Video evidence considered by the administrative law judge presiding at a disciplinary hearing
OATH Index No. 266/14
The employee, a maintainer at the Verrazano Bridge, duties include driving tow trucks and assisting disabled vehicles. He was charged with several acts of dangerous and insubordinate behavior, and making false statements.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti credited a driver’s testimony that the employee tailgated her car, cursed her over a loudspeaker, and threw a water bottle into her vehicle, while he was en route to assist a disabled car.
Based on video footage, ALJ Zorgniotti also found that the employee intentionally caused a wrecker to make contact with a co-worker in order to intimidate him. Even though employee had no prior disciplinary record,
Judge Zorgniotti found that employee’s “reckless and unpredictable behavior renders him unreliable”, and recommended termination of employment.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/14_Cases/14-266.pdf
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Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
April 11, 2014
April 10, 2014
No private right of action flows from a mere statement of general policy applicable to all Civil Service employees
No private right of action flows from a mere statement of general policy applicable to all Civil Service employees
Matter of Subway Surface Supervisors Assn. v New York City Tr. Auth., 2014 NY Slip Op 02380, Court of Appeals
The Subway Surface Supervisors Association, representing employees working under the title Station Supervisor Level One (SS-I) commenced a special proceeding against the New York City Transit Authority (TA) alleging that its members were being paid a lower base salary than their claimed counterparts, Station Supervisor Level Two (SS-II), for the same type of work.
The sole allegation in the petition was that the TA violated Civil Service Law §61(2), prohibiting out-of-title work.
The TA moved to dismiss the petition on, among other grounds, failure to state a cause of action. In response, the Union abandoned its §61(2) claim and opposed the TA's motion on new, unpleaded theories, that the TA's conduct violated Civil Service Law §115 and the Equal Protection Clauses of the New York and United States Constitutions.
Supreme Court deemed the §61(2) claim abandoned and, despite the fact that the Union failed to move for leave to replead or to amend its petition to allege the new claims, concluded that the petition stated a "potential" §115 violation, but that "a factual dispute remained" concerning whether SS-Is and SS-IIs performed the same duties. It referred the disputed issue to a special referee for a hearing, but before that hearing could be held Supreme Court granted the TA leave to appeal to the Appellate Division.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed. The majority found that the petition alleged viable Civil Service Law §115 and equal protection claims. The dissenting Justices would have dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action because, in their view, §115 enunciated only a state policy and did not confer upon state courts jurisdiction to enforce that policy. The dissenters would have found the Union's Equal Protection Clause arguments to be without merit.
TA then obtained leave to appeal its ruling on the certified question whether the order of Supreme Court as affirmed by the Appellate Division was properly made.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and “the motion to dismiss the petition granted, and the certified question answered in the negative.”
The court explained that courts of this State have routinely interpreted §115 and its predecessor, the nearly identically-worded former Civil Service Law §37* "a mere statement of general policy applicable to all Civil Service employees" and that is is clear that §115 is a preamble to Civil Service Law Article VIII, and no private right of action flows from it. In contrast, said the court, Article 14 of the Civil Service Law (the Taylor Law) provides the mechanism for represented employees to challenge alleged wage disparities between classifications.
As to the Union’s Equal Protection argument, the Court of Appeals said that the Union's equal protection claims must be dismissed because the Union freely negotiated and executed the collective bargaining agreement that contained lower wage rates for SS-Is and, to the extent an equal protection claim can be raised, it must be asserted by the employees subjected to the alleged discriminatory conduct.
N.B. Justice Rivera issued a concurring opinion commenting stating “I agree that petitioner Subway Surface Supervisors Association's (SSSA) claims under the Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses should be dismissed. However, I disagree with the reasons stated for dismissal of the Civil Service Law §115 claim, and would instead dismiss that claim because SSSA failed to plead its entitlement to relief based on proper §115 equal pay for equal work allegations [and I am writing separately] to present my analysis that §115 sets forth a clear legislative mandate to ensure pay equality for state employees, guaranteed in part by a cognizable private cause of action that allows parties to challenge pay discrimination.”
* See Civil Service Law of 1909, enacted as Chapter 15 of the Laws of 1909.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02380.htm
.
Matter of Subway Surface Supervisors Assn. v New York City Tr. Auth., 2014 NY Slip Op 02380, Court of Appeals
The Subway Surface Supervisors Association, representing employees working under the title Station Supervisor Level One (SS-I) commenced a special proceeding against the New York City Transit Authority (TA) alleging that its members were being paid a lower base salary than their claimed counterparts, Station Supervisor Level Two (SS-II), for the same type of work.
The sole allegation in the petition was that the TA violated Civil Service Law §61(2), prohibiting out-of-title work.
The TA moved to dismiss the petition on, among other grounds, failure to state a cause of action. In response, the Union abandoned its §61(2) claim and opposed the TA's motion on new, unpleaded theories, that the TA's conduct violated Civil Service Law §115 and the Equal Protection Clauses of the New York and United States Constitutions.
Supreme Court deemed the §61(2) claim abandoned and, despite the fact that the Union failed to move for leave to replead or to amend its petition to allege the new claims, concluded that the petition stated a "potential" §115 violation, but that "a factual dispute remained" concerning whether SS-Is and SS-IIs performed the same duties. It referred the disputed issue to a special referee for a hearing, but before that hearing could be held Supreme Court granted the TA leave to appeal to the Appellate Division.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed. The majority found that the petition alleged viable Civil Service Law §115 and equal protection claims. The dissenting Justices would have dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action because, in their view, §115 enunciated only a state policy and did not confer upon state courts jurisdiction to enforce that policy. The dissenters would have found the Union's Equal Protection Clause arguments to be without merit.
TA then obtained leave to appeal its ruling on the certified question whether the order of Supreme Court as affirmed by the Appellate Division was properly made.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and “the motion to dismiss the petition granted, and the certified question answered in the negative.”
The court explained that courts of this State have routinely interpreted §115 and its predecessor, the nearly identically-worded former Civil Service Law §37* "a mere statement of general policy applicable to all Civil Service employees" and that is is clear that §115 is a preamble to Civil Service Law Article VIII, and no private right of action flows from it. In contrast, said the court, Article 14 of the Civil Service Law (the Taylor Law) provides the mechanism for represented employees to challenge alleged wage disparities between classifications.
As to the Union’s Equal Protection argument, the Court of Appeals said that the Union's equal protection claims must be dismissed because the Union freely negotiated and executed the collective bargaining agreement that contained lower wage rates for SS-Is and, to the extent an equal protection claim can be raised, it must be asserted by the employees subjected to the alleged discriminatory conduct.
N.B. Justice Rivera issued a concurring opinion commenting stating “I agree that petitioner Subway Surface Supervisors Association's (SSSA) claims under the Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses should be dismissed. However, I disagree with the reasons stated for dismissal of the Civil Service Law §115 claim, and would instead dismiss that claim because SSSA failed to plead its entitlement to relief based on proper §115 equal pay for equal work allegations [and I am writing separately] to present my analysis that §115 sets forth a clear legislative mandate to ensure pay equality for state employees, guaranteed in part by a cognizable private cause of action that allows parties to challenge pay discrimination.”
* See Civil Service Law of 1909, enacted as Chapter 15 of the Laws of 1909.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02380.htm
.
The Commissioner of Education to determine if two positions are sufficiently similar within the meaning of Education Law §2510 in the first instance
The Commissioner of Education to determine if two positions are sufficiently similar within the meaning of Education Law §2510 in the first instance
Matter of Alden Cent. Sch. Dist. (Alden Cent. Schools Administrators' Assn.), 2014 NY Slip Op 02185, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
The school district filed an Article 75 petition seeking to stay arbitration of a grievance challenging the level of the compensation paid to an individual represented by the union who had been laid off from her position of principal of an elementary school and thereafter appointed from the preferred list to serve as an assistant principal at a middle school at a lower salary. The union filed a cross-petition seeking to compel arbitration of the grievance, contending that the educator’s new position was “sufficiently ‘similar’ within the meaning of the Education Law §2510(3)(a) such that she is entitled to the same level of pay.”
Supreme Court denied the school district’s petition for a stay of arbitration. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the lower court’s ruling and granted the district’s petition to stay the arbitration of the grievance.
Noting that it is well settled that, in deciding an application to stay or compel arbitration under CPLR §7503 the court is concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim, the Appellate Division explained that in making the threshold determination of arbitrability, the court applies a two-part test.
A court first determines whether "there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance. If no prohibition exists, [the court then determines] whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement."
In this instance the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the school district that the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction over the parties' dispute, and that arbitration is therefore prohibited by public policy.
The court said that the Commissioner of Education has the specialized knowledge and expertise to resolve the factual issue of whether the former position and the new position are similar within the meaning of Education Law §2510(3)(a). Accordingly, concluded the Appellate Division “the Commissioner of Education should ‘resolve, in the first instance’ the issue of fact whether two positions are sufficiently similar under Education Law §2510.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02185.htm
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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.
Matter of Alden Cent. Sch. Dist. (Alden Cent. Schools Administrators' Assn.), 2014 NY Slip Op 02185, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
The school district filed an Article 75 petition seeking to stay arbitration of a grievance challenging the level of the compensation paid to an individual represented by the union who had been laid off from her position of principal of an elementary school and thereafter appointed from the preferred list to serve as an assistant principal at a middle school at a lower salary. The union filed a cross-petition seeking to compel arbitration of the grievance, contending that the educator’s new position was “sufficiently ‘similar’ within the meaning of the Education Law §2510(3)(a) such that she is entitled to the same level of pay.”
Supreme Court denied the school district’s petition for a stay of arbitration. The Appellate Division, however, reversed the lower court’s ruling and granted the district’s petition to stay the arbitration of the grievance.
Noting that it is well settled that, in deciding an application to stay or compel arbitration under CPLR §7503 the court is concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim, the Appellate Division explained that in making the threshold determination of arbitrability, the court applies a two-part test.
A court first determines whether "there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance. If no prohibition exists, [the court then determines] whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement."
In this instance the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the school district that the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction over the parties' dispute, and that arbitration is therefore prohibited by public policy.
The court said that the Commissioner of Education has the specialized knowledge and expertise to resolve the factual issue of whether the former position and the new position are similar within the meaning of Education Law §2510(3)(a). Accordingly, concluded the Appellate Division “the Commissioner of Education should ‘resolve, in the first instance’ the issue of fact whether two positions are sufficiently similar under Education Law §2510.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02185.htm
The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click On http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/ for additional information about this electronic reference manual.
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