Seeking interim relief in the course of a disciplinary action brought pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law

Seeking interim relief in the course of a disciplinary action brought pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law

Appeal of Educator, Decisions of the Commission of Education, Decision #17,507

Educator,* a tenured teacher, was suspended by the School Superintendent pending the service of disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, requested that the Commissioner of Education grant Educator interim relief  in the form of “an immediate stay of [Educator's] suspension” permitting [Educator] to return to teaching.

Educator contended that following the suspension by the Superintendent the appointing authority, the school board [Board], failed to initiate charges at its next regular Board meeting thus violating Educator's tenure rights.  Educator also denied being involved in any in improper conduct and that any potential §3020-a charges would be without merit. Finally Educator asked the Commissioner to direct the Board  to expunge of any mention of the suspension from Educator's personnel file.

The Board asked that Educator's petition be dismissed as, indicating that:

1. It had voted to initiate charges against Educator pursuant to Education Law §3020-a and the Board's attorney had submitted an affidavit asserting that Educator "will be reassigned to duties ... during the pendency of the §3020-a proceeding;" 

2. Educator's personnel record contains no reference to the challenged suspension that could be expunged; and

3. The suspension of Educator by the Superintendent was appropriate because a  reasonable time between suspension and the filing of §3020-a disciplinary charges "is allowed."

Addressing the Educator's seeking the "expungement of the Superintendent’s suspension" from Educator's  personnel record, the Commissioner said such appeal must be dismissed as moot as the Commissioner will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest.

The Commissioner noted that with respect to Educator's request for interim relief seeking expungement of any mention of the suspension from the date on which it commenced "until the present," the appointing authority answer indicated that no letter, memorandum or other written document referencing Educator's suspension was prepared and placed in Educator's personnel file, which assertions were set out in the Board's verified answer and its attorney’s affirmation. The Commissioner declined to issue an order based on speculation that such a record might exist. 

Considering the alleged suspension of Educator, the Commissioner noted that in a reply affirmation, Educator's attorney acknowledged that the Board has the authority to suspend a tenured teacher such as [Educator] once it has filed §3020-a charges, but claimed that when the Board filed the disciplinary charges against Educator it took no action to suspend Educator and that Educator's continued suspension remained pursuant to actions taken by the Superintendent and thus was "illegal."** 

The Commissioner, citing Education Law §1711(2)(e), commented that the superintendent has statutory authority "to suspend ... [a] teacher or other employee until the next regular meeting of such board, when all facts relating to the case shall be submitted to such board for its consideration and action." Accordingly, said the Commissioner, "A suspension by a superintendent that extends beyond the next regular meeting of the board of education would be ultra vires."***

However, although the reply affirmation alleges that appointing authority did not take action to suspend Educator, Educator had not provided any evidence to corroborate that allegation.  The Commissioner said that she could not determine whether the appointing authority had taken any action on another date to suspend Educator with pay until a final resolution of the §3020-a proceeding.

 

Declining to order Educator's reinstatement "under these circumstances," the Commissioner observed that should Educator wish to continue to challenge the suspension, Educator's  recourse is to bring another appeal in an appropriate forum in which both parties would have a full and fair opportunity to address the legality of the suspension of the Educator after §3020-a charges were served upon him or her.

The Commissioner also explained that to the extent Educator seeks to challenge the merits of the suspension linked to a pending §3020-a proceeding, Educator's  claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Commissioner explained that Education Law §3020-a, as amended by Chapter 691 of the Laws of 1994, divested the Commissioner of jurisdiction to review §3020-a determinations of hearing officers, both final and non-final, implying that the issue of whether Educator was lawfully suspended by the Board was a matter for the §3020-a hearing officer[s] to determine .

For these reasons the Commissioner ruled that Educator's appeal to the Commissioner must be dismissed.

* As this disciplinary action pursuant to Education Law §3020-a is currently pending and it has not be determined whether any eventual hearing will be public or private, the individual upon whom the disciplinary charges were filed is herein identified as “Educator” to preserve his or her confidentiality.

** Addressing a procedural issue, the Commissioner’s regulations do not contemplate submission of a reply affidavit or affirmation in lieu of a reply, as Educator has done in this proceeding. However the Commissioner said that she "nevertheless accepted it for consideration in this appeal, noting that the reply affidavit is in the nature of a reply, as it responded to the appointing authority's affirmative defenses.

*** An action in excess of the authority or power possessed by an entity or an official or officer of that entity.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume58/d17507

Audits and reports were issued by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending September 28, 2018

Audits and reports were issued by New York StateComptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending September 28, 2018

Source: Office of the State Comptroller

Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report

 
City University of New York (CUNY): Controls Over CUNY Fully Integrated Resources and Services Tool (Follow-Up) (2018-F-4)
An initial audit released in September 2016 found that CUNY’s processes and controls did not adequately ensure that users had access only to functions that were necessary to meet their needs. In a follow-up, auditors found CUNY officials have made progress in addressing the issues identified in the initial report. Of the nine prior audit recommendations, one was implemented, six were partially implemented, and two were not implemented.

Department of Labor (DOL): Examination of Unemployment Insurance Willful Overpayments (2016-BSE1-02)
DOL did not consistently assess penalties in accordance with law and/or DOL procedures resulting in the failure to assess up to $311,775 in penalties—more than 10 percent of the penalty amount examined. This includes up to 1,679 penalties valued at $307,753 that were not assessed at all and up to 71 penalties valued at $4,022 that were under-assessed by DOL.

State Education Department: Programs for Little Learners (PFLL): Compliance With the Reimbursable Cost Manual (2017-S-87)
For the three fiscal years ended June 30, 2015, auditors identified $66,597 in ineligible costs that PFLL reported for state reimbursement, including $58,481 in personal service costs and $8,116 in other than personal service costs.

Department of Health (DOH) and the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA): Oversight of Hotels and Motels Used for Homeless Mixed-Use Temporary Residency (Follow-Up) (2018-F-12)
An initial audit report released in June 2017 concluded that, of the 80 hotels and motels auditors visited, 24 (30 percent) were in generally unsatisfactory condition, exhibiting problems such as mold; water damage; structural damage; and fire safety issues, such as exposed wiring and missing smoke detectors. Further, OTDA had not provided local Social Services Districts (SSDs) with sufficient guidance about corrective action plans to address unsatisfactory conditions. In a follow-up, auditors found that OTDA and DOH have implemented the joint recommendation contained in the original audit report, while OTDA has implemented two of its three recommendations.

Department of Health: Examination of Island Peer Review Organization (IPRO) (2018-BSE03-01)
DOH entered into a $79 million contract with IPRO to provide services related to Medicaid activities.  This contract and its amendments were not subject to approval by the Comptroller’s Office. IPRO entered into subcontractor agreements with five firms to help perform the services. Auditors found DOH approved payments to IPRO for subcontractor expenses that were not allowable under the contract. As a result of the audit, DOH prevented or recovered more than $133,000 in unallowable expenses. DOH has since strengthened their review of similar contract payments.

Department of Health (DOH): Medicaid Payments to Medicare Advantage Plan Providers (2016-S-54)
Auditors reviewed selected Medicare Advantage plan contracts offered by Fidelis and WellCare and, based on judgmental sampling, determined certain providers reported inflated Medicare Part C cost-sharing liabilities on 7,072 Medicaid claims resulting in overpayments of $770,935. Auditors determined three of the providers were overpaid 58, 74, and 79 percent of the total Medicaid payments they received for claims in the review. Auditors analyzed the remaining Part C cost-sharing claims billed by these providers during the audit period and found – if the rate of overpayment is consistent with the initial review – Medicaid potentially overpaid an additional $562,356 to these providers.

Find out how your government money is spent at Open Book New York. Track municipal spending, the state's 150,000 contracts, billions in state payments and public authority data. 

 

The availability of General Municipal Law §50-e(1)(b) rights to "defense and indemnification" to a municipal employees in an action brought in federal court

The availability of General Municipal Law §50-e(1)(b) rights to "defense and indemnification" to a municipal employees in an action brought in federal court

Richard Hardy  v Daley et. al., [New York City police officers in their personal rather than their official capacities], United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, C.V. 17‐2906

The United States District Court, Southern District, dismissed Richard Hardy's amended complaint alleging sexual assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and failure to intervene federal civil rights claims with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.

The Circuit Court sustained the district court's ruling with respect to the federal civil rights claims explaining that such a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face ... and allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Hardyʹs federal complaint, however, included New York State law claims, which the district court dismissed "failure to serve a timely notice of claim." The Circuit Court ruled that the district court had err in so doing.

Under New York law, explained the Circuit Court, service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to tort actions against a municipal entity or its employees and these provision apply "to state law claims even when they are brought in federal court." In contrast, in actions commenced against a municipal employee but not against the employing municipal corporation,* the service of a notice of claim upon the corporation is "required only if the corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify [the employee]" pursuant to §50-e(1)(b) of the General Municipal Law.

A municipality, however, is required to indemnify its employee only if his or her liability arose as the result of an act or omission constituting conduct "within the scope of his [or her] employment and in the discharge of his [or her] duties." Noting that Hardyʹs state law tort claims against defendants in their individual capacities are founded on alleged conduct that would be well beyond the scope of employment the Circuit Court explained that such allegations "would, by definition, have constituted 'intentional wrongdoing' [whereby] defendants would not have a right to indemnification by their public employer" otherwise available to such employees pursuant to §50-e(1)(b) of the General Municipal Law.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court found that Hardyʹs state law tort claims were not procedurally barred for failure to file a notice of claim and remanded the case is "for further proceedings consistent with this ruling."

* Service of the notice of claim upon an officer, appointee or employee of a public corporation shall not be a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special proceeding against such person. If an action or special proceeding is commenced against such person, but not against the public corporation, service of the notice of claim upon the public corporation shall be required only if the corporation has a statutory obligation to indemnify such person under this chapter or any other provision of law. The defendants are New York City police officers being sued in their personal rather than their official capacities and the City of New York is not a defendant in this action.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/ed1af089-8cc6-4bef-b0d9-6a58e44cfc23/4/doc/17-2906_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/ed1af089-8cc6-4bef-b0d9-6a58e44cfc23/4/hilite/