A court may set aside an administrative disciplinary penalty only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness

A tenured teacher [Plaintiff] employed by a Central School District [District] was charged with, inter alia, misconduct, conduct unbecoming a teacher, neglect of duty, and insubordination arising from, among other things, repeated incidents of alleged noncompliance with the District's mask requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic and certain conduct toward school administrators and a colleague.

The District served Plaintiff with a notice of the disciplinary charges and Education Law §3020-a disciplinary hearing was conducted. The hearing officer sustained most of the Charges and Specifications alleged by the District and imposed termination of Plaintiff's employment as the the penalty.

Plaintiff initiated a CPLR Article 75 appeal challenging the hearing officer's findings and the penalty imposed. The District responded with a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's CPLR Article 75 petition. Supreme Court granted the District's motion to dismiss the CPLR Article 75 action,  denied Plaintiff's petition, and dismissed the CPLR Article 75 proceeding.

The Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.  The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court decision, holding that the lower court had properly granted the District's  motion to dismiss the petition, had properly denied the Plaintiff's petition, and had properly dismissed the proceeding.

The Appellate Division, citing a number of relevant cases, explained:

1. "Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through a statutory mandate", in this instance by Education Law §3020-a, "the determination of the arbitrator is subject to 'closer judicial scrutiny' under CPLR 7511(b) than it would otherwise receive";

2. An award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding, such as is here the case, must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary or capricious; and

3. "When reviewing compulsory arbitrations in education proceedings such as [the instant proceeding], the court should accept the arbitrators' credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists".

Finding that the determination sustaining the charges of misconduct, conduct unbecoming a teacher, neglect of duty, and insubordination was rational, had evidentiary support, and was neither arbitrary or capricious, the Appellate Division held that,  notwithstanding Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, "the proceedings comported with due process" as Plaintiff was given "adequate notice of the charge and the notice was reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense".

Further, the Appellate Division's decision noted that "A court may set aside an administrative penalty only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness". Although "reasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been", this "does not provide a basis for ... refashioning the penalty".

The Appellate Division concluded that the penalty of termination of employment "was not so disproportionate to the sustained charges so as to shock one's sense of fairness, particularly in light of the repeated nature of the offending behavior, that it occurred in the presence of students, and the [Petitioner's] prior disciplinary record" and ruled that the Supreme Court had properly granted the District's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's petition and dismiss the Plaintiff's CPLR Article 75 proceeding.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

The U.S. Court of Appeals' summary of its decision in the Appeal of Barberan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Town of Eastchester, et al., Defendants-Appellees, is set out below

"Former employee sued the Town of Eastchester to recover for harm he allegedly suffered while employed with the Town of Eastchester Police Department (“Department”), including his ultimate termination. 

"In the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Barberan asserted claims for discrimination based on his Hispanic national origin and for retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”). 

"The district court concluded that Barberan failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, failed to show that the Town’s reasons for the adverse employment actions were pretextual and that the real reason was discrimination, and granted summary judgment for the Town. See Barberan v. Town of Eastchester, No. 19-cv-10983-VR, 2025 WL 962815, at *16, *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025). 

"On appeal, Barberan challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Town only with respect to his Section 1983 and NYSHRL discrimination claims. 

"And as to those discrimination claims, his challenge is limited to his termination (the other claimed adverse actions were abandoned). 

"For the reasons stated below, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED."

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's ruling posted on the Internet.

Selected administrative decisions posted on the Internet by New York State's Commissioner of Education

Decision No. 18,868 Appeal of certain action by the Board of Education of a School District concerning "shared decision-making". Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Decision No. 18,869 Appeal of a parent, on behalf of her child, involving action by the Board of Education of a Union Free School District involving the Dignity for All Students Act. Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Decision No. 18,870 Appeal of parents, on behalf of their child, with respect to the  action by a Board of Education of a Central School District concerning a school closure. Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Decision No. 18,872 Appeal of a parent, on behalf of her child, concerning a Montessori School an immunization issue. Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Decision No. 18,873 Appeal of a parent, on behalf of her child, addressing actions of the Board of Education of a Central School District concerning student discipline. Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Workers' Compensation Board offers NYS Workers' Compensation 101 with the Advocate for Injured Workers on November 3, 2026

On November 3, 2026, the New York State's Workers' Compensation Board’s Advocate for Injured Workers will present a program focusing on the basics of the New York State Workers’ Compensation System, including employees’ rights if they become injured or ill on the job. This presentation will also cover:

• Employees’ benefits under workers’ compensation
• How to file a claim
• How to get help with your claim if needed
• Tips and best practices for injured workers

The session is free and there will be time at the end for questions.

Important: When you register, you will automatically receive a confirmation email that includes a calendar invite. Be sure to add the invite to your calendar so you have a reminder! If you don’t receive the confirmation email in your inbox, please check your junk or spam folder.

Register here

for the Tuesday, November 3, 2026, 11:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. session.

New York City Department of Education's rejection of an application for security clearance held irrational under the circumstances

A New York State Supreme Court denied the Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78 petition seeking annulment of a determination by the New York City Department of Education [DOE] resulting in an administratively closing Plaintiff's application for a security clearance. 

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's ruling, on the law, reinstated Plaintiff's Article 78 proceeding and granted the Plaintiff's petition to the extent of annulling DOE's determination and directed DOE to process Plaintiff's security clearance application. This decision of the Appellate Division ultimately resulted in Plaintiff and DOE entering into a settlement agreement resolving* the prior Article 78 proceeding brought by Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff was subsequently nominated for appointment to a position by an independent agency that provided such services to DOE. Such employment, however, was contingent  on Plaintiff receiving security clearance with DOE. Plaintiff was then notified that her application was "administratively closed with no determination made," explaining that she had been "nominated for a position as a Speech Pathologist with independent providers" and that based on the terms of the settlement agreement she was not permitted to work as an independent provider. Petitioner challenged DOE's determination by filing a second CPLR Article 78 action. 

It was undisputed that Plaintiff was nominated for a position by Salveo, an agency providing such services to DOE. The Appellate Division, rejecting DOE's claim that Plaintiff had admitted her role to be that of an independent provider, explained that DOE misread Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff, said the Appellate Division, used the phrase to describe the ambiguity at issue and did not concede DOE's interpretation, concluded that DOE's determination rested on its misreading of the settlement agreement. 

* The Appellate Division's decision notes that DOE retained "the right to deny [Petitioner] clearance . . . for any reason, other than the reasons that gave rise to the [prior] litigation."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected items posted on the Internet during the week ending October 30, 2026

Cybersecurity on a Tight Government Budget? Explore approaches to strengthening cyber defenses without stretching already limited government resources. Learn More

States offer billions in incentives to support economic development each year Focusing on job training and other services instead of cash could improve the cost-benefit ratio, according to a new paper. Read More

Webinar: Make your first Year of Brownfields Funding count Learn practical strategies to manage funding effectively, meet EPA requirements and support future funding opportunities. Register today

Twenty-two states have adopted laws expanding opportunities for accessory dwelling units But passing laws doesn't always mean more homes get built. Read More

A New Era for Justice Information Sharing This paper explores how cloud, AI and other technological advancements are creating new opportunities for secure justice information sharing. DOWNLOAD

Close the Utility and Local Government Workforce Gap See how intelligent payment tools and digital self-service options can handle routine billing and customer service tasks, giving government staff more time for work that requires their expertise.

DOWNLOAD

How the City of Newport News Is Raising the Bar for Open Government  Facing a surge in public records requests, Newport News centralized FOIA management to improve transparency, streamline compliance and strengthen public access to government information. READ NOW

Modernizing CJIS Compliance: A Path to Secure Information Sharing and AI Readiness This guide breaks down what agencies need to know about CJIS Security Policy Version 6.1, including new requirements for encryption, vulnerability management, incident reporting and information-sharing agreements. DOWNLOAD

Plaintiff's failure to follow the MTA's procedures for appealing alleged denials of Freedom of Information Law requests filed defeats his claim of constructive denial of such requests

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court had properly dismissed the Plaintiff's  several petitions insofar as Plaintiff sought review of alleged constructive denials of the dozens of purported Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] requests. 

MTA Plaintiff had not consistently submitted his FOIL requests through a MTA's online portal or by physical mail to the MTA's FOIL team. Even when instructed to submit all his additional FOIL requests using the MTA online portal, Plaintiff declined to do so and then failed to follow the MTA's procedure for appealing alleged "constructive denials" of purported FOIL requests.

Finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding these FOIL requests, Supreme Court granted the Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA] and its employees' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FOIL requests in view of Plaintiff being advised that an instant FOIL request was under review as were 72 other purported FOIL requests. 

Supreme Court also denied Plaintiff's motions to amend Plaintiff's amended petition and motion for a default judgment, and dismissed the instant proceeding Plaintiff had filed  pursuant to CPLR Article 78.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's rulings, noting that:

1. Plaintiff's original FOIL request, submitted February 18, 2025, was appropriately denied and leave to amend was providently denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; 

2. Plaintiff's February 18, 2025 FOIL request was under consideration when Plaintiff commenced the instant Article 78 proceeding on June 6, 2025 and when Plaintiff filed an amended petition on August 14, 2025; and 

3. Plaintiff moved to further amend after Plaintiff received a partial response to his FOIL request and was informed that additional efforts to locate FOIL documents responsive were ongoing.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court had properly dismissed Plaintiff's amended petition insofar as Plaintiff sought review of alleged constructive denials of the dozens of purported FOIL requests Plaintiff had sent in April 2025 as those requests were not properly submitted to the MTA, which provides for submission of FOIL requests either through an online portal or by physical mail to the MTA's FOIL team*. 

Even when instructed to submit all his additional FOIL requests using the MTA online portal, Plaintiff declined and then Plaintiff failed to follow the MTA's procedure for appealing constructive denials of these purported requests.

Finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding these FOIL requests. 

In addition, the Appellate Division observed that Supreme Court had "appropriately denied [Plaintiff's] motion for a default judgment, as [Plaintiff had] moved for relief while the MTA's cross-motion to dismiss was still pending".

* The Appellate Division's decision notes that Petitioner "appropriately submitted his first request through the MTA online portal and by physical mail, but he failed to send his remaining requests by either of these methods". 

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.