The collective bargaining agreements [CBA] in place between the City of Rochester and the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. [Locust Club], the union representing police officers in the City since the 1980's, had governed the procedure for disciplining police officers. In 2019, the Council of the City of Rochester adopted, the Mayor of the City of Rochester signed, and voters approved via referendum, Local Law No. 2, which created the Police Accountability Board [PAB], a body of nine City residents whose powers included the exclusive authority to "investigate and make determinations respecting" any police officer accused of misconduct.*
The PAB's authority included the power to conduct a hearing on the alleged misconduct and to impose disciplinary sanctions, up to and including dismissal, if the officer were found guilty. The City's police chief was free to impose additional punishment upon that officer, but was obliged at a minimum to implement the sanction determined by the PAB.
There is no dispute that the disciplinary procedures set forth in Local Law No. 2 deviated in significant respects from the agreed-upon procedures set forth in the CBA then in effect and that they were not agreed to by the Locust Club. The Locust Club and others commenced this combined CPLR Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge Local Law No. 2 and, in particular, its transfer of police disciplinary authority to the PAB.
Supreme Court ultimately granted the petition in part and held, among other things, that Local Law No. 2 was invalid to the extent that it transferred that authority to another entity. The City Council appealed the Supreme Court's ruling; Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision. (196 AD3d 74 [4th Dept 2021]).
The Appellate Division held that the City was obliged to negotiate with the Locust Club on the issue of police discipline because in 1985 the City had repealed the provision of its charter vesting a local official in charge of the police force with unilateral authority over police discipline and that the City's effort to revive that authority in Local Law No. 2 necessarily failed under the Municipal Home Rule Law because it was inconsistent with a general law, "the Taylor Law's mandate of collective bargaining for police discipline" (196 AD3d at 84). The court granted the City Council's motion for leave to appeal and now affirm.**
Noting that this case was the latest of a series in which the Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of when police disciplinary procedures are subject to collective bargaining, the Court said:
1."In 1958, the Legislature enacted Civil Service Law §§75 and 76 to specify "the procedures for disciplining public employees, including police officers, . . . [and] provide for a hearing and an appeal" (See Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Public Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d 563.
2. "[A]lthough Civil Service Law §§75 and 76 generally govern police disciplinary procedures, preexisting laws that expressly provide for control of police discipline were 'grandfathered' under Civil Service Law §76 (4), which provides that nothing in sections 75 and 76 'shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local' laws or charters" (See Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d 109, 114 [2017], quoting Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 573).
3. "Thereafter, the Taylor Law was enacted in 1967 to enshrine 'the "strong and sweeping" public policy in favor of collective bargaining in this state' and require good faith bargaining between recognized employee organizations and public employers over the terms and conditions of employment (See Matter of City of Long Beach v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 39 NY3d 17, 22 [2022], quoting Matter of City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 NY2d 73, 78 [2000]; see Civil Service Law § 200 et seq., as added by L 1967, ch 392; Matter of City of Schenectady, 30 NY3d at 114).
4. "Although the disciplinary procedures set forth in Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 predate the Taylor Law, [the Court of Appeals] previously 'held that the policy of the Taylor Law prevails, and collective bargaining is required [for disciplinary procedures], where no legislation specifically commits police discipline to the discretion of local officials' (See Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 571; see Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL-CIO v Helsby, 62 AD2d 12 [3d Dept 1978], affd [for reasons stated in] 46 NY2d 1034 [1979]).
5. "[The Court of Appeals'] prior decisions have also addressed the situation where a law grandfathered under Civil Service Law §76(4) gives rise to a conflict 'between the strong and sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and a competing policy . . . favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of police forces' (See Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 571 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of City of Schenectady, 30 NY3d at 114; Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Service Empls. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d 1066, 1069 [2012]).
6. The Court of Appeals said it had "resolved that tension by holding that the specific goal of strong disciplinary
authority for the leader of a police force prevails over the general one of
supporting collective bargaining" and that, where "legislation specifically
commit[ting] police discipline to the discretion of local officials . . . is in
force, the policy favoring control over the police prevails, and collective
bargaining over disciplinary matters is prohibited" (citing Matter of Patrolmen's
Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 571-572; see Matter of
City of Schenectady, 30 NY3d at 115; Matter of Town of Wallkill, 19 NY3d
at 1069).
7. In the words of the Court of Appeals, "To put it simply, 'some [municipalities] have the right to bargain about police discipline, and some do not' (Matter of City of Schenectady, 30 NY3d at 118), and the difference depends upon whether there is applicable legislation 'specifically commit[ting] police discipline to the discretion of local officials . . . in force' (See Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 571-575)."
Applying those principles in the instant matter, the Court of Appeals observed that the parties are in agreement that §330 of the 1907 City Charter constituted prior legislation committing police discipline to the discretion of the City official in charge of the police force which was grandfathered under Civil Service Law §76(4). The provision would have prohibited collective bargaining over police disciplinary procedures had it remained "in force" (See Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 572).
That said, the Court explained the "Municipal Home Rule Law expressly vests the City with the power to "revise and amend its charter by local laws that are not inconsistent with the constitution or general law" (Matter of St. Lawrence County v City of Ogdensburg, 40 NY3d 121, 126 [2023]; see Municipal Home Rule Law §10[1][ii][c] [1]), as well as the power to "adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general law relating to its property, affairs or government" (Municipal Home Rule Law §10[1][i])."
It was further established that the City could exercise that power in a way that surrendered authority granted to it under the 1907 City Charter and, indeed, as the City itself pointed out, a referendum was required to approve Local Law No. 2 of 2019 precisely because that law "[a]bolishe[d], transfer[red] or curtail[ed]" the charter power of the Mayor to appoint and remove all members of boards (Municipal Home Rule Law §23[2][f]).
As to the City Council's suggestion that it did not intend for the 1985 law to require the City to collectively bargain police discipline but, even accepting that its intent is relevant in view of the plain text of the law itself, there is no evidence in the record to support that claim. In any event, by 1985 the case law was clearly established that police discipline was a proper subject of collective bargaining where the procedures of Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 applied, and the City Council certainly should have been aware of that fact (see Matter of Town of Greenburgh [Police Assn. of Town of Greenburgh], 94 AD2d 771, 771-772 [2d Dept 1983], lv denied 60 NY2d 551 [1983]; Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, 62 AD2d at 17).
The High Court said "It follows that, upon the enactment of Local Law No. 2 of 1985, there was no longer a conflicting charter provision in force that 'specifically commit[ted] police discipline to the discretion of local officials'; therefore, 'the policy of the Taylor Law prevail[ed], and collective bargaining [was] require' on the issue of police discipline (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc., 6 NY3d at 571)."
Further, the Court of Appeals opined, "The [State] Legislature may therefore act to articulate a public policy that would prevail over the "strong and sweeping" one favoring collective bargaining that it has already adopted in the Taylor Law (id. at 78 [internal quotation marks omitted]) and, if it does so, this Court will enforce that policy just as stringently as we have the one set forth in the Taylor Law. Absent such action by the [State] Legislature, however, the statewide policy in favor of collective bargaining must control."
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, insofar as appealed from, with costs.
* The PAB's authority included the power to conduct a hearing on the alleged misconduct and to impose disciplinary sanctions, up to and including dismissal, if the officer were found guilty.
** Chief Judge Wilson dissented in an opinion in which Judges Rivera and Halligan concur. Judge Troutman took no part.
Click HERE to access the Court of Appeals' majority decision and Chief Judge Wilson's dissent.