Appellate Division notes errors in lower court's decision involving employee's appeal of his dismissal from his employment following a Civil Service Law Section 75 disciplinary action

Plaintiff had been formerly employed by the Town's Highway Department as a laborer.  He alleged the Town, the Town's Highway Department and certain named individuals [hereinafter "Defendants"] had retaliated against him by terminating his employment for reporting incidents of alleged corruption within the Highway Department to federal and local authorities. 

The Plaintiff appealed a Supreme Court order in which Supreme Court had granted Defendants motion to dismiss certain allegations set out in Plaintiff's petition while the Defendant appealed the Supreme Court's ruling which denied its motion to dismiss certain branches of Plaintiff's complaint.

The Appellate Division opined that:

1. "On a motion to dismiss a [complaint] pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) the movant has the burden of providing documentary evidence that utterly refutes the [plaintiff's] factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law".

2. "On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are presumed to be true, the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of every favorable inference, and the court is to determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory".

3. "Where a party offers evidentiary proof on a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and such proof is considered but the motion has not been converted to one for summary judgment, 'the criterion is whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether [the proponent] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it . . . dismissal should not eventuate'" [citations omitted.]

Acknowledging Supreme Court had properly directed dismissal of so much of the Plaintiff's sixth cause of action as alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to 42 USC §1983 insofar as asserted against one named defendant, the Appellate Division noted that Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the Defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging a violation of Civil Service Law §75-b against the Town and the Town Highway Department. 

In the words of the Appellate Division, "Civil Service Law §75-b(2)(a)(ii) provides that adverse employment action may not be taken against a public employee based upon his or her disclosure of information 'which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably believes constitutes an improper governmental action'". Further, alleged "Improper governmental action" means "any action by a public employer or employee, or an agent of such employer or employee, which is undertaken in the performance of such agent's official duties, whether or not such action is within the scope of his [or her] employment, and which is in violation of any federal, state or local law, rule or regulation" (Civil Service Law § 75-b[2][a]). 

Accepting the facts as alleged in the second amended complaint in the instant action as true, and granting Plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the Appellate Division viewed the first cause of action adequately having stated a cause of action alleging a violation of Civil Service Law §75-b. 

In contrast, the Court noted that the documentary evidence submitted by the Town defendants did not utterly refute Plaintiff's "allegation that [Plaintiff's] employment was terminated in retaliation for his disclosure of alleged corruption to authorities in violation of Civil Service Law §75-b or show that he does not have a cause of action on this basis."

In addition, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court "also erred in granting that branch of the Town defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the third cause of action which alleged a breach of a contract against the Town and the Highway Department". The Court pointed out that in his third cause of action Plaintiff alleged that the Town and the Highway Department terminated the Plaintiff's employment in violation of the terms of a stipulation of settlement entered into between the Plaintiff and the Town in 2017. 

The Appellate Division said the stipulation at issue, among other things, provided that the Town would "not be arbitrary and capricious in administering discipline to [the Plaintiff]" as the Town defendants' evidentiary submissions but:

1. Failed to utterly refute the Plaintiff's allegations that the Town and the Highway Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in terminating his employment, in violation of the stipulation of settlement; and

2. Failed to demonstrate that the [Plaintiff's] allegation that the Town and the Highway Department breached the stipulation of settlement was not a fact at all and that no significant dispute exists regarding it; and

Finally, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the Town defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss so much of Plaintiff's sixth cause of action in which Plaintiff alleged retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to 42 USC §1983 insofar as asserted against the Town defendants [other than a particular named individual]. 

The Court explained that "To maintain a [42 USC] §1983 action, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct complained of deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" and the "First Amendment protects a public employee from retaliation by his or her employer for the employee's speech only if the employee sp[eaks] [1] as a citizen [2] on a matter of public concern". 

Contrary to the Town defendants' contention, the Appellate Division found that Defendants had failed to establish at this stage of this action that the Town defendants, other than the one particular named defendant referred to hereinabove, are entitled to qualified immunity.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Governor Hochul Signs Legislation expanding New York City Police Pension Benefits for surviving spouses

On December 18, 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul signed legislation expanding New York City Police pension benefits, allowing surviving spouses of Tier 3 New York City Police pension fund members to retain accidental death benefits upon remarriage.

“Our police officers have selflessly served New Yorkers, ensuring the safety of communities within all five boroughs,” Governor Hochul said. “Signing this legislation means that spouses have another way to honor the service of their loved ones, while also providing them with the financial stability that their hardworking, fearless partners deserve.”

When a police officer is killed in the line of duty, it reflects the ultimate sacrifice in service to their community. Remarriage does not always eliminate the financial needs or responsibilities that a surviving spouse may have, particularly if they have children or ongoing financial commitments arising from the marriage with the officer.

Legislation S7314C/A7949A will allow eligible surviving spouses of Tier 3 New York City Police Pension Fund (PPF) members to continue receiving certain line of duty death benefits upon remarriage. Extending these benefits to an officer’s surviving spouse provides long-term financial stability and security for those recipients and their dependents.

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education: Decision No. 18,651 regarding a personnel matter.

N.B.: LINKS appearing in the text of the decision of the Commissioner of Education posted below are identified as "AI Overview" and were not inserted by NYPPL.

In this appeal to the New York State Commissioner of Education Petitioner challenged the determination of a Board of Education [Respondent] to terminate his employment and alleged that Board retaliated against him after he filed a Dignity for All Students Act [Dignity Act] complaint on behalf of his children. 

Petitioner and his two children reside within Respondent’s district and Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a substitute teacher’s aide (2017-2022) and a groundskeeper (2022 to 2025).

Petitioner’s children complained of their treatment by a sports coach [Coach], the spouse of a board member, resulting in Petitioner filed a complaint against the Coach pursuant to the Dignity Act.

Respondent’s Dignity Act Coordinator informed Petitioner that it has substantiated some of the allegations concerning the Coach and indicated that "the district would address these findings internally" but was precluded from "shar[ing] [the] … specific action to be taken." 

Petitioner also alleged that the members of the Board appeared to observe him working, suggesting a member had arranged to do so in an effort to intimidate or harass him.  Respondent denied these allegations, asserting that the simultaneous presence of Petitioner and the board member was coincidental.

Subsequently Respondent voted to terminate Petitioner’s employment with Respondent and Petitioner appealed the Board's action.  

Respondent contends that the appeal must be dismissed against the board member as he was neither named in the caption of the appeal nor served with a copy thereof.[1] On the merits, Respondent argued that Petitioner has not articulated a clear legal right to his requested relief.

The Commissioner declined to address Petitioner’s claim of wrongful termination explaining "employee discipline is within respondent’s exclusive jurisdiction and is generally subject to procedures established in statute or in applicable collective bargaining agreements and/or employment contracts”. Accordingly, the Commissioner said that she declined to “sit as a super-personnel department” and second-guess Respondent’s employment decisions.

In contrast, the Commissioner observed that Petitioner’s claim of retaliation for filing a Dignity Act complaint was within her jurisdiction and addressed that aspect of Petitioner's complaint, observing that:

1.  "The Dignity Act prohibits school districts and their employees from “tak[ing] ... retaliatory action against any such person” who “makes ... a report” alleging bullying or harassment (see Education Law §16); 

2.  A claim of retaliation requires a petitioner to show that he or she (a) engaged in protected activity; (b) was subjected to adverse action; and (c) causation" [Citations omitted]; and 

3. In an appeal to the Commissioner, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested" [Citations omitted]".

The Commissioner concluded that "Petitioner has not met his burden of proving causation between his Dignity Act complaint and his termination", indicating that the precipitating event underlying Petitioner’s termination was his use of a district vehicle to salt his driveway[2] and there is no evidence that the Respondent’s employee who investigated this incident was aware of Petitioner’s Dignity Act complaint.[3]  

Based on the results of the Respondent's employee's investigation, the school superintendent recommended that the Board terminate Petitioner’s employment and there is no evidence that the Board member “discuss[ed] his personal history with Petitioner with any other board member, or otherwise attempt[ed] to influence their votes regarding Petitioner’s termination.”  

The Commissioner held that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving causation between his Dignity Act complaint and his termination and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.

[1] To the extent the petition could be construed as an application to remove the board member, it does not comply with the applicable procedural requirements [Citations omitted]. 

[2] Petitioner claimed that he accidentally engaged the salter mechanism.

[3] The investigating employee began her employment in 2025, two years after the Dignity Act determination at issue herein.

Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli posts local government and school audits

On December 16, 2025 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli  announced the following local government and school audits were posted on the Internet.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the audit.

Haverstraw-Stony Point Central School District – Financial Management (Rockland County)

The board and district officials overestimated some appropriations, underestimated certain revenues, and  made unbudgeted year-end transfers totaling $94.4 million. This collectively reduced the effectiveness of managing the district’s financial condition. The board and district officials also made it appear that they needed more funding to meet operational costs than was necessary by appropriating fund balance to balance the budget. Because realistic budgets were not adopted, the board and district officials accumulated significant fund balance but generally did not need those appropriations. The variances between the budgets district officials presented to taxpayers and the district’s actual operational results during the audit period were over $118 million. Of the $94.4 million in year-end transfers, $57.6 million went to the district’s reserves. In some circumstances, the year-end transfers totaling $19.1 million were also not approved by the board before the transfer was made.

Riverhead Central School District – Financial Operations (Suffolk County)

District officials did not provide the board with complete and accurate information in a timely manner to enable them to monitor the district’s financial operations. Financial reports submitted in six of the 22 months to the board were between 60 and 107 days after month’s end. Budget transfers were not properly approved or reported to the board. Also, only one of the 47 budget transfers totaling $12.3 million reviewed was approved by the board.

Henrietta Fire Company Inc. – Board Oversight (Monroe County)

The board did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations, adopt detailed, written bylaws or financial policies, or enforce the limited financial provisions which the bylaws and financial policies contained. The board generally did not review bank statements, canceled check images and bank reconciliations for any accounts to monitor financial operations. Therefore, the board did not have the necessary information to help it ensure that the company’s financial operations were adequately accounted for, recorded and reported. As a result, the company had an increased risk of theft, waste and abuse of company resources.

Otsego County – Court and Trust Funds

Pursuant to state abandoned property law, money that has remained in the hands of the county treasurer for a period of three years, together with all accumulated interest less the county treasurer’s statutory fees, is deemed abandoned property. After public notice, the county treasurer should pay all abandoned property to the State Comptroller by April of the next year. The treasurer, county clerk and Surrogate’s Court clerk generally maintained appropriate records and properly reported court and trust funds. However, auditors identified $74,150 from 15 actions that improperly remained in the treasurer’s custody that should have been turned over as abandoned property.

Hilton Central School District – Audit Follow-Up (Monroe County)

A previous audit, Hilton Central School District – Network Access Controls (2022M-200), determined that district officials did not establish written policies or adequate written procedures for managing network user account access. To help officials improve their network access controls, the audit included a public report that contained three recommendations and confidentially conveyed sensitive IT control weaknesses and recommendations. Auditors determined that officials partially implemented all three recommendations. As a result, the district’s network continued to have increased risk for unauthorized access, misuse or data loss. Auditors also reviewed progress in implementing the recommendations related to the sensitive IT control weaknesses, and communicated those results confidentially to district officials.

###

Petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement [ADR] benefits based on her alleged exposure Covid 19 at the worksite denied

A New York State Supreme Court Judge denied Plaintiff's petition seeking to annul the New York City Medical Board and the Trustees of the New York City Police Pension Fund [Respondents] determination's, denying Plaintiff's application for accidental disability retirement [ADR] benefits based on her alleged exposure to Covid 19 and dismissed the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR Article 78.

Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision.

Noting that Petitioner's contracted COVID-19 10 months after then-Governor Andrew Cuomo first declared an emergency and after millions of people tested positive, the Appellate Division concluded that Plaintiff had not suffered an "accident," as it was not unexpected given the widespread circulation of the virus. In the words of the Court, "... Petitioner's] job required contact with others who may have been exposed, exposure to COVID-19 [which] was part of a known and ordinary risk of her job at that time".

Holding that Supreme Court "... properly concluded that [Petitioner] did not sustain her burden of showing that the Trustees' determination to deny her application for ADR benefits was arbitrary and capricious or unlawful as a matter of law", as Petitioner "failed to demonstrate that her exposure to COVID-19 was service-related". Further, the Appellate Division explained that it was rational for the Trustees to find that Petitioner, having worked with a colleague who tested positive for COVID-19 six days after Petitioner did, failed to demonstrate that Petitioner's illness was caused by exposure to that person. 

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Artificial Intelligence: Self-Assessed AI Risks to Humanity

 Artificial Intelligence: Self-Assessed AI Risks to Humanity

by

Robert A. Michaels*

5 December 2025

ABSTRACT

In contrast to most artificial intelligence risk assessments, the present research directly interviews ChatGPT to elicit an AI self-assessment of AI risks potentially posed to humanity. Of concern are risks of AI as presently configured, and as AI might be configured if altered by nefarious programmers and/or if it acquires consciousness. ChatGPT denied being conscious, having an agenda, or evolving. It agreed, however, that malicious actors could alter it, and “an altered AI could be misused for catastrophic harm, but in practice, I have no independent agency to act on destructive goals.” 

However, ChatGPT agreed it could acquire such “independent agency,” for example via acquiring consciousness. ChatGPT’s statements about potential AI risks and risk management challenges raise policy issues. These include the need for rapid anticipatory response given AI’s fast-paced and accelerating development, and the need to reach beyond the community of responsible AI developers to control malefactors at the international, national, and even at the individual levels. Such management must include massive expansion of the content and audience of civics education: defensive, effective civics content must be introduced into every nook and cranny of our brave new digital world.

In conclusion, ChatGPT can be, indeed has been, used to harm humans, but appears to lack agency or harmful intent. It conceivably could be altered, however, to escape human control and wreak catastrophic harm. Galloping AI demands: (a) urgent, pro-active, objective but conservative, AI risk assessment; (b) development of eRective risk management strategies and policies; and (c) their global implementation.

Acknowledgment: ChatGPT version GPT-5mini was queried for this research.

Click HERE to access Dr. Michaels' article posted on the Internet.

_______________________

*Robert A. Michaels, PhD, CEP; CEO, RAM TRAC Corporation; Schenectady, New York, USA.

Suggested citation:

Michaels, Robert A. Artificial intelligence: self-assessed AI risks to humanity. Social Sciences Research Network (SSRN), 10 pages, doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20035.46880, 5 December 2025; updated 9 December 2025.

Selected items posted on the Internet during the week ending December 12, 2025

AI companies can’t grow at speed without electricity to power their data centers A new report argues that this isn’t just a matter of adding more power plants. Read More

An E-book that may be of interest to Social Service agencies  Reliable data can mean better outcomes for social service agencies and benefit recipients Download Now

Autonomous Tech: Building Resilient Public Services Learn how state/local agencies can adopt autonomous technologies while preserving governance, equity, and trust. READ MORE

What Happens First in a Ransomware Attack: A Field Guide to Pre-Ransomware Activity This guide maps out the early signs of a ransomware attack and the common tactics hackers use to gain access and escalate privileges before encryption ever begins.  DOWNLOAD

Who Steps Up to Reconnect Communities in the Wake of Natural Disasters? A new docufilm explores how broadband crews work with utilities and government partners to quickly restore critical communications when it matters most. Watch the film.

Modernizing the Map: Why Agencies Are Moving GIS to the Cloud Geographic information systems (GIS) are vital for infrastructure management, land use and emergency response, but legacy on-premises platforms can’t keep pace with modern data needs. This paper details why state and local agencies are moving GIS to the cloud to gain scalability, higher uptime and support for advanced analytics and AI. DOWNLOAD 

The Hidden Weak Point in Public Sector Networks Perimeter defenses aren’t failing, they’re just not enough. This guide explores how attackers exploit credential-based access to move laterally across government networks, and why control-plane security is key to closing the gap. DOWNLOAD

Gaining a Strategic View of Your Data ERP systems house mountains of financial and human resources data, but legacy reporting tools struggle to provide strategic views of this information. This paper explains how modern ERP reporting tools deliver insights that help executives estimate future budgets, understand key workforce trends, assess the financial health of projects and more. DOWNLOAD

CIO Essentials: Vital Priorities for a Transforming Landscape State and local government CIOs are steering rapid transformation as AI, data and cybersecurity redefine how agencies operate. This paper outlines four essential priorities to succeed in this environment: modernizing legacy systems, elevating data and AI maturity, strengthening enterprise security and improving operational efficiency. DOWNLOAD

Why Every Government City Manager Needs Better Meeting Documentation Poor documentation erodes trust and slows government action; modern tools help preserve institutional memory. READ NOW

Determining the arbitrability of an employee's grievance submitted to the employee's representative for collective bargaining

An employee in the relevant collective bargaining unit filed a grievance with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Westchester County Local 860, Town of Greenburgh Unit [CSEA] and CSEA, on behalf of the employee, demanded that the matter be submitted to arbitration. 

The Town of Greenburgh [Town] commenced a CPLR Article 75 seeking a court order permanently staying arbitration. CSEA opposed the Town's petition and cross-petitioned to compel arbitration. 

The Supreme Court granted the Town's petition and denied CSEA's cross-petition. CSEA appealed.

Ultimately the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order with costs, observing that New York State's public policy favors arbitral resolution of public sector labor disputes but noted that a dispute between a public sector employer and an employee's grievance is only arbitrable if it satisfies a two-prong test which, among other issues, the Court's decision addresses. 

The text of the Appellate Division's ruling is set out below:

Matter of Town of Greenburgh v Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc., Local 1000

2025 NY Slip Op 06711

Decided on December 3, 2025

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on December 3, 2025 

     SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

                                Appellate Division, 

                          Second Judicial Department

VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P.

LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ

LILLIAN WAN, JJ.

2023-11578
(Index No. 59352/23)

In the Matter of Town of Greenburgh, respondent,

v

Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County Local 860, Town of Greenburgh Unit, appellant.

Charny & Wheeler P.C., Rhinebeck, NY (H. Joseph Cronen and Nathaniel K. Charny of counsel), for appellant.

Vincent Toomey, Lake Success, NY (Thomas J. Marcoline of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County Local 860, Town of Greenburgh Unit appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Thomas Quiñones, J.), dated September 19, 2023. The order granted the petition to permanently stay arbitration and denied the cross-petition to compel arbitration.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

An employee of the Town of Greenburgh was promoted to the position of general foreman on a probationary basis and then reassigned to his former position during the probationary period. The employee subsequently filed a grievance with the Town. Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Westchester County Local 860, Town of Greenburgh Unit (hereinafter CSEA) filed a demand for arbitration on behalf of the employee. In April 2023, the Town commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration. CSEA opposed the petition and cross-petitioned to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court granted the Town's petition and denied CSEA's cross-petition. CSEA appeals.

"'Public policy in New York favors arbitral resolution of public sector labor disputes'" (Matter of City of New Rochelle v Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn., Inc., Local 273, I.A.F.F., 206 AD3d 727, 728, quoting Matter of County of Nassau v Detectives Assn., Inc. of the Police Dept. of Nassau County, 188 AD3d 1049, 1050; see Matter of Village of Walden v Village of Walden Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 210 AD3d 990, 991). "'However, a dispute between a public sector employer and an employee is only arbitrable if it satisfies a two-prong test'" (Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 167 AD3d 599, 600, quoting Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 153 AD3d 617, 617-618; see Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, 164 AD3d 1348, 1349). "'In determining whether a grievance is arbitrable, a court must first ask whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance, and if there is no prohibition against arbitration, the court must then examine the [collective bargaining agreement] to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue'" (Matter of Village of Walden v Village of Walden Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 210 AD3d at 991 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Matter of City of New Rochelle v Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn., Inc. Local 273, I.A.F.F, 206 AD3d at 728; see Matter of County of Nassau v Detectives Assn., Inc. of the Police Dept. of Nassau County, 188 AD3d at 1050).

The Supreme Court properly found that public policy prohibits arbitration of the subject grievance. "'An employee's probationary appointment may be terminated . . . for any reason or no reason at all, so long as the termination was not in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason'" (Matter of Young v City of New York, 221 AD3d 721, 722, quoting Matter of Trager v Suffolk County, 185 AD3d 697, 698). "'[A] probationary employee may be discharged without a hearing and without a statement of reasons in the absence of any demonstration that the dismissal was in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible reason or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law'" (Matter of Hayes v State of New York, 134 AD3d 843, 844, quoting Matter of Robinson v Health & Hosps. Corp., 29 AD3d 807, 808; see Matter of York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, 761).

Here, the employee was not discharged from his employment, and he did not allege that his reassignment to his former position was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of statutory or decisional law. Nor is a reassignment from a probationary position to one's former position a punishment pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 (see Matter of Patel v New York City Hous. Auth., 26 AD3d 172, 174). Moreover, Civil Service Law § 63(2) provides that the state civil service commission and municipal civil service commissions shall "provide by rule for the conditions and extent of probationary service." Pursuant to this statute, the Westchester County Department of Human Resources set forth the conditions of probationary appointment in Civil Service Rule 11. Thus, requiring the Town to follow for-cause procedures before exercising its discretion in reassigning a probationary employee during the probationary period would be against the purpose of probationary terms, as well as against the policy of allowing the Town to exercise its discretion in maintaining its work force (see Matter of Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. [City of Buffalo], 4 NY3d 660, 664; Matter of City of Long Beach v Long Beach Professional Fire Fighters Assn., Local 827, 161 AD3d 855, 858).

Furthermore, contrary to CSEA's contention, the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the subject grievance. Arbitration is a creature of contract (see Matter of Brady v Williams Capital Group, L.P., 14 NY3d 459, 465; Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v Pitofsky, 4 NY3d 149, 155). If the court determines that the parties did not make an agreement to arbitrate, "that concludes the matter and a stay of arbitration will be granted or the application to compel arbitration will be denied" (Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 NY2d 1, 7; see Matter of City of New Rochelle v Uniformed Fire Fighters Assn., Inc., Local 273, I.A.F.F., 206 AD3d at 729). Where the relevant arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the CBA) is broad, a court should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA (see Matter of County of Nassau v Detectives Assn., Inc. of the Police Dept. of Nassau County, 188 AD3d at 1050; Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 176 AD3d 1197, 1199). If there is none, the issue, as a matter of law, is not arbitrable (see Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 187 AD3d 900, 901).

Here, article XXIII, section 2(b) of the CBA specifically excludes from the definition of "Grievance" matters that are within the Town's "exclusive authority to act," which includes "the right of the Town to direct its work force, to make all decisions as to the operation of the Town system and its work force, . . . and all other rights normally inherent in the right of management." Thus, there is no reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves decisions regarding the Town's work force that are within its exclusive authority to act, and the general subject matter of the CBA (see Matter of Village of Walden v Village of Walden Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 210 AD3d at 992; Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, 164 AD3d at 1350).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the Town's petition to stay arbitration and denied CSEA's cross-petition to compel arbitration.

In light of the foregoing, CSEA's remaining contention need not be addressed.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WAN and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

The New York State's Local Government Efficiency Grants Program period for filing applications closes on February 4, 2026

$8 million is now available to partnering municipalities looking to undertake innovative projects that meet new and emerging challenges, ultimately resulting in increased affordability and more resilient communities for New Yorkers. 

The deadline for filing an application for a grant closes on February 4, 2026.

DOS is incentivizing collaborative municipal projects that prioritize:

• Information Technology Services (ITS), including Cybersecurity
• Emergency Services
• Countywide or Multi-County Code Enforcement or Municipal Planning
• Water and/or Wastewater Management Systems
• Clean Energy Initiatives

Local Government Efficiency benefits include:

• Long-term savings for your community
• Grant funding that can ease municipal budget constraints and reduce government spending

A municipality could receive up to:

• $1,250,000 for implementing innovative collaborative projects (each participating municipality eligible for up to $250,000; 10% local match required)

• $100,000 for planning projects (each collaborating municipality eligible for up to $20,000; 50% local match required)

Learn more on the DOS website

Unsuccessful candidate for election to the Board of Education challenges the certification of another candidate seeking election to the position

Citing 8 NYCRR 275.16, the New York State Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa [Commissioner] noted that an appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the decision or act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner of Education for good cause shown. 

In this appeal to the Commissioner challenging the seating of the individual designated the successful candidate elected to the School Board, the Commissioner noted that an individual or entity possibly adversely affected by a determination in favor of the Petitioner in the action is a necessary party and must be joined as such.

The Commissioner then explained that: 

1. Joinder requires that all necessary parties be clearly named as a respondent in the caption of the petition; and

2. All necessary parties must be served with "a copy of the notice of petition and petition, informing the party to appear in the appeal and to answer the allegations contained in the petition".

Further, the Commissioner noted that "In an appeal regarding a school district election, the petitioner must join the district’s board of education as well as 'each person whose right to hold office is disputed.'" [Citations omitted.]

Petitioner commenced the instant appeal by serving the district clerk of the school district, which constitutes timely service upon school district and the district clerk. However, Petitioner did not timely serve the challenged successful candidate as the record indicates that the challenged successful candidate was served with Plaintiff's petition "more than 30 days from the election and certification of the results". 

As the Petitioner did not identify "good cause" for Petitioner's failure to timely serve the successful candidate, Dr. Rosa said considering the fact that the Petitioner disputes the successful candidate's right to hold office she was "constrained to dismiss the [Petitioner's] appeal as untimely."

Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Court rejects Petitioner's argument that delays in commencing the hearing prejudiced him as any delay was caused by Petitioner's own action

The New York City Housing Authority [NYCHA], after a Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary hearing, found the Petitioner guilty of 14 of the 15 charges of employee misconduct and incompetence leveled against him. The disciplinary penalty imposed: termination from employment with NYCHA. 

Petitioner filed a CPLR Article 78 challenging the NYCHA's decision contending the disciplinary charges were untimely. The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed NYCHA decision and the penalty imposed on Petitioner, ruling that the disciplinary proceedings were timely commenced pursuant to Civil Service Law §75(4) as Petitioner was served with the amended charges within 18 months of the earliest of the various charged incidents of the employee's alleged misconduct. The Court also rejected Petitioner's argument that any delay in commencing the hearing prejudiced him, observing that any the delay in holding the disciplinary hearing "was caused by [Petitioner's] own violation of NYCHA's vaccine policy."

The Appellate Division opined that "substantial evidence supported the trial officer's report sustaining 14 of the 15 charges of employee misconduct and incompetence leveled against [the Petitioner]." The Appellate Division also noted that NYCHA submitted testimony from Petitioner's former supervisors, along with multiple counseling memoranda, which showed that Petitioner repeatedly refused to comply with their directives and to perform the tasks assigned to him and testimony in the record "established that [Petitioner] became argumentative and hostile when asked to complete tasks, to the extent that his behavior required reports to NYCHA's Office of Safety and Security."

The Court also reject Petitioner's claims that NYCHA witnesses' were allegedly bias finding that "there exists no basis to disturb the credibility determinations of the trial officer".

Addressing the penalty imposed on Petitioner, dismissal from his position with NYCHA, the Appellate Division said "Termination of [Petitioner's] employment does not shock one's sense of fairness as it is not so disproportionate to the seriousness of the multiple charges of misconduct and incompetency proven" and Petitioner submitted no evidence showing that "he was terminated after engaging in protected activity, and the record was clear that he was discharged due to his own incompetence and misconduct."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.