Determining if an expired collective bargaining agreement provided certain retirees with vested health insurance benefits

Plaintiffs in this action are teachers who retired from their positions with the  Central School District [District] in June 2011 and who at the time they retired were covered by the provisions set out in "an expired collective bargaining agreement" [CBA] between the Teachers Association [Association] and the District.

That CBA had "expired" on June 30, 2010 [Former CBA]. A successor CBA [Successor CBA] between the DTA and the District was ratified in October 2013 and its provisions were made applicable retroactively effective July 1, 2010.

The Former CBA provided, among other things, that the District would pay 100% of the health insurance premiums for health insurance coverage for retired employees and their dependents. The Successor CBA between the DTA and the District was ratified in October 2013 and no longer provided that the District would pay 100% of the health insurance premiums for such coverage for retired employees and their dependents. Rather the Successor CBA required certain employee contributions for health insurance premiums for both individual and dependent coverages. 

In January 2014, Plaintiffs individually submitted verified claims to the District  stating that their vested contract rights had been violated when they were required to pay five percent of the required  health insurance premium for coverage and in October 2014 commenced this action, contending that the Former CBA, rather than the Successor CBA, controlled with respect to their health insurance premium costs in retirement for individual and dependent coverage. 

Ultimately Supreme Court, among other things, granted Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, finding that the Former CBA was still effective at the time that Plaintiffs had retired and that there was no evidence that they waived their retiree health insurance benefits under the Former CBA. The District appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Observing that "the essential facts are not in dispute," the Appellate Division said "this case presents questions of law"  —  specifically:

1. What health insurance provisions apply to plaintiffs — the Former CBA or the Successor CBA; and 

2. Whether Plaintiffs' health insurance rights vested under the Former CBA. 

Noting that Civil Service Law §209-a (1) (e), the so-called Taylor Law, "requires an employer to continue all the terms of an expired CBA while a new agreement is being negotiated," the Appellate Division opined that "the assumption is that all terms of a CBA remain in effect during collective bargaining of a successor agreement," citing Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 20 NY3d 651.

Although the court said that typically "contractual rights and obligations do not survive beyond the termination of a [CBA], rights which accrued or vested under the [old CBA] will, as a general rule, survive termination of the [old CBA]."*  Thus courts "must look to well-established principles of contract interpretation to determine whether the parties intended that the contract give rise to a vested right." 

While a court when determining whether a CBA creates a vested right to future benefits  should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises, when an agreement is ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation is it appropriate for the court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent and "it is logical to assume [from the absence of any such durational language of how long retirees will receive benefits] that the bargaining unit intended to insulate retirees from losing important insurance rights during subsequent negotiations by using language in each and every contract which fixed their rights to coverage as of the time they retired."

The Appellate Division decided that Supreme Court properly found that, pursuant to Civil Service Law §209-a(1), because the Successor CBA had not yet been ratified at the time Plaintiffs retired, the terms of the Former CBA remained in effect pending the negotiation and ratification of the Successor CBA. Accordingly, the question turns to whether Plaintiffs' contractual rights vested under the Former CBA  survived its termination.

Finding that the language in the Former CBA was ambiguous, the Appellate Division said that this "permits this Court to look outside the contract to extrinsic evidence to discover the intent behind this provision of the Former CBA and in this instance the evidence adduced "supports the conclusion that it was the District's intent to provide full coverage for retired employees such as Plaintiffs."**

The court also noted that retirees were not permitted to vote in the ratification of the Successor CBA process and that such an absence of voting rights "further indicates that [the District] intended to protect Plaintiffs from losing their health insurance benefits," and concluded that Plaintiffs' rights vested under the Former CBA and survived its termination.

Finally, the Appellate Division said it was "unpersuaded by [the District's] contention that Plaintiffs waived their health insurance rights under the Former CBA" as they ratified the Successor CBA by their receipt and retaining retroactive pay in 2014 for the 2010-2011 school year, and the Successor CBA contained a clause making it applicable retroactively. Indeed, said the court, the record indicates that Plaintiffs had been making their health insurance premium payments under protest and had told the District that acceptance of such retroactive salary payments would not constitute such a waiver.

Supreme Court, said the Appellate Division, properly inferred that it was not Petitioner's  intention to waive the benefits provided them under the Former CBA*** and thus Supreme Court properly granted Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and denied the District's motion for summary judgment.

* See Kolbe v Tibbetts, 22 NY3d 344.

** The District's amended response to a Plaintiff's demand for interrogatories stated the it interpreted the language "district participation rate in effect of 1/1/84" "to refer to those employees who retire under the [Former CBA] receiving the same benefit as employees who were retired as of 1/1/84."

*** The Appellate Division said that one of the Petitioners had "made clear in her letter of resignation, she had an agreement with [the District] that she would receive the retroactive [salary] payment while retaining the [health insurance] benefits of the old CBA."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_02843.htm

Court sustains dismissal of a teacher found to have placed a student at serious risk of harm

A teacher [Plaintiff] employed by the New York City Department of Education [DOE] was served with disciplinary charges and specifications pursuant to Education Law §3020-a. The arbitrator found Plaintiff guilty of having had a physical altercation with a student and the penalty imposed on the teacher was dismissal from his position.

Plaintiff then filed an appeal pursuant to CPLR Article 75 in Supreme Court challenging his termination from his position. Finding that the penalty imposed, dismissal, was disproportionate to Plaintiff's offense, Supreme Court vacated the penalty set in the arbitration award and remanding the matter to DOE to provide for a hearing before a different arbitrator, who would then issue a new penalty determination. DOE appealed Supreme Court's ruling and the Appellate Division unanimously vacated the lower court's decision on the law.

The Appellate Division, noting that Plaintiff did not contest the  arbitrator's finding at his disciplinary hearing that he had punched a student twice in the head or face while physically removing him from the classroom, said that the record demonstrates that the arbitrator considered all the circumstances, including the fast-developing situation necessitating the student's removal from the classroom and generally credited Plaintiff's testimony. 

The court concluded that regardless of whether or not the arbitrator erred in finding that Plaintiff's denial of having thrown punches precluded a finding of remorse, the record showing minor injuries to the student, and a separate finding by the arbitrator that Plaintiff's actions put the student at serious risk of harm, supports imposing the penalty of dismissal based on the Plaintiff's use of excessive force.

Citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, 34 NY2d 222, the Appellate Division opined that "Contrary to Supreme Court's finding, the penalty of termination of [Plaintiff's] employment was not so disproportionate to his offense as to shock one's sense of fairness" and reinstated the penalty  initially imposed on Plaintiff by the arbitrator, dismissal from his position. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_02893.htm

________________________

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances
 Determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee
 in the public service found guilty of misconduct or incompetence.
For more information click on http://booklocker.com/7401.html
________________________ 

Processing a Freedom of Information request

In Matter of Abdur-Rashid v New York City Police Dept., 31 NY3d 217, the Court of Appeals, quoting Matter of Fink v Lefkowitz, 47 NY2d 567, said that "To promote open government and public accountability, FOIL* imposes a broad duty on government agencies to make their records available to the public. The statute is based on the policy that the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government'." 

In the instant action Plaintiff-Appellant's [Plaintiff] FOIL request asked the New York City Department of Education's [DOE] for copies of forms used by its employees' to request approval to be absent from work for religious observances in cases where the request was denied during a specified period of time. DOE denied Plaintiff's request on the ground that the requested records were not described so as to enable it, with reasonable effort, to conduct a search to locate and identify them.** This decision was sustained administrative appeal.

Plaintiff then initiated a CPLR Article 78 action seeking a court order compelling DOE (1) to produce such records pursuant to FOIL and (2) for an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs. Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding, which ruling the Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division explained that FOIL requires that documents requested be "reasonably described" in order to enable the agency to locate the records in question." With respect to DOE's denial of Plaintiff's request on the ground that the requested records were not reasonably described, the court opined that DOE conceded that it would be able to locate the requested records as they "are maintained at the schools where the relevant employees are currently or were last assigned."

Considering the fact that DOE "knows where the requested records are located," the Appellate Division rejected DOE's claim that it would be burdensome for it to conduct a search of the personnel files at each of its 1,700 schools to produce the requested records. In particular the court noted that FOIL provides that the "agency shall not deny a request on the basis that the request is voluminous or that locating or reviewing the requested records or providing the requested copies is burdensome because the agency lacks sufficient staffing or on any other basis if the agency may engage an outside professional service to provide copying, programming or other services required to provide the copy, the costs of which the agency may recover pursuant to paragraph (c) of subdivision one of section eighty-seven of this article."

However, the issue of "burdensome" for DOE to produce the requested records and, or, whether DOE is able to engage an outside professional service to cull the records sought was not addressed by the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division said it could not resolve this issue "on this record" as, among other things:

1. It is unclear as to how much time would be involved for an employee at each school to review the relevant files; and 

2. Although Plaintiff has expressed its willingness to reimburse DOE for reasonable costs involved in having DOE's employees, or an appropriate third party, review and copy the relevant DOE's records, there is no information in the record as to what that cost would be or whether the Plaintiff would, in fact, be willing to reimburse DOE for the full amount of those costs, once those costs are determined.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division vacated the Supreme Court's judgment, reinstate the petition, and remit the matter to the lower court "further proceedings, including additional submissions by the parties, and a new determination of the petition." 

As the petition remains undetermined, the Appellate Division also ruled that Plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs was premature.

* Public Officers Law Article 6 [see generally POL §84]

** DOE explained that the requested records were "not coded or stored electronically"  and in order to locate and identify the requested records, more than 100,000 individual personnel files would have to be searched. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2020/2020_02758.htm

Duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to injuries resulting from hazards that are inherent in the work the employee is to perform

The plaintiffs [Plaintiff] in this action to recover damages for personal injuries "suffered on the job" was employed as a sanitation worker by the City of New York [City]. Plaintiff claimed that he was injured while he and a coworker were working "on the job" lifting a heavy bag of garbage as the result of his coworker's losing his grip on the bag. 

Plaintiff sued the City claiming, among other things, "common-law negligence and loss of consortium" as the result of [a] his coworker's negligence and [b] the City's negligence in the coworker's training and supervision. City moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending, among other things, that the injury was caused by an inherent hazard of the job for sanitation workers and that the injured Plaintiff's coworker was not negligent. 

Supreme Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and Plaintiff appealed from those branches of the City's motion that resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiffs causes of action alleging common-law negligence and loss of consortium.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's determination, explaining that although employers in New York State generally "have a common-law duty to provide their employees with a safe place to work," there is an exception to that rule whereby the duty "does not extend to hazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the employee is to perform". In this instance, said the court, "The hazard of being injured as a result of lifting a heavy garbage bag and loading it into a sanitation truck is inherent in the work of a sanitation worker," citing Marin v San Martin Rest., 287 AD2d 441.

The court ruled that City had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that the injured Plaintiff"s coworker was not acting negligently or differently than a reasonably prudent sanitation worker would, and that Plaintiff"s injury resulted from a risk inherent in his assigned work as a sanitation worker.

Finding that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Appellate Division said that it agreed with the Supreme Court's determination to grant those branches of the City's motion that were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and loss of consortium.

Presumably Plaintiff would be eligible for workers' compensation benefits otherwise available to him.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
https://www.leagle.com/decision/innyco20200520293