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March 18, 2016

Distinguishing between residence and domicile


Distinguishing between residence and domicile
Rosseychuk (City of New York--Commissioner of Labor), 2016 NY Slip Op 01885, Appellate Division, Third Department

An individual may simultaneously have a number of residences but he or she has only one domicile at a time regardless of the number of residences involved. The term “domicile” means the place where a person has his or her permanent home to which he or she intends to return if living or having a residence at a different location. 

Zhanna Rosseychuk, as an employee of the New York City Office of Child Support Enforcement [Office], was required to become a resident of the City within 90 days of being hired and to maintain such residency.* The Office discharged Rosseychuk after it learned that that she did not comply with this residency requirements.

Rosseychuk’s application for unemployment insurance benefits was denied by an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] on the ground that she voluntarily left her employment without good cause inasmuch as she provoked her discharge by not complying with the employer's residency policy. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, without resolving the issue of whether Rosseychuk was in full compliance with the Office's residency policy, reversed the ALJ’s decision on the ground that the voluntary transgression prong of the doctrine of provoked discharge had not been established so as to find that Rosseychuk had voluntarily left her employment without good cause. The Office appealed the Board’s decision.

The Appellate Division said that a "Provoked discharge . . . is a narrowly drawn legal fiction designed to apply where an employee voluntarily engages in conduct which transgresses a legitimate known obligation and leaves the employer no choice but to discharge him [or her]." Whether an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits voluntary left his or her of employment without good cause by provoking his or her discharge is a factual determination for the Board to determine.

Rosseychuk testified that she began living with her cousin in an apartment in New York Cityin an attempt to comply with the Office's residency requirements, as well as to accommodate her school schedule. Rosseychuk testified that she gave her cousin money to live in the apartment and to help offset expenses, that she received mail at that address, including bank account and credit card statements, and that she paid pays New York City income taxes. She also testified that, because she did not fully understand the residency requirement, she asked both her supervisor and the employer's personnel department if she was considered to be in compliance with the necessary requirement; those inquiries, however, went unanswered.

Although Rosseychuk spent time with her husband in an apartment outside New York City, the Office acknowledged that "an individual could maintain more than one residence, even if one was outside New York City, and still be in compliance with its residency requirement."

The Appellate Division ruled that “Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that [Rosseychuk] did not voluntarily engage in conduct that transgressed the [Office’s] mandate so as to find that she provoked her discharge.

* NYC Administrative Code §12-119 Definitions, provides: “As used in sections 12-120 and 12-121 of this subchapter:
“a. The word "residence" means domicileand the word "resident" means domiciliary[emphasis supplied].
“b. The term "city service" means service as an employee of the city or of any agency thereof other than service in a position which is exempted from municipal residence requirements pursuant to the public officers law or any other state law.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 17, 2016

Tests used by court to determine if a public officer or employee is entitled to “qualified immunity” when he or she is being sued for damages in a civil action


Tests used by court to determine if a public officer or employee is entitled to “qualified immunity” when he or she is being sued for damages in a civil action
Lawson v. Hilderbrand et al, USCA, 2nd Circuit, 15-653-cv [Summary Order*]

Timothy Hilderbrand and his co-defendants appealed a United States District Court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on their theory that they were entitled to qualified immunity on “Lawson’s search and seizure claims” in the first count of his complaint.** 

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, said that qualified immunity may be claimed by public officers and employees in civil suits seeking damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

The court then explained that although an appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment typically is not permitted as that decision is not a “final judgment,” the collateral order doctrine permits an immediate appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity “where the district court denied the motion as a matter of law.”*** However, such an appeal is available to defendants only the defendants “accept as true [the] plaintiff’s version of the facts for purposes of the appeal.”

According to the decision, police entered Duncan Lawson’s home with his consent. When that consent was revoked, the Second Circuit said that “it was objectively reasonable” for the police officers to believe that “exigent circumstances made their continued presence in the house, and their confinement of the residents to the living room, lawful.”

The Second Circuit said that “When a government official charged with violating federal constitutional rights seeks summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the Court may first consider whether there was a “violation of clearly established law before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.”

In this instance the court concluded that “the lack of clearly established law” barring the actions the police officers involved entitles them to qualified immunity for their actions.

In contrast, certain public officials are entitled to “absolute immunity.” Absolute immunity is typically limited to judges, prosecutors, legislators, and the highest executive officials when acting within their authority. Absolute immunity also has been granted to lawyers in some situations.

* Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by federal rule of appellate procedure 32.1 and the 2nd Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with the Second Circuit, a party must cite either the federal appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

** Lawson v. Hilderbrand, 88 F. Supp. 3d 84

*** The doctrine allows appeals from interlocutory rulings (i.e., rulings preceding a final judgment) so long as those rulings conclusively decide an issue separate from the merits of the case [See Cohen v Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541].

The 2nd Circuit’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

New national study reports “Saving for College” 529 plan costs “state by state”


New national study reports “Saving for College” 529 plan costs “state by state”
Source: Study by Joseph Hurley, Savingforcollege.com

This 2016 study notes that New York's 529 College Savings Program “offers the lowest-cost 529 plan among plans that charge the same fee across the entire menu of investment options. Its total 10-year costs are $205, representing an annual fee of only 0.16%.” Also, New York does not charge 529 program participants an annual fee.

Highlights from the study are posted on the Internet at:

March 16, 2016

Employee’s disciplinary history for rudeness and insubordination considered in determining disciplinary penalty to be imposed


Employee’s disciplinary history for rudeness and insubordination considered in determining disciplinary penalty to be imposed
Admin. For Children’s Services v Berrios, OATH Index #124/16

Giselle Berrios, a child protective specialist, employed by the Administration for Children’s Services [ACS], was served with disciplinary charges alleging that she failed to appear at family court hearing concerning a case under her supervision at the time scheduled and raising her voice at an agency attorney when questioned about the case.

Berrios admitted to having forgotten to appear at family court, but denied yelling at the agency attorney.

ALJ Astrid B. Gloade found that Berrios' testimony was not credible. The ALJ noted that the case had been on the court’s calendar almost every week because the judge was closely monitoring ACS’s response to numerous concerns that had been raised about the family’s well-being.

In contrast, the ALJ found that the attorney's testimony was corroborated by a contemporaneous telephone complaint and an e-mail to Berrios' supervisor after the incident.

In addition, Judge Gloade noted that “even were I to credit [Berrios’] explanation [that she forgot the court appearance], her forgetfulness does not excuse her failure to appear in court.”

Given the nature of the proven misconduct, as well as Berrios’ disciplinary history for rudeness and insubordination, the ALJ recommended that Berrios be suspended without pay for 55-days.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/16-124.pdf
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March 15, 2016

Use of video surveillance recording in disciplinary actions


Use of video surveillance recording in disciplinary actions
NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection v Gaicia, OATH Index #211/16

With the expanding installation of video surveillance equipment, video tape recordings are being used with increasing frequency in disciplinary actions.

The NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection [Department], alleged that one of its employees, Supervising Sewage Treatment Worker Nicholas Gaicia, had an oral altercation with a co-worker that also involved Gaici's throwing chairs and slamming doors.

The Department introduced a video surveillance recording into evidence, contending that  the video the showed the exchange between Gaicia and his co-worker. It also presented the testimony of three employees in support of the charges it had filed against Gaicia.

Gaicia testified in his defense and called four other employees as witnesses testify on his behalf.

OATH Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] John B. Spooner found that the video tape and the testimony presented by the employer failed to support the “incredible assertion that Gaicia was threatening” his co-worker. The ALJ also found that the allegations that Gaicia had thrown chairs and slammed doors set out in the Department's notice of discipline were not corroborated by the Department’s witnesses.

ALJ Spooner recommended that the disciplinary charges brought against Gaicia be dismissed and that he be reimbursed for the time he was suspended from his position without pay.   

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

The Discipline Book - A 458 page guide focusing on New York State laws, rules, regulations, disciplinary grievances procedures set out in collective bargaining agreements and selected court and administrative decisions concerning disciplinary actions involving state and municipal public officers and employees. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/5215.html 
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Cybercriminals hold computer files hostage for ransom


Cybercriminals hold computer files hostage for ransom
Source: Governing the States and Localities

Tod Newcombe, writing for Governing the States and Localities, points out the growing threat of cybercrime and just how vulnerable public entitites are to it.

As an example, Mr. Newcombe reports that “In June 2014, an officer with the Durham, N.H., Police Department opened what she thought was a digital fax attached to an email about an investigation she was working on. Instead, it was a type of malicious software that infected files throughout the entire police department’s network of computers. By the next morning, the entire system was in serious trouble.

“The officer had accidentally downloaded an extortion malware program popularly known as ransomware. It encrypts a computer’s files (meaning they can only be accessed by the cybercriminals) and then sends victims a digital ransom note, demanding money to decrypt them.”

The full text of Mr. Newcombe’s article is posted on the Internet at:

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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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