If a court finds that an administrative penalty is shocking to one's sense of fairness” it must remand the matter for a new penalty determination
Matter of Liguori v Beloten, 2010 NY Slip Op 06739, Decided on September 30, 2010, Appellate Division, Third Department
Dr. James M. Liguori pleaded guilty to one specification of professional misconduct based upon his failure to maintain adequate records and agreed to a penalty consisting of “a censure and reprimand,” being on probation for three years under the supervision of a practice monitor, to pay a $25,000 fine and to perform “100 hours of nonmedical community service.”
Subsequently the Chair of the Workers' Compensation Board, Robert E. Beloten, removed Dr. Liguori’s name from the Board’s list of eligible providers.*
When Liguori’s request for reconsideration and, or, administrative review of the removal of his name from the list of “WCB providers” was denied, he commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Chair’s determination.
Supreme Court granted Liguori’s petition, finding that the Chairman Beloten had “failed to adequately explain the basis for [Liguori’s] removal from the list of authorized providers and remitted the matter for further proceedings”.
In response to the Board’s issuing a new determination that, again, removed his name from the list of authorized providers that set out its basis for Liguori’s removal, Liguori again filed an Article 78 petition contending that the Board’s second determination was arbitrary and capricious and violated his right to due process.
Supreme Court granted Liguori’s petition. Although the court found that the explanation for Liguori’s removal was adequate, it ruled that “the Chair's determination nonetheless was arbitrary and capricious” and ordered the Board to restore Liguori to its list of eligible providers. The Board appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that "Judicial review of an administrative penalty is limited to whether the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law," citing the Pell Doctrine, Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222 – the so-called Pell Doctrine.
The Pell Doctrine stands for the proposition that courts must uphold the penalty imposed by an administrative body unless it is "so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."
The Appellate Division said that in determining if a penalty meets the Pell standard, “the reviewing court may neither second-guess the administrative agency nor substitute its own judgment for the action taken.” Further, said the Appellate Division, should the court determine “that the penalty imposed cannot stand, the court may not fashion a reduced penalty” but must remit the matter to the agency for a redetermination of the penalty to be imposed.
As to its basis for vacating the Supreme Court’s determination, the Appellate Division said that it had concluded that based on its review of the record “we cannot say that the penalty imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.”
* WCB providers are authorized to render care and treatment to individuals who had suffered work-related injuries.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06739.htm
NYPPL