation be reduced to three months.

The Town filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR seeking to vacate so much of the arbitration award as reduced the penalty imposed upon Employee by the Town while the union and Employee cross-petitioned to confirm the arbitration award providing for a lesser penalty..

Supreme Court decided that, "notwithstanding the restrictive language of the [collective bargaining agreement] which would seem to preclude the arbitrator from reducing a penalty absent a finding that the discipline imposed was not for just cause,'" it was "evident from the terms of the parties' submission to the arbitrator that the parties intended to confer a broader authority on him." The Supreme Court then denied the Town’s the petition and granting the cross petition.

The Appellate Division commenced its review of the Supreme Court’s ruling by noting that "Judicial review of an arbitrator's award is extremely limited" and that a court may vacate an arbitration award pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) "only if it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

Further, said the court, “A party can only waive its contention that an arbitrator acted in excess of his or her power ‘by participating in the arbitration with full knowledge’ of the alleged error that is being committed and ‘by failing to object until after the award’ is issued.”

Citing Article X(E)(6) of the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between the parties, which provided that "[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to restore any fine, any penalty including loss of vacation or personal days, reinstate any discharged employee, with or without back pay or remove any written reprimand in the event he [or she] finds the discipline imposed was not for just cause", the Appellate Division decided that the Town had not consented to the arbitrator having authority to modify the penalty imposed upon Employee in the event that he made a finding that the Town had just cause to discipline her.

The Appellate Division, noting that at the beginning of the arbitration, the issue to be determined was defined as whether there was just cause to punish Employee and, "if not," what the remedy should be, explained that “As framed in this manner, the issue to be determined by the arbitrator was in accordance with his powers, as set forth in Article X(E)(6) of the CBA, which only empowered the arbitrator to provide [Employee] with a remedy upon a finding that the imposition of discipline was not founded on just cause.

As the arbitrator found that there was just cause for the discipline imposed, the Appellate Division held that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in reducing the penalty imposed. Further, said the court, “Contrary to the contention of the Union and [Employee], the stipulation that the arbitrator would determine whether the hearing officer had considered progressive discipline in the course of imposing the initial penalty upon [Employee] did not confer upon the arbitrator an independent power to reduce the penalty imposed.”

Commenting that the record reflects that the Town did not participate in the arbitration with full knowledge that the arbitrator intended to render a determination in excess of the powers set forth in the CBA, the Appellate Division ruled that that “Supreme Court erred in denying the petition to vacate so much of the arbitration award as reduced the penalty imposed upon [Employee] and erred in granting the cross petition of [Employee] and the Union to confirm the award.”
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The decision is posted on the Internet at:
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December 03, 2013

Automatic termination of certain NYC Emergency Medical Service employees violating the Department’s zero drug tolerance policy not subject to collective bargaining



Automatic termination of certain NYC Emergency Medical Service employees violating the Department’s zero drug tolerance policy not subject to collective bargaining
Roberts v New York City Off. of Collective Collective Bargaining, 2013 NY Slip Op 07870, Appellate Division, First Department

The issue raised in this appeal was whether the New York City Fire Department’s policy of "zero tolerance" regarding the use of illegal drug that required automatic termination of certain emergency medical services [EMS] employees who fail or refuse to provide a specimen for a drug test is subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

The New York City Board of Collective Bargaining decided that this policy was not subject to collective bargaining under the Taylor Law [Civil Service Law Article 14].

The Appellate Division upheld the Board’s determination, explaining that [1] “the City Charter provides that the discipline of these EMS employees is the sole province of the New York City Fire Commissioner” and [2] “the Fire Department's determination of an appropriate penalty for illegal drug use relates to its primary mission of providing public safety.”

Initially the Department’s “no illegal drug” policy did not always result in the termination of EMS workers who tested positive for drugs and in some instances “first-time offenders could avoid termination, in the discretion of FDNY on a case-by-case basis, if they sought counseling and treatment.”

However in May 2007 the Department implemented a new alcohol and drug testing policy for EMS workers which imposed a "zero tolerance" for illegal drug use, and provided that “EMS workers who test positive for illegal drugs, or who refuse to provide a specimen, shall be terminated for a first offense.” However, the policy also provided that EMS workers with a drug problem who voluntarily come forward could avail themselves of counseling services without any disciplinary consequences.

The Union representing EMTs and paramedics filed an improper practice petition alleging that the Department had violated the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 12-301 et seq.) by unilaterally implementing the termination provision without first bargaining in good faith with the unions. The Department contended that the termination provision was not a substantive change in policy and, in any event, was not subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

Although the Board found that the new policy deviated from the earlier policy, which allowed for some exercise of discretion in deciding whether offenders should be offered alternative dispositions, including counseling and rehabilitation, it ruled that the new automatic termination provision was within management's right to take disciplinary action against its employees, and thus was outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.

The Appellate Division said that while “[t]here is no question that New York has a strong policy of supporting collective bargaining, and a presumption exists that all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory bargaining,” this presumption can be overcome where there exists clear legislative intent to remove an issue from mandatory bargaining

Citing Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 6 NY3d at 563, the Appellate Division noted that the Court of Appeals held that “police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when the Legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials.”

Subsequently the Court of Appeals ruled that “the triggers and methodology for testing city police officers for drugs are matters within the Police Commissioner's disciplinary authority and thus excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy” [Matter of the City of New York v Patrolmen’s Benevolent Asso., 14 NY3d 465.

The Appellate Division held that these two decisions by the Court of Appeals mandate a conclusion that [Department’s] implementation of a policy of terminating EMS workers after failing or refusing to take a drug test is not subject to collective bargaining” as New York City Charter §487(a) gives the Fire Commissioner the "sole and exclusive power" to "perform all duties for the government, discipline, management, maintenance and direction of the fire department."

The policy of deterring illegal drug use by EMS workers is just as crucial as the policy of preventing police officers from using prohibited drugs and the Department “has a substantial and compelling interest in ensuring that workers responsible for the well-being and transportation of injured and sick citizens are free from the effects of illegal drugs.”

The Appellate Division also noted that the Court of Appeals has ruled that a public employer “cannot be compelled to bargain over ‘inherent and fundamental policy decisions relating to the primary mission of the public employer," citing Matter of New York City Tr. Auth., 19 NY3d 876.

Because the determination of the appropriate penalty for drug use by EMS workers goes directly to the Department’s core mission and involves public safety, and because specific legislation vests disciplinary authority over such matters with the Fire Commissioner, this issue is removed altogether from the sphere of collective bargaining.

The Union has also contended that the Department’s automatic termination policy “interferes with EMS workers' procedural due process rights to have an administrative law judge or arbitrator determine the appropriate penalty”

The Appellate Division disagreed, noting that the employee’s due process rights “were not abrogated completely by the challenged policy because they still are entitled to a hearing on any charges arising from drug testing, and to appeal any finding of guilt.” Further, said the court, the Union’s primary position that penalties for specific offenses must always be collectively bargained is a position that is at odds with both the City Charter and controlling Court of Appeals precedent.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


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December 02, 2013

Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption Releases Preliminary Report


Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption Releases Preliminary Report
Source: Press Office, Moreland Commission



On December 2, 2013 the Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption announced its findings and recommendations. The Commission was charged by Governor Cuomo on July 2, 2013 to probe systemic public corruption and the appearance of such corruption in state government, political campaigns and elections in New York State. The report today reflects the findings of the Commission and makes recommendations to toughen and improve existing laws and procedures.

Commission's Preliminary report recommends Campaign Finance Reform, Independent Election Law Enforcement Agency, New Laws and Tougher Penalties, and New Disclosure Rules.

The Commission specifically investigated the effectiveness of New York’s campaign finance laws, the management and affairs of the State Board of Elections, the weaknesses of laws relating to lobbying, conflicts of interest, public ethics, the use of tax-exempt organizations to influence public policy and elections, and the strength and effectiveness of our criminal laws with respect to public corruption and abuses of public trust.

The preliminary report is divided into four areas that the Commission has focused on thus far in its investigation: campaign finance, enforcement at the Board of Elections, the adequacy of current laws for effectively prosecuting corruption and outside income of legislators and legislative discretionary funding.

The Commission’s preliminary report is posted on the Internet at:
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Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 30, 2013


Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending November 30, 2013
Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report  

Comptroller DiNapoli School Audits Municipal Audits

On November 27, 2013 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed audits of




Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli on November 27, 2013 announced his office completed audits of







the Westford Fire District.


"The (Untapped) Carbon Conundrum" Joint Op–Ed by Comptroller DiNapoli and CALPERS CEO Stausboll

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and CALPERS CEO Anne Stausboll have published a joint op–edon The Huffington Post entitled, “The (Untapped) Carbon Conundrum” which details why a consortium of over 70 leading institutional investors asked 45 of the world’s largest fossil fuel companies to assess how their business plans fare in a low–carbon future.


DiNapoli Appoints Catherine Lynch to Pension Investment Advisory Committee

Catherine A. Lynch has been named to the Investment Advisory Committee of the $160.7 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced on Wednesday, November 27, 2013..
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