Recent Decisions issued by Administrative Law Judges of the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings

Below are summaries of recent OATH Administrative Law Judge's decisions.  To ascertain whether the ALJs' recommendations were adopted by the appointing authority please call OATH's calendar unit at 1-844-628-4692.

Worker alleged to be under the influence of drugs while on duty

OATH Index No. 1530/19

A worker, who was found unconscious at work, was charged with possessing and being under the influence of drugs while on duty and being absent without leave. Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison sustained the charges that the employee was under the influence of drugs while on duty but dismissed the absence charge.

Termination of the worker’s employment was recommended by the appointing authority, but because the employee’s problems appeared to have started following a line of duty injury, Judge Addison suggested that the appointing authority consider placing the individual on a leave of absence to allow him to return when fully rehabilitated.

The appointing authority adopted Judge Addison's findings and recommendation.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1530.pdf

Special officer alleged to have used excessive force against a client

OATH Index No. 2742/18

A special officer [SO] was charged with using excessive force against a client at a New York City job center. The charges filed against the officer alleged that he kicked the client hard in the face and pulled the client’s arm when the client was already held in a prone position on the floor by several other officers. SO denied the charges filed against him.

In the course of a four-day trial, the appointing authority offered seven witnesses and SO offered three. ALJ Noel R. Garcia credited the appointing authority’s witnesses, found that SO guilty of serious misconduct, and recommended termination of his employment. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/18_cases/18-2742.pdf

Employee charge with targeting a co-worker with inappropriate, aggressive and threatening language 

OATH Index No. 1863/19

An employee was charged with twice accosting a fellow employee and addressing  inappropriate, aggressive and threatening language to the co-worker.

During trial the appointing authority presented the testimony of four employees. Testifying on her own behalf, the charged employee denied having used any inappropriate or aggressive language.

ALJ Addison found the appointing authority’s witnesses credible and sustained the charges. Considering the charged employee’s long service with the agency,  Judge Addison recommended a penalty of 40 days’ suspension without pay, "with credit for time served."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1863.pdf

Motion seeking the recusal of the Supreme Court Justice presiding over a CPLR Article 75 action

Petitioner [Employer] commenced this proceeding in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 75 to vacate an arbitration award that concluded that Employer had improperly terminated the employment of member of the negotiating unit represented by the employee organization [Union]. 

Supreme Court granted the Employer's petition and vacated the arbitration award. The Union and the terminated employee  then asked [1] the Supreme Court Justice who had presided over this Article 75 action to recuse herself; and [2] an order to vacate the order and judgment earlier issued by her. The Justice denied the motion. 

Mandatory disqualification of a Supreme Court Justice pursuant to Judiciary Law §14 is required where the trial judge presiding over any claim is "related by consanguinity or affinity to any party to the controversy within the sixth degree."* 

The Appellate Division explained that the record did not show that any person related to the challenged Supreme Court Justice was a party to Article 75 proceeding and thus mandatory disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law §14 was not required

Turning to the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon, 3(E)(1)(d)(i), which concerns a judge recusing himself or herself as a matter of the exercise of his or her discretion, the Appellate Division said that this provision addresses a judge decision to decline "self-disqualification" or reject a motion to do so.

As to the question of discretionary recusal, the Appellate Division again agreed with the Supreme Court Justice's denial of the motion seeking her recusal based on alleged impropriety or bias. The Appellate Division's decision notes that in the absence of a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law §14, "the determination concerning a motion seeking recusal based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and the personal conscience of the court." 

Such recusal, opined the Appellate Division, as a matter of due process, "is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion, or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist." 

Accordingly, said the court, the denial of a recusal motion will constitute an improvident exercise of discretion only where the moving party puts forth demonstrable proof of the judge's bias or prejudgment and here there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that  the Supreme Court Justice had any improper interest in the outcome of the Article 75 proceeding or harbored actual bias against the Union or its member so as to warrant the conclusion that her denial of their recusal request was an improvident exercise of discretion.

* "First cousins twice removed" constitute the sixth degree of consanguinity.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06391.htm

[See, also, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06402.htm]

Suing for alleged defamation following the publication of an article concerning "official governmental activities"

New York's Civil Rights Law §74 shields publishers from civil liability for claims of defamation when the alleged defamatory statements are accurate reports about official government events and activities.*

Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion to strike the Respondent's Civil Rights Law §74 defense** to allegations of defamation, holding that "Civil Rights Law §74 ... confers an absolute privilege on a fair and true report of any official proceeding."

Supreme Court also noted that "a newspaper article which relies upon the findings of an official proceeding [does not] lose the protection of the statute merely because its publication precedes release of the official findings. 

Indeed, observed the court, even the announcement of an investigation by a public agency, made before the formal investigation has begun, is protected as a report of an official proceeding within the contemplation of §74, as is a report of an ongoing investigation, as long as it is accurate"

In addressing Petioner's appeal challenging the Supreme Court's ruling concerning Respondent's §74 defense, the Appellate Division identified as covered by the rubric "official government activities" was an article that "hyperlinked a CNN article and the embedded dossier compiled by Christopher Steele, which included a confidential report containing the alleged defamatory statements" about Plaintiffs.

The Appellate Division, sustaining the Supreme Court's ruling, opined that the Plaintiffs "would have concluded that there were official proceedings, such as classified briefings and/or an FBI investigation concerning the dossier as a whole, including the confidential report relating to plaintiffs."

* Civil Rights Law§ 74 provides that "A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding." The same is true with respect to "any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published."

** The Supreme Court's ruling is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2018/2018_30834.pdf

The Appellate Division's decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_03473.htm