The plaintiff [Petitioner] brought an action in federal district court alleging that the Town of East Haven, Connecticut [Town] discriminated against her because of her age in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§621‐634, and Connecticut state law.
The federal district court granted Town's motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Petitioner had failed to make out a prima facie case of any adverse employment action because Petitioner chose to retire rather than attend a scheduled disciplinary hearing. This, in the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, was "the only merits‐based challenge presented in the Townʹs summary judgment motion."
Petitioner appealed the district court's ruling contending that the court erred in failing to view her evidence that her retirement was not voluntary but was coerced by the threat of likely termination as the result of a disciplinary action undertaken by Town against her and thus constituted a constructive discharge.
The Circuit Court agreed, holding that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioner sufficed to present genuine issues of fact "as to whether a reasonable person in Petitioner's shoes would have felt compelled to retire." Again, in the words of the Circuit Court, "If this case were tried, a factfinder, applying the correct legal standard to the issue of constructive discharge, could rationally find that an employee in [Petitoner's] shoes would have felt compelled to submit her resignation stating that she was retiring, rather than face nearly certain termination."
The Circuit Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the matter to the lower court for further proceedings.
In Rychlick v Coughlin, 99 A.D.2d 863, aff'd 63 NY2d 643, the Appellate Division opined that threatening to do what the appointing authority has a right to do – in this instance filing disciplinary charges against Rychlick if he refused to resign from his position -- did not constitute coercion so as to make Rychlick’s resignation involuntary.
Further, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b), which applies to officers and employees of the State as the employer, in pertinent part provides that "... when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation." Many local jurisdictions in New York State have adopted a similar rule or regulation.
Further, 4 NYCRR 5.3(b), which applies to officers and employees of the State as the employer, in pertinent part provides that "... when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation." Many local jurisdictions in New York State have adopted a similar rule or regulation.
The Circuit Court of Appeal's decision is posted on the Internet at: