ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

May 06, 2016

Supreme Court’s imposing a “lesser disciplinary penalty” upon remand found to have usurped the authority of the arbitrator under the circumstances


Supreme Court’s imposing a “lesser disciplinary penalty” upon remand found to have usurped the authority of the arbitrator under the circumstances
Fernandez v New York City Tr. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 03435, Appellate Division, First Department

In an earlier appeal involving the same parties, the Appellate Division vacated the arbitration award that sustained the New York City Transit Authority's (NYCTA) decision to terminate Carlos Fernandez’s employment.* The Appellate Division then remanded the matter to the Arbitrator for imposition of a lesser penalty.

On remand, however, Supreme Court granted Fernandez’s petition to the extent of restoring him, “upon his successful completion of a medical examination, to his position as a bus operator, with full benefits and accrued vacation running from the date of his reinstatement.”

NYCTA appealed and the Appellate Division “unanimously reversed” the Supreme Court’s action on the law and the facts. The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court’s imposing “a lesser penalty” usurped the Arbitrator's authority and the lower court should have remitting the matter to the Arbitrator for a rehearing and new determination as to the appropriate lesser penalty.

The Appellate Division explained that the matter should have been remitted to the original Arbitrator as “there has been no showing that the original Arbitrator is biased or otherwise incapable of carrying out his duties.”

* NYPPL’s summary of the earlier Appellate Division ruling is posted on the Internet at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2014/08/transcribing-hearing-in-disciplinary.html[In pertinent part, it reports that the penalty imposed by the arbitrator on the employee, termination, was vacated by the Appellate Division and the matter remanded to the arbitrator “for the imposition of a lesser penalty.” In that action the Appellate Division said that the termination of the employee, a NYCTA bus driver for 15 years, with an unblemished record of employment and who had consistently received positive performance evaluations, and had never been disciplined as the sanction “for a single, alleged transgression is grossly excessive and shocks our sense of fairness,” citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and  Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222.]

The 2016 decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_03435.htm
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 A Reasonable Penalty Under The Circumstances - a 618-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html
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May 05, 2016

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has scheduled a webcast concerning Accumulated Sick and Vacation Pay Deferred to 403(b) or 457(b) Plans

The U.S. Internal Revenue Service has scheduled a webcast concerning accumulated sick and vacation pay deferred to 403(b) or 457(b) Plans

Revenue Agents from the Office of Federal, State and Local Governments Lori Stieber and Patricia A. Regetz will present a webcast addressing the treatment of accumulated sick and vacation pay deferred to 403(b) or 457(b) Plans for tax purposes on June 2, 2016 at 2 p.m. Eastern Time; 1 p.m. Central Time; 12 p.m. Mountain Time, and 11 a.m. Pacific Time.

Register for this webcase at: https://www.webcaster4.com/Webcast/Page/925/15027

Those registered will use the same link to attend the event.

Among the topics to be covered:

1. When is accumulated sick and vacation leave pay subject to Federal Employment Taxes

2. When can taxes be deferred and for how long?

3. What is an elective contribution?

Imposing multiple disciplinary penalties on an employee found guilty of misconduct


Imposing multiple disciplinary penalties on an employee found guilty of misconduct
Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v New York State Unified Ct. Sys., 2016 NY Slip Op 03326, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

A hearing officer, after an administrative hearing conducted pursuant to provisions set out in a  collective bargaining agreement, found Robert Stanek guilty of certain disciplinary charges of misconduct. As a result Stanek was suspended for five days without pay. In addition, the appointing authority placed Stanek on probation for a period of six months and issued a letter of reprimand.

Stanek appealed the appointing authority’s decision but Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division “pursuant to CPLR §7804(g)” on the ground that the petition raises a substantial evidence issue.

The Appellate Division said that the Supreme Court’s action was incorrect as the appointing authority’s determination “was not made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law.” Rather, said the court, “the determination was the result of a hearing conducted pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement."*

Notwithstanding this procedural issue, the Appellate Division retained the matter and consider Stanek’s petition “in the interest of judicial economy.”

The court then explained that although Stanek’s petition raised a substantial evidence issue, its review of this administrative determination pursuant to CPLR §7803(3) is limited to whether the determination was "affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion." If a court finds that the determination is supported by a rational basis, it must sustain the determination even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the appointing authority.

Further, the Appellate Division said that “an administrative determination regarding discipline will be afforded heightened deference where a law enforcement agency such as [the court security arm of the Unified Court System] is concerned."**

Noting that Stanek did not contend that the determination is affected by an error of law, the Appellate Division concluded that, viewing the administrative record as a whole, the  determination of the appointing authority was not arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Further, opined the court, “There is evidence in the record that supports the determination, and that evidence was credited by the Hearing Officer and adopted by [appointing authority] in its determination.”

The court also rejected Stenak’s contention that the penalties imposed constitute an abuse of discretion, commenting that “It is well settled that ‘a penalty must be upheld unless it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,' thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law,” citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 1, 34 NY2d 222. The court then concluded that the penalties imposed on Stanek, a court security officer, did not shock its sense of fairness considering the higher standard of fitness and character that pertains to law enforcement personnel, coupled with Stanek 's refusal to accept any responsibility for his conduct.

* A collective bargaining agreement may authorize the imposition of multiple disciplinary penalties. In contrast, in disciplinary actions taken pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law the courts have held that "the imposition of multiple penalties was improper" as Civil Service Law §75.3 provides for a choice of penalties, thus prohibiting the imposition of more than one of the discrete penalties set out in the statute [see Matteson v City of Oswego, 186 A.D.2d 1017]. However, imposing multiple penalties is possible where there are multiple offenses involved [See Wilson v Sartori, 70 AD2d 959].

** Stanek served as a court security officer.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_03326.htm
 _____________________

A Reasonable Penalty Under The Circumstances - a 618-page volume focusing on New York State court and administrative decisions addressing an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html
 _____________________


May 04, 2016

Federal and State laws, rules and regulations control affecting public sector officers and employees engage in partisan political activities


Federal and State laws, rules and regulations affecting public sector officers and employees engage in partisan political activities
Sources: Internal Revenue Service publication, Hatch Act, New York State’s Ethics Commission, case law

Updated information published by the Federal, State and Local Government office of the Federal Internal Revenue Service explaining the reporting and withholding requirements for election workers is posted on the Internet at: https://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/Federal,-State-&-Local-Governments/Election-Workers-Reporting-and-Withholding. The Internal Revenue Service also reminds public entities employing individuals to work in primary and general elections that specific statutes  apply to them, including whether they are covered by a "Section 218 Agreement".* 

In addition, certainpolitical activities of State and municipal employees whose employment is fully federally financed may be restricted by the Hatch Act [53 Stat. 1147].

Essentially, the Hatch Act bars State and local officers and employees from being candidates for public office in a partisan election,** using official authority or influence to interfere with or affect the results of an election or nomination and directly or indirectly coerce contributions from subordinates in support of a political party or candidate.

Although a public officer or employee subject to the provisions of the Hatch Act may lawfully seek the nomination for partisan public office, he or she must resign from his or her public employment upon accepting the nomination.

Further, New York State’s Ethics Commission has issued an Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion No. 98-12, addressing the application of Public Officers Law §74 to State employees who work on political campaigns, including fundraising. It is posted on the Internet at http://www.jcope.ny.gov/advice/ethc/98-12.htm

Examples of case law include Pagan v Commissioner of Labor, 53 AD3d 964, in which the Appellate Division addressed the disqualification of an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits following his termination for accepting a designation to run as a candidate for the State Assembly, ruling that his employment was terminated due to misconduct.

The individual, employed by the New York City Housing Authority, had violated the Authority's  written policy prohibiting its staff members running for political office in a partisan election.

Noting that “It is well settled that "[v]iolation of an employer's reasonable policies may constitute disqualifying misconduct," the Appellate Division said that the Authority’s guidelines were established “to assure compliance with the Hatch Act (5 USC §1501 et seq.) and the City of New York’s Conflicts of Interest Board Rules.”

Another relevant decision, Matter of Blackburne, 211 AD2d 13, [motion to appeal denied, 86 N.Y.2d 705], holds that an individual otherwise entitled to a “due process disciplinary hearing” such as one provided by a Taylor Law Collective Bargaining Agreement or by a State Law such as Civil Service Law Section 75 or Section 3020-a of the Education Law, may be summarily removed from his or her position on the authority of a federal Merit Systems Protection Board determination. 

The Blackburne decision, which addressed the right of an individual to file a Taylor Law contract disciplinary grievance after the Merit Systems Protection Board directed his removal from his position for violating the Hatch Act, held that arbitration would offend public policy as it "would significantly lessen the efficacy of the Hatch Act and frustrate its purpose and scope."

*If the election workers are covered by a Section 218 Agreement with the Social Security Administration (SSA), the terms of the Agreement will determine whether the payments are subject to FICA.

** A candidate seeking election to a school board is typically deemed to be seeking office in a “non-partisan” election.

May 03, 2016

Title VII, a “precise, complex, and exhaustive” statute, does not prohibit employment practices that are not specifically prohibited by the act



Title VII, a “precise, complex, and exhaustive” statute, does not prohibit employment practices that are not specifically prohibited by the act
Cooper v N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, U S Circuit Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit, Docket #2015-3392

Winifred Cooper¸ a former New York State Department of Labor’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity, filed suit against the Department alleging that the Department had unlawfully retaliated against her for opposing an employment practice prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and New York State’s Human Rights Law, Executive Law §§290 et seq.

In December 2012, Cooper learned that the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations [GOER] had developed a plan to “alter the means by which internal Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] complaints were to be processed by state departments and agencies." 

In the words of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Cooper, “believing that the proposed changes materially conflicted with federal regulations because they would ‘subject the EEO complaint response process to political pressure,’ increasing the likelihood that workplace discrimination would go unredressed,” initiated a series of communications with her supervisors bring her concerns to their attention. Cooper’s position proved persuasive and GOER’s plan was altered in consideration of her views. 

Subsequently Cooper was terminated from her position. Alleging that her termination was “in retaliation for having lobbied against GOER’s proposal,”  Cooper sued. The federal district court dismissed her petition and the Circuit Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Circuit Court explained that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual … because he [or she] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” within the meaning of 42 USC §2000e.* Further, said the court, “A plaintiff seeking to demonstrate that he [or she] engaged in protected activity need not show that the behavior he [or she] opposed in fact violated Title VII; he [or she] must, however, show that he [or she] “possessed a good faith, reasonable belief,” that the employer’s conduct qualified as an “unlawful employment practice” under the statute.”

However, said the court, the conduct Cooper opposed – the amendment of internal procedures in a manner that, she believed, would permit political considerations to influence the evaluation of discrimination claims – is not a “practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII nor could Cooper reasonably have believed otherwise. For these reasons Cooper was not entitled to the relief she sought.Accordingly, Circuit Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claims.

* As an example, the Circuit Court of Appeals noted, objecting to the employer’s failure to adhere to its own affirmative action program is not protected activity because such a failure is not an “unlawful employment practice” within the meaning of Title VII.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:



May 02, 2016

Challenging a decision to terminate a probationary teacher's employment


Challenging a decision to terminate a probationary teacher's employment
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,894

William Floyd Union Free School District employed Matthew Nadolecki as a special education math teacher subject to his satisfactory completion of a three-year probationary period which was to run through September 28, 2013.  In April 2012 the superintendent advised Nadolecki that he would recommend that the board terminate Nadolecki’s services as a probationary teacher. 

Nadolecki requested a written statement of the reasons for the superintendent’s recommendation. The superintendent responded stated that his recommendation was based on Nadolecki’s failure to meet district expectations in the following areas: [1] ineffective and inadequate classroom teaching techniques; [2] ineffective implementation of lesson plans; [3] ineffective communication with parents; and [4] ineffective and sometimes inappropriate guidance for students. 

Via an April 18, 2012 email, Nadolecki initiated a Level 1 grievance pursuant to his collective bargaining agreement in which he stated that he was “grieving the efforts by the district to terminate [his] probationary appointment through dismissal.”  On April 23, 2012, the superintendent responded, repeating the reasons he had enumerated earlier and denied Nadolecki’s Level 1 grievance. Nadolecki then filed a Level 2 grievance, which grievance was denied on May 3, 2012.

At its May 22, 2012 meeting, the School Board considered the superintendent’s recommendation and voted to terminate Nadolecki’s probationary appointment, effective June 30, 2012. Nadolecki was advised of the board’s decision by letter dated May 24, 2012.

Nadolecki appealed the Board’s decision to the Commissioner of Education, contending that his termination was “in violation of the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, district policies and was otherwise retaliatory because of his alleged whistle-blowing activities.”  Nadolecki also argued that the Superintendent’s letter dated April 23, 2012 “did not comply with Education Law §3031.”

The School District maintained that it had complied with all applicable laws, including Education Law §3031, when it terminated Nadolecki and that Nadolecki’s petition failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  In addition, the District said that [1] the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, [2] that petitioner lacks standing to bring this appeal and [3] that the appeal is untimely. In addition the District alleged that the April 23, 2012 notice complied with Education Law §3031.

Addressing a number of procedural issues, the Commissioner said that “It is well settled that a school employee who elects to submit an issue for resolution through a contractual grievance procedure may not bring an appeal to the Commissioner of Education for review of the same matter.”

Nadolecki had brought earlier filed a grievance at Level 1 in which he alleged that the district’s efforts to terminate him violated the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between the School District and Nadolecki's employee organization; asserted that certain CBA provisions regarding evaluations and observations were not adhered to; asserted that he believes he was being terminated for not “staying under the radar;” and because of his participating in a “protected union activity”.

Unsuccessful at Level 1, Nadolecki next filed a Level 2 grievance and a final determination denying his Level 2 grievance was issued on May 3, 2012.* 

Succinctly, the Commissioner said the Nadolecki “claims that [the School District]  violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, which were the subject of a prior grievance, must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, citing Bd. of Educ., Commack UFSD v Ambach, 70 NY2d 501.

Nadolecki, in effort to persuade the Commissioner to assume jurisdiction in this appeal notwithstanding his initial election to seek a remedy as provided by the CBA, argued that because he commenced his grievance prior to his actual termination by the School District, the Commissioner should retain jurisdiction over this appeal.  However, said the Commissioner, Nadolecki was attempting to raise the same collective bargaining issues in this appeal as he raised in the grievance and the Commissioner rejected Nadolecki’s argument that because he only grieved School District’s “intention” to terminate his employment, he is entitled to commence an appeal on those same issues from his actual termination.

The Commissioner also observed that, in any event, Nadolecki claims would be dismissed under the doctrine of election of remedies.  The Commissioner explained that the commencement of an action or proceeding in another forum for the same or similar relief constitutes an election of remedies which precludes the initiation of a subsequent appeal to the Commissioner involving the same issues.

Turning to the merits of Nadolecki appeal, the Commissioner pointed out that “ A board of education has the unfettered right to terminate a probationary teacher or administrator’s employment for any reason unless the employee establishes that he or she was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statutory proscription.”

In an appeal to the Commissioner, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which the petitioner seeks relief. Nadolecki, said the Commissioner, failed to establish that he was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason, or in violation of a statutory proscription. 

While Nadolecki contended that he was terminated in retaliation for alleged "whistle-blowing", the Commissioner found that, on the record before her, he has not met his burden of establishing that his dismissal was in retaliation for whistle blowing. 

Although Nadolecki disagreed with the School District’s decision to terminate his services, the Commissioner ruled that he did not establish that the School District terminated his employment for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statutory proscription, thus failing to meet his burden of proof.

Noting that Nadolecki alleged that the School District violated Education Law §3031 by failing to give him more than a general statement as to the reasons for his dismissal, the Commissioner rejected this claim, explaining that Nadolecki “has not established that [the School District] failed to comply with the requirements of Education Law §3031."

Further, said the Commissioner, “even if noncompliance were established, the remedy for a violation is not automatic reinstatement of a teacher to his former position, and equity does not require a board to provide a windfall to petitioner in the form of salary because he performed no services for the district after the termination date.”

The Commissioner then dismissed Nadolecki’s appeal in its entirety.

* Significantly, Nadolecki did not allege in this appeal that the union breached its duty of fair representation with respect to processing his grievance. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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