Distinguishing between a covered employee and an independent contractor for the purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

Distinguishing between a covered employee and an independent contractor for the purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

2015 NY Slip Op 04550, Appellate Division, Third Department

A law firm [Firm] appealed a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [Board] which assessed Firm for additional unemployment insurance contributions after ruling that a claimant [Lawyer] for unemployment insurance benefits for eligible for such benefits.

Lawyer had been retained as a "contract attorney" by the Firm to perform document review services in conjunction with the litigation of a class action lawsuit. After his assignment ended, Lawyer applied for unemployment insurance benefits and . The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that Lawyer was the Firm’s employee and assessed it for additional unemployment insurance contributions as a result.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision explaining that "Whether an employer-employee relationship exists is a factual determination for the Board, and its decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence." Citing Matter of LaValley, 120 AD2d 1498, the court said that "in cases where the rendering of professional services is involved, an employment relationship can be found where there is substantial evidence of control over important aspects of the services performed other than results or means."

The decision indicates that Lawyer:

1. was paid an agreed-upon hourly rate and required to work at least 45 hours a week, but not more than 50 hours per week;

2. was given specified hours each day to report to his assigned work station;

3. was required to take a daily unpaid 30 minute lunch break and was occasionally required to report to work on weekends;

4. was allowed to take unpaid days off, provided that he requested the time off in advance;

5. received daily assignments from an associate attorney employed by the Firm and who supervised Lawyer’s work; and

6. assisted in the litigation by providing written memoranda summarizing deposition testimony, work that included Lawyer's attendance at meetings with attorneys from other firms involved in the litigation.

These elements, said the Appellate Division, constituted “substantial evidence” supporting the Board's decision that the Firm retained sufficient overall control of Lawyers services to establish an employment relationship, despite evidence in the record that could support a contrary conclusion.

Significantly, the court commented that “The fact that [Lawyer] signed a written agreement designating him as an independent contractor does not compel a different result, citing Matter of Joyce, 116 AD3d 1132.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04550.htm

Anatomy of an unlawful discrimination complaint

Anatomy of an unlawful discrimination complaint

2015 NY Slip Op 04601, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages for alleged unlawful discrimination and retaliation within the meaning of 42 USC §§1981 and 1983, the “Civil Rights Act” and for alleged violation of Executive Law §296, the State’s Human Rights Law, in connection with his employment at a State agency [Agency].  Supreme Court granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and Plaintiff appealed.

In considering Plaintiff’s appeal the Appellate Division said:

1. Aplaintiff alleging discrimination in employment has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and

2. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

If the plaintiff is able to satisfy each of these requirements, said the Appellate Division, the burden then shifts to the employer "to rebut the presumption of discrimination by clearly setting forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision."

If the employer is able to do so, the burden of going forward shifts to the plaintiff and in order to succeed on his or her claim, "the plaintiff must prove that the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination by demonstrating both that the stated reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason."

With respect to Supreme Court granting Agency’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, the court said to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a discriminatory employment action, “a defendant must demonstrate either the plaintiff's failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual.”

In this instance the Appellate Division found that after Agency demonstrated a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law while Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether any adverse employment action he allegedly suffered occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory motive.

Further, the court noted that the Agency’s setting out “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons” for its challenged actions, said that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Agency’s explanations were pretextual.

While it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices, in order to make out a claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must show that (1) he or she has engaged in protected activity; (2) his or her employer was aware of such activity; (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action based upon the protected activity; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Again, Agency demonstrated, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action alleging retaliation while Plaintiff, again, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he engaged in a protected activity or that Agency was aware of any such complaint prior to the date on which Plaintiff sent an email specifically complaining of discrimination.

The Appellate Division decided that Plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a causal connection between any protected activity in which he engaged and any adverse employment action nor did he rebut the Agency’s evidence that any adverse action taken against him was justified by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Accordingly, the court held that Supreme Court had properly granted Agency’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04601.htm

Benefit available members of union pursuant to a "Memorandum of Agreement" was a “vested lifetime benefit”

Benefit available members of union pursuant to a "Memorandum of Agreement" was a “vested lifetime benefit”

Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v Union of Automotive Technicians, 2015 NY Slip Op 05114, Appellate Division, First Department

Due to budget constraints, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey [Port Authority], effective January 1, 2011, discontinued its free E-Z Pass program available to retired Port Authority employee.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed a decision by Supreme Court modifying an arbitration award to rule that the E-Z Pass benefit as encompassed in the parties' 2006-2011 Memorandum of Agreement was a vested lifetime benefit available to retired members of the Union of Automotive Technicians in accordance with the provisions set out in the parties' 2006-2011 Memorandum of Agreement.

The court noted that “In light of our disposition of previous appeals raising the same issue, Supreme Court reached the right result in this matter,” citing Port Authority of New York and New Jersey v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Lieutenants Benevolent Association, 124 AD3d 473, among other relevant decisions.

NYPPL’s summary of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Lieutenants’ case is posted on the Internet at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2013/06/article-75-petition-seeking-to-confirm.html

The Automotive Technician decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05114.htm