Determining the employer of a workers' compensation benefit claimant is critical to determining if a respondent may be sued by the claimant

Determining the employer of a workers' compensation benefit claimant is critical to determining if a  respondent may be sued by the claimant

Dube v County of Rockland, 2018 NY Slip Op 02597, Appellate Division, Second Department

New York State's Workers' Compensation Law provides that:

1. An employee who is entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits may not sue his or her general employer or special employer for injuries occurring during the course of employment.

2. A special employee is "one who is transferred for a limited time of whatever duration to the service of another" and a determination as to whether a special employment relationship exists is generally an issue of fact requiring consideration of many factors, including:

            [a] who controls and directs the manner of the employee's work,

           

            [b] who is responsible for payment of wages and benefits,

            [c] who furnishes equipment,

            [d] who has the right to discharge the employee, and

            [e] whether the work being performed was in furtherance of the special employer's or the general employer's business.

3. General employment is presumed to continue, and that presumption can only be rebutted by a "clear demonstration of [the] surrender of control by the general employer and assumption of control by the special employer."

The workers' compensation claimant in this action, Richard Dube, a police officer employed by the Town of Ramapo, was selected as a candidate for the Rockland Regional Rescue, Entry and Counter-Terrorism Team [REACT], a part-time SWAT team comprised of specially trained police officers from participating law enforcement agencies in Rockland County.

During a physical fitness test in connection with his candidacy for REACT, Dube suffered heat stroke and sustained personal injuries. Dube and his wife, suing derivatively, [Plaintiffs] commenced an action against the County, the Rockland County Sheriff's Department, and REACT [County Defendants]. Subsequently the action was consolidated with an action commenced by Plaintiffs against USPLabs, LLC.

County Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint asserted against them, contending that Dube was their special employee and therefore barred from commencing an action against them. The County Defendants also contended that they were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint based upon governmental immunity, the "firefighter's rule," and the doctrine of primary assumption of risk.

The Supreme Court granted the County Defendant's motion, determining that Dube was a special employee of the County Defendants, but did not address addressing the other grounds claimed by the County Defendants in support of its motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs appealed the Supreme Court's decision.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court ruling, explaining that the County Defendants "failed to meet their initial burden of submitting sufficient evidence demonstrating the absence of any triable issues of fact" in that the County Defendants failed to submit sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Dube remained a general employee under the control of the Town at the time of the incident.

The Appellate Division pointed out that Dube was under the control of the County Defendants for the limited purpose of the physical test to evaluate his ability to join REACT. In contrast, Dube's general employer, the Town of Ramapo, paid his wages, gave him permission to attend the REACT test on his regular work day, paid his workers' compensation benefits premiums, and retained the authority to discharge or discipline him.

Addressing the County Defendants claim of "governmental immunity," the Appellate Division said the County Defendants "failed to establish, prima facie, that there was a set procedure for administering the physical test and that they did not violate accepted practices.

Further, said the court, the County Defendants reliance on the "firefighter's rule" is misplaced in light of the court's determination that the County Defendants  failed to establish, prima facie, that Dube was their special employee.

Finally, the Appellate Division noted that as the County Defendants "failed to establish, prima facie, that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is applicable under the circumstances of this case."

As the County Defendants failed to meet its prima facieburden, Supreme Court was required to deny its motion for summary judgment "regardless of the sufficiency of the [Plaintiffs'] papers submitted in opposition. Accordingly, the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's decision, on the law, and awarded one bill of costs to the Plaintiffs.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_02597.htm

Seeking to dismiss a lawsuit on the basis of collateral estoppel, also know as issue preclusion

Seeking to dismiss a lawsuit on the basis of collateral estoppel, also know as  issue preclusion

Razzano v Remsenburg‐Speonk Union Free Sch. Dist., et al., USCA, Second Circuit, Docket 17-775-CV

Janice Razzano, acting pro se,* appealed a federal district courtʹs ruling in favor of  the Remsenburg‐Speonk Union Free School District [District] dismissing her complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law.

The district court, in an oral ruling dismissing the Razzano's petition and subsequently clarified its decision, explaining that a New York State Appellate Divisionʹs decision precluded Razzanoʹs complaint ʺunder the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."

The Circuit Court initially considered the following components of the lower court's decision.

I. Failure to Prosecute - The Circuit Court explained that a district court may dismiss an action "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order" and reviews Rule 41(b) dismissals for abuse of discretion. Although review for abuse of discretion ʺsuggests great deference,ʺthe Circuit Court said it recognizes that ʺdismissal is a harsh remedy and is appropriate only in extreme situations" and in reviewing a Rule 41(b) dismissal, consider the following five factors:

(1) the duration of the plaintiffʹs failure to comply with the court order;

(2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal;

(3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings;

(4) a balancing of the courtʹs interest in managing its docket with the plaintiffʹs

interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard; and

(5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than

dismissal.

In this instance the Circuit Court said it could not make a determination concerning the application of Rule 41(b) by the district court as the record was   incomplete and the district court was better situated than the Circuit Court to develop the record and assess the propriety of dismissal in the first instance.

II. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion) - Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the re-litigation of an issue that was previously decided, regardless of whether the two lawsuits are based on the same cause of action.

The district court had invoked the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata to support its dismissal of Razzano's action but the Circuit Court again noted "record deficiencies."

Although the §3020-a proceeding resulting in Razzanoʹs termination was ʺan administrative adjudication that must be given [issue] preclusive effect,ʺissue applies only if ʺ(1) the identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.ʺ The District, as the party asserting issue preclusion, ʺbears the burden of showing with clarity and certainty what was determined by the prior judgment,ʺthe Appellate Division's decision** is given issue preclusive effect ʺonly if it is quite clear that this requirement has been met.ʺ

Addressing the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the Circuit Court said that New York uses a ʺtransactional approachʺsuch that ʺonce a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction are barred.ʺ

In rejecting Razzanoʹs termination challenge, the Appellate Division held that the hearing officer ʺproperly rejected [Razzanoʹs] defense that the disciplinary proceedings were retaliatory in natureʺand that the ʺevidence of specific incidents of inappropriate, unprofessional, or insubordinate conduct . . . demonstrate[d] a separate and independent basis for the action takenʺ such that ʺa defense under Civil Service Law §75-b cannot be sustained.ʺ

The Circuit Court found that Razzanoʹs state court ʺclaimʺwas her CPLR §7511 petition challenging the §3020-a hearing officerʹs decision. Razzanoʹs defense to the disciplinary charges was that they were retaliatory in violation of Civil Service Law § 75-B(2)(a), a State "Whistleblower Statute but Razzano did not assert the claims she raised in her federal district court complaint with respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 1983, and New York State's Human Rights Law for which she sought monetary damages, equitable relief, and attorneyʹs fees and costs.

As it appeared that neither the administrative hearing officer nor the Appellate Division had the power to rule on the discrimination claims, as Razzano had not raised them in the disciplinary proceeding or in her petition challenging the decision the Circuit Court concluded that dismissal on res judicata grounds was unwarranted.

The Circuit Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the matter to the lower court "for further proceedings consistent with this order."

* An individual acts "pro se" by serving as his or her own attorney in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.

** Razzano v Remsenburg-Speonk UFSD, 41 N.Y.S.3d 72

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/19590bd6-7c4a-43be-82e8-0d96d8dd64f5/1/doc/17-775_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/19590bd6-7c4a-43be-82e8-0d96d8dd64f5/1/hilite/

Setting the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court and judges on the New York State Court of Appeals

Setting the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court and judges on the New York State Court of Appeals

Response to an inquiry from a NYPPL reader

The short answer to your question concerning determining the number of justices on the United States Supreme Court is the number of justices is set by Act of Congress as the Constitution of the United States does not provide for the number of justices sitting on the Court.

§1 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "That the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum", i.e., six justices. 

From time to time the number of justices on the Supreme Court has been modified by Acts of Congress to reflect the growth of the United States and the increasing number of judicial circuits. 

For example, the "Seventh Circuit Act of 1807" statutorily increased the size of the Court from six Justices to seven. 

Subsequently the number of justices was increased to 9 in 1837 and then to 10 in 1863. In 1869, however, the Circuit Judges Act set the number of justices of the Supreme Court back to 9, and it has since remained 9 notwithstanding former President Franklin D. Roosevelt's attempt to increase the number of justices to "not to exceed 15."

In contrast, §2 of Article VI - Judiciary - of the Constitution of the State of New York, in pertinent part, provides:

a. The court of appeals is continued. It shall consist of the chief judge and the six elected associate judges now in office, who shall hold their offices until the expiration of their respective terms, and their successors, and such justices of the supreme court as may be designated for service in said court as hereinafter provided. The official terms of the chief judge and the six associate judges shall be fourteen years.

Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of four shall be necessary to a decision; but no more than seven judges shall sit in any case. In case of the temporary absence or inability to act of any judge of the court of appeals, the court may designate any justice of the supreme court to serve as associate judge of the court during such absence or inability to act. The court shall have power to appoint and to remove its clerk. The powers and jurisdiction of the court shall not be suspended for want of appointment when the number of judges is sufficient to constitute a quorum.

b. Whenever and as often as the court of appeals shall certify to the governor that the court is unable, by reason of the accumulation of causes pending therein, to hear and dispose of the same with reasonable speed, the governor shall designate such number of justices of the supreme court as may be so certified to be necessary, but not more than four, to serve as associate judges of the court of appeals.

Seeking interim relief in the course of a disciplinary action brought pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law

Seeking interim relief in the course of a disciplinary action brought pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law

Appeal of Educator, Decisions of the Commission of Education, Decision #17,507

Educator,* a tenured teacher, was suspended by the School Superintendent pending the service of disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, requested that the Commissioner of Education grant Educator interim relief  in the form of “an immediate stay of [Educator's] suspension” permitting [Educator] to return to teaching.

Educator contended that following the suspension by the Superintendent the appointing authority, the school board [Board], failed to initiate charges at its next regular Board meeting thus violating Educator's tenure rights.  Educator also denied being involved in any in improper conduct and that any potential §3020-a charges would be without merit. Finally Educator asked the Commissioner to direct the Board  to expunge of any mention of the suspension from Educator's personnel file.

The Board asked that Educator's petition be dismissed as, indicating that:

1. It had voted to initiate charges against Educator pursuant to Education Law §3020-a and the Board's attorney had submitted an affidavit asserting that Educator "will be reassigned to duties ... during the pendency of the §3020-a proceeding;" 

2. Educator's personnel record contains no reference to the challenged suspension that could be expunged; and

3. The suspension of Educator by the Superintendent was appropriate because a  reasonable time between suspension and the filing of §3020-a disciplinary charges "is allowed."

Addressing the Educator's seeking the "expungement of the Superintendent’s suspension" from Educator's  personnel record, the Commissioner said such appeal must be dismissed as moot as the Commissioner will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest.

The Commissioner noted that with respect to Educator's request for interim relief seeking expungement of any mention of the suspension from the date on which it commenced "until the present," the appointing authority answer indicated that no letter, memorandum or other written document referencing Educator's suspension was prepared and placed in Educator's personnel file, which assertions were set out in the Board's verified answer and its attorney’s affirmation. The Commissioner declined to issue an order based on speculation that such a record might exist. 

Considering the alleged suspension of Educator, the Commissioner noted that in a reply affirmation, Educator's attorney acknowledged that the Board has the authority to suspend a tenured teacher such as [Educator] once it has filed §3020-a charges, but claimed that when the Board filed the disciplinary charges against Educator it took no action to suspend Educator and that Educator's continued suspension remained pursuant to actions taken by the Superintendent and thus was "illegal."** 

The Commissioner, citing Education Law §1711(2)(e), commented that the superintendent has statutory authority "to suspend ... [a] teacher or other employee until the next regular meeting of such board, when all facts relating to the case shall be submitted to such board for its consideration and action." Accordingly, said the Commissioner, "A suspension by a superintendent that extends beyond the next regular meeting of the board of education would be ultra vires."***

However, although the reply affirmation alleges that appointing authority did not take action to suspend Educator, Educator had not provided any evidence to corroborate that allegation.  The Commissioner said that she could not determine whether the appointing authority had taken any action on another date to suspend Educator with pay until a final resolution of the §3020-a proceeding.

 

Declining to order Educator's reinstatement "under these circumstances," the Commissioner observed that should Educator wish to continue to challenge the suspension, Educator's  recourse is to bring another appeal in an appropriate forum in which both parties would have a full and fair opportunity to address the legality of the suspension of the Educator after §3020-a charges were served upon him or her.

The Commissioner also explained that to the extent Educator seeks to challenge the merits of the suspension linked to a pending §3020-a proceeding, Educator's  claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Commissioner explained that Education Law §3020-a, as amended by Chapter 691 of the Laws of 1994, divested the Commissioner of jurisdiction to review §3020-a determinations of hearing officers, both final and non-final, implying that the issue of whether Educator was lawfully suspended by the Board was a matter for the §3020-a hearing officer[s] to determine .

For these reasons the Commissioner ruled that Educator's appeal to the Commissioner must be dismissed.

* As this disciplinary action pursuant to Education Law §3020-a is currently pending and it has not be determined whether any eventual hearing will be public or private, the individual upon whom the disciplinary charges were filed is herein identified as “Educator” to preserve his or her confidentiality.

** Addressing a procedural issue, the Commissioner’s regulations do not contemplate submission of a reply affidavit or affirmation in lieu of a reply, as Educator has done in this proceeding. However the Commissioner said that she "nevertheless accepted it for consideration in this appeal, noting that the reply affidavit is in the nature of a reply, as it responded to the appointing authority's affirmative defenses.

*** An action in excess of the authority or power possessed by an entity or an official or officer of that entity.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume58/d17507