Challenging a federal district court's granting summary judgment in favor of a former employer in response to Plaintiff's claims of unlawful discrimination and retaliation

The Plaintiff, acting pro se in this appeal, challenged a federal district court's granting his former employer, the Syracuse Regional Airport Authority [SRAA], summary judgment in response to Plaintiff's allegations of unlawful discrimination and retaliation.

The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, noting that summary judgment is proper "only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant'" and "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" is the movant entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Further, the Circuit Court said although we “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants", even pro se litigants must do more than offer “purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars,” (See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989].

When a Title VII discrimination claim is based on circumstantial evidence, as was here the case, the court said it applied "the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to determine whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence to survive [a motion for] summary judgment". To do so:

1. Plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he] is qualified for [his] position; (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.”

2. If the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action.”

3. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show at the third step either that “the employer’s stated justification for its adverse action was nothing but a pretext for discrimination,” or that, “even if the employer had mixed motives, the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was at least one motivating factor in the employer’s adverse action.”

In this instance, the Circuit Court said it agreed with the district court's granting summary judgment in favor of SRAA based upon Plaintiff’s failure to meet his burden at the first step as it concluded that the Plaintiff "had not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a prima facie case of racial discrimination".

Considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the Circuit Court indicated that "the district court construed [Plaintiff's] briefs and pleadings as asserting two adverse employment actions: the denial of [Plaintiff's] bid for a shift assignment and [Plaintiff's] subsequent termination after [Plaintiff] threatened to assault a co-worker".

With respect to shift assignment issue, the undisputed record indicates that shifts were assigned based on who was more senior – which his co-worker was. In light of this, Plaintiff presented nothing “more than conclusory allegations” that the denial of his preferred shift was on account of his race".

Addressing Plaintiff's termination claim, the Circuit Court said Plaintiff "offers no evidence reflecting that his discharge was based on racial discrimination". And, continued the Circuit Court, "even if we were to assume that [Plaintiff] had made out a prima facie case of discrimination related to his termination, [Plaintiff's] claim would still fail because SRAA offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his firing that [Plaintiff] did not rebut as the record is clear that Plaintiff "made threats of physical violence against [the co-worker]  to another employee", stating, among other things, that he was “gonna break [the co-worker's] back if he step[s] out [of] line".

Significantly, Plaintiff admitted that "an employee could be terminated under the City’s policy for making threats" and the Circuit Court,  citing Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, noted that regardless of whether a specific policy was in place, “[w]e have held generally that insubordination and conduct that disrupts the workplace are legitimate reasons for firing an employee”.

Addressing Plaintiff's claim of retaliation, the Circuit Court opined that assuming that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, "SRAA articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for [Plaintiff's] termination: [Plaintiff’s] alleged threat to harm [a co-worker]". 

Accordingly, the court said the "burden therefore shifted back to [Plaintiff] to prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of his termination" but beyond bald assertions, Plaintiff offered no evidence that he would not have been fired “in the absence of the retaliatory motive.” Rather, the court noted that the record reflects that SRAA had already harbored concerns regarding Plaintiff’s previous history of assault and making verbal threats, which is why it “decided to give [Plaintiff] a chance at employment” on a probationary basis.

Again noting that it construed pro se filings liberally, the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Click HERE to access the text of the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.

Tolling the running of the statute of limitations

"To avoid dismissal of an action for failure to serve a complaint after a demand for the complaint has been made pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint and a potentially meritorious cause of action" (see Mazzola v Village Hous. Assoc., LLC, 164 AD3d 668, 669; Fox v Gross, 219 AD3d 584, 585-586). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a delay in serving a complaint after a demand is made is within the discretion of the court".

Supreme Court granted the motion of Stony Brook School, et al. [Respondent], pursuant to CPLR 3012(b) to dismiss the action insofar as asserted against it for failure of the Petitioner to timely serve the complaint.

The Appellate Division, however, reversed the Supreme Court's ruling "on the law and, in the exercise of its discretion", denied the motion of the Respondent to dismiss the action "insofar as asserted against it for failure to timely serve the complaint."

The Appellate Division's ruling states that in June, Plaintiff had commenced this action filing a summons with notice and moved for leave to proceed anonymously. On June 23, Respondent served the Plaintiff with a demand for the complaint. Plaintiff then served the complaint on Respondent and Respondent moved pursuant to to dismiss the action insofar as asserted against it, arguing that the complaint was not served within the 20-day period after the demand was served as mandated by CPLR 3012(b). Supreme Court granted the Respondent's motion. The Plaintiff then appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Granting Plaintiff's motion to vacate the lower coutt's decision, the Appellate Division observed:

1. "To avoid dismissal of an action for failure to serve a complaint after a demand for the complaint has been made pursuant to  CPLR 3012(b), a plaintiff must demonstrate: 

a. A reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint; and

b. A potentially meritorious cause of action.

The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a delay in serving a complaint after a demand is made is within the discretion of the court. 

The Appellate Division opined that Plaintiff "proffered a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving the complaint, as [Plaintiff's] motion for leave to proceed anonymously was not decided until after the 20-day period to comply with the [Respondent's] demand for the complaint had expired."

Further, said the court, Plaintiff also demonstrated that he had a potentially meritorious cause of action. Thus "Supreme Court should have denied the [Respondent's] motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(b) to dismiss the action insofar as asserted against it for failure to timely serve the complaint". 

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Honoring all first responders

Today is September 11 -- a date on which we remember and honor all first responders, past, present, and those in training, for their dedication and for the aid and assistance they provide in times of stress.

Applying the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine in an appeal of a state court decision to a federal district court

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, appealed a federal district court dismissing his federal action challenging a New York State court’s issuance of a divorce decree that awarded Petitioner’s former spouse a share of his “military pension.” 

In so doing, the federal district court rejected Petitioner's argument that the New York State Supreme Court decision violated the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, [see 10 U.S.C. §1408] when it treated his military benefits as marital property that could be distributed to his ex-spouse in the court's adjudication his New York State divorce proceeding.*

Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner's action and considering the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine, the Circuit Court explained Rooker-Feldman strips a district court of subject-matter jurisdiction "where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court” and applies where: 

(1) "the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court;

(2)"the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment;

(3) "the plaintiff invites review and rejection of that judgment; and

(4) "the state judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced."

Noting that each of these four element had been satisfied in this instance and Petitioner "does not argue that these four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have not been met" but, rather, argued that the Rooker-Feldman abstention "simply does not apply to his case because the state court judgment violated the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act." 

In effect, Petitioner contended his "invocation of a federal statute is enough to overcome the doctrine", which the Circuit Court explained if that were so, then the doctrine itself would be a nullity, since virtually every plaintiff in a Rooker-Feldman-style case is claiming that "the state court judgment violated his federal rights."

In the words of the Circuit Court, this "is precisely what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits, and [Petitioner] has failed to show why his case – invoking the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act – falls outside the doctrine or the [United States] Supreme Court precedent surrounding it."

Although Petitioner contended that the federal district court confused his military pension for his “Veteran’s Administration Disability Compensation, Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, Inheritance, and Estate Funds”, the Circuit Court of Appeal opined that "Whatever the merits of that argument, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from overruling a state court judgment like the one issued here."

Instead, said the court, such arguments must be made "to the state courts in the first instance, and then to the Supreme Court of the United States on direct appeal from the state’s court of last resort".  Citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 and other decisions, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “[a]fter state court proceedings are completed, Rooker-Feldman means that a party cannot seek review in a federal district court”.

* The Federal District Court had dismissed Petitioner’s complaint with prejudice,  concluding that his suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Click HERE to access the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Hearsay evidence, if deemed "sufficiently relevant and probative", may constitute substantial evidence in an administrative proceeding

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the disciplinary penalty imposed on an employee [Petitioner] found guilty of disciplinary charges alleging Petitioner had engaged in misconduct against another employee that constituted sexual harassment. 

Petitioner had challenged the determination finding him guilty of the charges served on him and the penalty imposed, placement on probation for six months and suspension without pay for five days. 

Dismissing Petitioner's appeal, the Appellate Division, concluding that the guilty determination was supported by substantial evidence, "i.e. relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact", noted that hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings and "if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence."

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.