In this action to recover damages for alleged unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Executive Law §296 and the Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107, Plaintiff appealed from an order of the Supreme Court granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing her complaint.
Plaintiff had taken a pregnancy-related leave but had repeatedly failed to commit to a date on which she would return from such leave. Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment at the end of her pregnancy-related leave.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender and retaliation within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law [NYSHRL] (Executive Law §296) and the New York City Human Rights Law [NYCHRL] (Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107). Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.
Supreme Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.
The Appellate Division found that:
1. Defendant met its prima facie burden by demonstrating that Plaintiff's employment was terminated for a nondiscriminatory reason, namely her failure to commit to a return-to-work date, citing Niemotko v Mount St. Mary Coll., 241 AD3d at 703; and
2. Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Defendant's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination, citing D'Agostino v MMC E., LLC, 184 AD3d 719.
The Appellate Division held that "Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the [Defendant's] motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging pregnancy discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL", noting that "the [Defendant] met its prima facie burden by establishing that there was no evidentiary route that could allow any jury to believe that the [Plaintiff's] employment was terminated for discriminatory reasons".
The Appellate Division also noted that Plaintiff "failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered explanation [by the Defendant] was a pretext for discrimination or whether discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the challenged action".
Opining that "Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the [Defendant's] motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging gender discrimination in violation of the NYCHRL", the Appellate Division dismissed Plaintiff's appeal.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.