New York State local government and school audits posted on the Internet on September 16, 2026.

On September 16, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government and school audits were posted on the Internet.

                Click the text highlighted in COLOR to access the audit report.

South Huntington Union Free School District – Credit Cards (Suffolk County) District officials did not ensure that credit card charges were authorized, supported, for valid district purposes or approved. As a result, the board and officials did not establish adequate oversight and internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that district credit cards were used appropriately and in the best interest of taxpayers. In addition, because the board did not ensure that all claims were reviewed and approved by the claims auditor prior to payment, the district faced an increased risk of paying for goods or services that did not serve a proper district purpose.

Village of Groton – Capital Project (Tompkins County) The village board did not competitively procure certain goods and services for the project. Although the project’s original construction contracts, totaling $3.7 million, were properly procured, the board subsequently procured $135,900 in goods and services without seeking competition in accordance with state law or the village’s procurement policy.

Beekmantown Central School District – Investment Program (Clinton County) Auditors determined that the district’s investments were legal, safe and liquid. However, district officials did not develop and manage a comprehensive investment program. For example, during the audit period, officials did not prepare any cash flow forecasts to estimate funds available for investment or solicit interest rate quotes from financial institutions. As a result, officials missed an opportunity for the district to realize additional revenues of more than $1 million.

Honeoye Central School District – Financial Management (Ontario County and Livingston County) The board and district officials did not effectively manage fund balance. Although the board and district officials generally maintained surplus fund balance within the statutory 4 percent limit, they did so by transferring surplus fund balance to reserves at, or after, year-end and maintaining $1.1 million excess fund balance in the debt service fund. As of June 30, 2025, two general fund reserves totaling $977,890 were not reasonably funded.

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Concerning standing to sue in an educational setting.

Defending Education* is an association of parents, students, and concerned citizens that brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging a set of student speech policies adopted by the Croton-Harmon Union Free School District, a New York State School District, for alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 

Defending Education represented three of its parent-members whose children attend school in the Croton-Harmon School District and espouse social and political views that they wish to share but refrain from doing so because they feared their speech was prohibited by the School District’s policies. Defending Education brought suit in a Federal District Court seeking a preliminary injunction against the School District's enforcement of those policies. 

The District Court denied that motion and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction citing Aguayo v Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the Second Circuit had held that "Associations lack standing to sue on behalf of their members for claims brought under §1983". Defending Education appealed the District Court’s decision to the Second Circuit but, acknowledging Aguayo, moved for summary affirmance, which the Second Circuit granted. 

Defending Education then petitioned for reconsideration of their cause of action en banc, asking the Second Circuit to overrule Aguayo and to remand the case to the District Court so that Defending Education could pursue its lawsuit against the School District. 

After circulating this opinion to all active members of the Second Circuit and receiving no objection, the Second Circuit overrule Aguayo’s holding "with respect to associational standing under §1983".  In its place, the Second Circuit adopted the rule outlined by the Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), and adopted by its sister Circuits, which provides that a membership organization has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members under §1983 when:

(a) those members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;

(b) the interests protected are germane to that organization’s purpose, and 

(c) the participation of individual members in the lawsuit is not necessary for the claim asserted or the relief requested. 

The Second Circuit than REVERSE the judgment of the Federal District Court and REMAND the matter for further proceedings in accordance with its instant ruling. 

* The Court pointed out that "Defending Education is an association of parents, students, and concerned citizens that brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging a set of student speech policies adopted by the Croton-Harmon Union Free School District (“Croton-Harmon” or the “District”) in New York for alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.

 

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Employee alleges Employer subjected him to unlawful retaliation and other unlawful acts and served him with false disciplinary charges

Plaintiff was served with Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary charges. After a Civil Service Law §75 hearing, a Hearing Officer found that Plaintiff was guilty a charge of speeding on the Thruway but found that all remaining disciplinary charges were not sustained. 

Although the Hearing Officer recommended that Plaintiff be restored to his position,  Plaintiff was reassigned to another facility, more than a three hour drive from Plaintiff's residence.

Plaintiff sued his Employer and other named individuals [Defendants] alleging that he was subjected to retaliation and other actions acts by Defendants including being served with disciplinary charges based on "false and manufactured charges", and a disciplinary suspension. The matter proceeded to trial and a jury considered the following three causes of action:

(1) Deprivation of Plaintiff's 14th Amendment right to equal protection pursuant to 42 USC §1983; 

(2) Retaliation in violation of 42 USC §1983; and 

(3) Tortious interference with business relations.

The jury found for Plaintiff and awarded Plaintiff $500,000 in damages for "pain, suffering, and emotional distress, harm to reputation, and loss of enjoyment of life". 

Supreme Court awarded Plaintiff $185,392 in attorneys' fees. 

Defendants appealed the Supreme Court's ruling, contending Supreme Court erred in denying that part of their CPLR 3211 motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's equal protection cause of action. The Appellate Division rejected that contention. 

Defendants, citing Engquist v Oregon Dept. of Agriculture (553 US 591), also argued that "a class-of-one equal protection claim is unavailable in the public employment context, and an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement, such as alleged by [Plaintiff], is likewise barred. Noting that the Second Circuit has left open that question and that there is a split of authority in the district courts, the Appellate Division said it was "persuaded by the reasoning in Airday v City of New York (2020 WL 4015770), that selective-enforcement claims survive after Engquist.

Defendants' further argued that, "even if selective-enforcement claims survived Engquist, they are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 USC §1983". The Appellate Division said that such an argument was not preserved for its review, and, in any event, is without merit, observing that "Public officials may invoke qualified immunity under 42 USC §1983 unless, inter alia, the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time." Further, opined the Appellate Division, malice-based selective-enforcement claims premised on the violation of equal protection were recognized at the time of Defendants' actions and thus Defendants were aware of the purported unlawfulness of their conduct.

Defendants next contend that, with respect to Plaintiff's equal protection cause of action, Plaintiff failed to identify "a materially similar comparator whom [Defendants] treated differently and [Defendants] are therefore entitled to a directed verdict on that cause of action". The Appellate Division held that "[Defendants'] contention [was] not preserved for [its] review inasmuch as [Defendants] did not raise that issue in their motion for a directed verdict."

Defendants also argued that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of their CPLR 3211 motion seeking to dismiss the retaliation cause of action because Plaintiff's speech was not protected inasmuch as it was speech he made as an employee, not as a citizen. The Appellate Division rejected that argument, noting that "To establish a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff  'must demonstrate that (1) [their] speech addressed a matter of public concern, (2) [they] suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the speech and the adverse employment action, so that it can be said that [their] speech was a motivating factor in the determination'". 

In contrast, the Appellate Division noted that "[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline".

The Appellate Division said it agreed with Defendants that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tortious interference cause of action, observing that "Generally, actions against [New York] State officers acting in their official capacity in the exercise of governmental functions are deemed to be, in essence, claims against the State and, therefore, suable only in the Court of Claims".

Finally, the Appellate Division rejected Defendants' contention that the matter should be remitted to Supreme Court for a recalculate the award of attorneys' fees and unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment without costs.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.