A tenured associate professor [Plaintiff] employed by the defendant [College], commenced this action alleging that the College discriminated against her on the basis of sex and her disability and retaliated against her after she complained of such alleged unlawful discrimination. Supreme Court granted the College's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and Plaintiff appealed.
With respect to the alleged disparate treatment and disability discrimination that was based on the College's purported refusal to provide Plaintiff a reasonable accommodations for her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Contrary, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court properly granted that portion of the College's motion with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of disparate treatment and disability discrimination based on the College's purported refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Appellate Division explaining that the College had met its initial burden on the motion with respect to those aspects of Plaintiff's causes of action by establishing that an essential function of Plaintiff's job was teaching and that Plaintiff's requested accommodation, -- that she be allowed to work part time without teaching any courses -- was unreasonable.
Addressing Plaintiff's allegation that College violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court's order based on its finding that the College "failed to establish as a matter of law that the difference in pay between Plaintiff and a less senior male colleague who performed similar work under similar conditions 'is due to a factor other than sex.'" In so doing the court rejected the College's claim that the pay disparity was the result of a merit system, finding that the evidence it submitted in support of its motion [1] failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that there was "an organized and structured procedure whereby employees are evaluated systematically according to predetermined criteria" and [2] that the College's employees "were aware of the purported merit system."
Turning to Plaintiff's causes of action for alleged sexual discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Right Law [NYSHRL], the Appellate Division concluded that issues of fact existed as to whether the College's challenged actions were "based upon nondiscriminatory reasons," and thus summary judgment was precluded on those causes of action and that they should also be reinstated.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations of unlawful retaliation, the Appellate Division opined that to establish a claim for unlawful retaliation under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show that "(1) she has engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer was aware that she participated in such activity, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action based upon her activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." In contrast, said the court, a defendant may establish entitlement to summary judgment in a retaliation case if the defendant "demonstrate[s] that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie claim of retaliation."
The Appellate Division decided that the College's denial of Plaintiff's request to return to work part time without any teaching duties and its requirement that she retain an administrative role that fell "within the duties of [her] position'" were not adverse employment actions and thus Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie claim of retaliation with respect to these allegations.
In contrast, however, the Appellate Division found that 'issues of fact exist" as to whether the College unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff after she complained of gender discrimination when it required her to retain her position as the undergraduate coordinator while at the same time maintaining her regular course load and also reinstated this element of her petition.
As to Plaintiff's allegations of violations of Title VII based on unlawful retaliation, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court correctly dismissed this element of Plaintiff's complaint because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, a condition precedent to going forward with this aspect of her complaint.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: