ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL

March 13, 2019

Courts may not interfere with an administrative tribunal's proper exercise of its discretion


In this appeal Petitioner challenged Supreme Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Article 78 petition seeking to annul the determination of New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) that there was no probable cause to believe that Petitioner's employer, the Roswell Park Cancer Institute Corporation (Roswell), engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice against her in its entirety.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the Article 78 action, rejecting Petitioner's contention that Supreme Court must determine whether substantial evidence supported SDHR's determination. The court explained that when SDHR renders a determination of no probable cause without holding a hearing, the appropriate standard of review is whether the probable cause determination was arbitrary and capricious or lacked a rational basis."

Citing Matter of Sullivan v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 160 AD3d 1395, the Appellate Division also rejected Petitioner's argument that SDHR was required to hold a hearing on her complaint before it could make a probable cause determination. SDHR, said the Appellate Division, "has the discretion to determine the method to be used in investigating a [complaint], and a hearing is not required in all cases," noting that the record indicated that Petitioner "had a full and fair opportunity to present her case and that [SDHR's] investigation was neither abbreviated nor one-sided." The fact that there was conflicting evidence before SDHR, opined the Appellate Division, did not create a material issue of fact that warranted a formal hearing"

In addition the Appellate Division indicated that:

1. probable cause exists only when, after giving full credence to the complainant's version of the events, there is some evidence of unlawful discrimination;

2. there must be a factual basis in the evidence sufficient to warrant a cautious person to believe that discrimination had been practiced; and

3. the court's standard of review is an "extremely deferential one.

In effect, courts cannot interfere with an administrative tribunal's exercise of discretion "unless there is no rational basis for its exercise or the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious, a test which chiefly relates to whether a particular action should have been taken or is justified and whether the administrative action is without foundation in fact."

The bottom line: The Appellate Division found that Supreme Court properly concluded that SDHR's determination that there was no probable cause to believe that Roswell discriminated against Petitioner was not arbitrary or capricious and had a rational basis in the record.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 12, 2019

Claiming absolute privilege or qualified privilege as a defense in litigation involving alleged defamatory statements


The relevant facts in this action were not in dispute. Monroe County terminated Plaintiff from his position and on the same day the Monroe County Executive issued statements to the press that were published in local newspapers. Contending that three of the statements made by the County Executive were defamatory, Plaintiff sued Monroe County, among other named defendants [herein after collectively "Defendants"]. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's cause of action for alleged defamation, claiming an absolute or, in the alternative, a qualified privilege. Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion and the court's ruling was appealed. 

Citing Clark v McGee, 49 NY2d 613, the Appellate Division said that Defendants' statements to which Plaintiff objected "were absolutely privileged" noting that if an absolute privilege defense prevails it affords complete immunity from liability for alleged defamation to "an official [who] is a principal executive of State or local government ... with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties."

Courts typically apply a two-prong test in order to determine if an absolute privilege defense is available to the official based on [1] the status of the individual alleged to have utter the defamatory statement and [2] the subject matter of the statement in terms of it being consistent with the speaker's public duties. In some cases the forum in which the statement was uttered may be a consideration as well.

In this instance the Appellate Division conclude that absolute privilege applied because the speaker was the Monroe County Executive and her statements with respect to Plaintiff's termination concerned matters involving her official duties.*

In alternative, had a defense of absolute privilege not been available to Defendants, the Defendants might have advanced a claim that qualified privilege applied with respect to the County Executive's statements to the press as its defense.**

The qualified privilege defense, explained the Appellate Division "is available when a statement [not within the ambit of absolute privilege] is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, legal or moral, or in the conduct of his [or her] own affairs, in a matter where his [or her] interest is concerned."

Were a qualified privilege defense relied upon in this action, Defendant initially would have had to demonstrate that the County Executive made the  statements object to by Plaintiff  in her role as the Monroe County Executive in the course of discharging her duties and responsibility in order to keep the public informed regarding a sensitive issue that had obtained extensive media attention.

Once this was done, the burden of going forward would have been shifted to Plaintiff, who would have then been required to demonstrate a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the statements of the County Executive were motivated solely by malice.

Another area that may result in litigation is one in which Employee A alleges that he or she was defamed in an internal communications between administrators, or between another employee, Employee B, and an administrator concerning Employee A. 

Murphy v Herfort, 428 NY2d 117, is an example of litigation resulting from statements contained in communications between administrators; Missek-Falkoff v Keller, 153 AD2d 841, is an example of a case where Employee 1 sued another employee, Employee 2, because of the contents of a memorandum from Employee 2 to a superior concerning a “problem” with Employee 1.


As alternatives to claiming absolute immunity or qualified immunity, a public officer or employee involved in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding or in an administrative hearing may advance a claim of use immunity or transaction immunity as a defense, while from time to time a governmental entity may cite the Doctrine of Governmental Function Immunity*** as a defense, founded on the principle of the separation of powers and which is intended to ensure that public servants are free to exercise their decision-making authority [see Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137;  Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69]

* The court further opined that because the investigation and the underlying actions of Plaintiff became a matter of public attention and controversy, the form of communication, e.g., statements to the press, was warranted, citing Kilcoin v Wolansky, 75 AD2d 1, affd 52 NY2d 995.

** In Tulloch v Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114, the US Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the differences between absolute immunity and qualified immunity.

*** Although New York State has waived Sovereign Immunity as a defense on behalf of itself and its municipal subdivisions, the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity continues to shield public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_00747.htm

March 11, 2019

Determining the compensation to be included when calculating the final average salary of a New York City Employees Retirement System member


When the New York City Employees Retirement Systems [NYCERS] failed to included the compensation Plaintiff had received from the City University of New York [CUNY] in addition to his compensation from the New York City Housing Authority [Authority] in the calculation of his final average salary for the purposes of determining the pension portion of his  retirement allowance, Plaintiff file a CPLR Article 78 petition naming NYCERS, the City of New York Department of Citywide Administrative Services, and CUNY as respondents [hereinafter jointly Defendants]. 

Plaintiff contended that NYCERS should have included his CUNY compensation in the determination of his final average salary. Supreme Court judgment granted Plaintiff's petition and directed NYCERS to include the salary the Plaintiff received from the CUNY in the calculation of his final average salary. Defendants appealed and the Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling, on the law, confirmed NYCERS' determination with respect to its calculation of Petitioner's final average salary and dismissed the proceeding "on the merits."

The Appellate Division's decision indicated that (1) Plaintiff had been employed as a full-time employee by the Authority; (2) as a part-time adjunct lecturer by CUNY; (3) had  joined the NYCERS on January 5, 1981; and (4) had never been a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York [NYCTRS].

When Plaintiff filed his retirement application with NYCERS, NYCERS determined his "final average salary" only considering the compensation he received as a result of his employment with the Authority. When asked, NYCERS informed Plaintiff that the title of adjunct lecturer was a "non-eligible NYCERS title" and thus  his earnings while employed with CUNY were not included in the final average salary computation upon which the pension portion of his retirement allowance was based.

The Appellate Division held that contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, Plaintiff employment with CUNY was not "city-service," as defined by Administrative Code §13-101(3).* The court explained that Supreme Court relied upon language contained in Administrative Code §13-563 which, in relevant part, "extended membership in NYCTRS to all lecturers employed by CUNY who serve on a "per hour, per diem, per monthly or per semester basis, . . . provided however that such lecturers are not members of any other retirement system supported in whole or in part by the city."

The Appellate Division opined that because the Plaintiff had elected to be a member of NYCERS, he was not eligible for membership in NYCTRS notwithstanding Plaintiff's employment with both the Authority and CUNY, concluding that Plaintiff was eligible for membership in either NYCERS or NYCTRS, but not both.

In the words of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court's "interpretation had the effect of rewriting the definition of "city-service" to include any city employee who is both NYCERS and NYCTRS eligible, regardless of which retirement system they choose, and created a new, unpermitted exception to the dual employment provisions in the Administrative Code."

As the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"** is typically followed by courts when determining the legislative intent or application of a statute, the Appellate Division concluded that "where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded."

The bottom line: the Appellate Division ruled that as "the determination that Plaintiff is not entitled to inclusion of his CUNY earnings in the calculation of his final average salary was not arbitrary or capricious or affected by an error of law, the Supreme Court should have denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding on the merits."


* The Appellate Division observed that because Plaintiff was eligible for membership in NYCTRS, his employment with CUNY was not "city-service" as defined by Administrative Code §13-101(3).

**  A "Law Latin" term meaning when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned in a statute all others of the same class are excluded.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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