Applying the terms of an agreement settling a disciplinary action

During the course of Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing Plaintiff, represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement with the appointing authority [Employer] acting "on its own behalf and on behalf of its present and former ... employees." The settlement agreement provided that the Employer would discontinue the disciplinary proceeding and remove a letter of disciplinary charges from the Plaintiff's personnel file while Plaintiff agreed to retire from his employment with the Employer and to release the Employer and its employees "from all claims or causes of action he may have or claim to have . . . including any and all claims in any way arising out of, or related to, his employment with the Employer, or his separation from that employment."

Subsequently Plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for defamation, alleging that the individuals [Defendants] named in his complaint, also employees of the Employer, had falsely accused him of actions that led to the disciplinary charges that were preferred by the Employer against him.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, submitting a copy of the settlement agreement that had been executed by the Plaintiff in connection with the discontinuance of the disciplinary proceeding that had been brought against him.

Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, Supreme Court granted the Defendant's motion "for failure to state a cause of action" and Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division explained that [1] the terms of the release contained in the settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously encompass Plaintiff's action and [2] Plaintiff failed to allege any unlawful or wrongful threat by the Employer that could serve as the basis of a claim of duress, which was the only ground the plaintiff alleged to void the release. Thus, opined the Appellate Division, "the release executed by the [Plaintiff] should be enforced according to its terms."

The Appellate Division noted the following elements with respect to a release that will be enforced by a court:

1. "A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law;"

2.  "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him [or her] on the ground that . . . the cause of action may not be maintained because of . . . [a] release";

3 "Where . . . the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a jural act 'binding on the parties';"

4.  "Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release"; and

5. "Although a defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims, a signed release shifts the burden ... to the plaintiff to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06588.htm

New York State's double jeopardy legal loophole closed

On October 16, 2019, New York State Governor Andrew M. Cuomo  announced that he had signed legislation (S.4572/A.6653) to close New York's double jeopardy legal loophole that protects individuals who are pardoned by a President from being prosecuted at the state level for the same offense. 

This key reform, which was an Attorney General's program bill, gives New York prosecutors discretion to pursue prosecution of criminal acts where they have jurisdiction.

School Board's abolishment of a position challenged by residents of the school district

The Board of Education [Board], on the recommendation of the School Superintendent, voted to abolish the position of assistant principal at the school district's Junior-Senior High School. The Board then created an "interim position" of District Administrator for K-12 Curriculum, Instruction, and Student Support Services.*

Certain residents of the school district [Petitioner] asked the Commissioner of Education to annul the Board's resolutions, contending that the Board's actions were arbitrary and capricious because the Board did not, among other things:  (1) discuss the resolutions at a public meeting; (2) provide a rational basis for their decision; (3) collaborate with district professionals; or (4) consider actual curricular needs, adverse consequences or relevant data.

The Commissioner ruled the Petitioners' appeal must be dismissed for lack of standing, explaining that an individual may not maintain an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal or property rights and only individuals who are directly affected by the action being appealed have standing to bring an appeal.

Here, said the Commissioner, Petitioners "merely assert that they are residents" of the school district and "[s]tatus as a resident of the district or as a parent of a student does not, in and of itself, confer capacity to seek review of the actions of a board of education with respect to its employees."

Noting that Petitioners also alleged that the Board had violated the State's Open Meetings Law, the Commissioner pointed out that the Open Meetings Law, Public Officers Law §107, vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging violations of the said law in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and alleged violations thereof may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner as the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to address the Open Meetings Law allegations.

* Certain residents [Petitioners] in the district had initiated a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 challenging the Board's abolition of the assistant principal position and then creating the position "interim position." Supreme Court dismissed Petitioners’ claims on the grounds that the Commissioner of Education had primary jurisdiction over such claims and Petitioners turned to the Commissioner for relief.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume59/d17762