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Matter of Hart v Town of Guilderland Indus. Dev. Agency |
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2024 NY Slip Op 03118 |
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Decided on |
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Appellate Division, Third Department |
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Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided and Entered:
CV-23-1696
[*1]In the Matter of Thomas Hart et al., Petitioners,
v
Town of Guilderland Industrial Development Agency et al., Respondents.
Calendar Date:
Before:Garry, P.J.,
James Bacon, New Paltz, for petitioners.
Hodgson Russ LLP,
James P. Melita, Town Attorney, Guilderland, for Town of
Phillips Lytle LLP,
Garry, P.J.
Proceeding initiated in this Court pursuant to EDPL 207 to review
a determination of respondent Town of Guilderland Industrial Development Agency
condemning five discontinued public roads and certain deed restrictions held by
petitioner
The underlying facts of this case are more fully set forth in this
Court's prior decisions in two related matters, in which this Court twice
approved of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8 [hereinafter
SEQRA]) review of the same project at issue in this proceeding, conducted by
the Town of Guilderland Planning Board (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Town of Guilderland,
205 AD3d 1120, 1126-1127 [3d Dept 2022]; Matter of Hart v Town of Guilderland, 196 AD3d 900,
913-914 [3d Dept 2021]). Pertinent here, in 2018, the Town Board of respondent
Town of
In March 2023, respondent Crossgates Releaseco, LLC (hereinafter
Crossgates) submitted an application to respondent Town of Guilderland
Industrial Development Agency (hereinafter the IDA) requesting that the IDA use
its power of eminent domain to acquire portions of these five discontinued
public roads in the Town of Guilderland, and to condemn certain deed
restrictions which purported to restrict commercial development at the project
site. Petitioners Thomas Hart and Lisa Hart are Guilderland residents and own a
home "approximately 245 feet" from the proposed project site.
Petitioner 1667 Western Avenue, LLC (hereinafter 1667) owns property located at
1667 Western Avenue and a gasoline distributor operates a gas station on 1667's
property; the deed to 1667's property includes provisions — referred to as deed
restrictions — limiting commercial development on the proposed project site.
A public hearing was held. Petitioners argued at this hearing that
the project did not serve a public purpose. Thereafter, the IDA issued a
determination authorizing the use of eminent domain as to the subject
discontinued roads and deed restrictions, finding that neither served a public
use and that the acquisition of and extinguishment of interest in same would
"maximize the public uses, benefits, and purposes associated with the
[p]roject." In rendering its determination, the IDA incorporated the
Planning Board's environmental impact statement completed in connection with
the aforementioned [*2]SEQRA review and "conducted an
extensive discussion of the SEQRA Record . . . and the general effect of the
[p]roject in its entirety on the environment and residents of the
locality." Petitioners commenced this proceeding in this Court pursuant to
EDPL 207 seeking to annul the IDA's determination on the basis that the
condemnation was in violation of the EDPL and SEQRA. Respondents answered.
Initially, pursuant to EDPL 207 (A), only those "aggrieved by
the condemnor's determination and findings" have standing to seek judicial
review thereof. A condemnee is defined under the EDPL as "the holder of
any right, title, interest, lien, charge or encumbrance in real property
subject to an acquisition or proposed acquisition" (EDPL 103 [C]).
Petitioners have not demonstrated their status as condemnees for purposes of
challenging the IDA's condemnation of the subject roads, which are owned by the
Town and were previously discontinued pursuant to Highway Law § 207 (compare Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post,
26 NY3d 301, 310 [2015]; Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City
of Albany, 13 NY3d 297, 305 [2009]). "Thus all that petitioners
are entitled to under [the] EDPL is a properly conducted hearing held on proper
notice" (Matter of East Thirteenth St. Community Assn. v New York State
Urban Dev. Corp., 84 NY2d 287, 295 [1994]). Given that such hearing was
held, they do not have EDPL standing as to that issue (see id.; Matter of McCarthy v Town of Smithtown, 19 AD3d 695,
696 [2d Dept 2005]; Matter of Hugh Gassner Fire Co. v South Spring Val.
Fire Dist., 294 AD2d 502, 502 [2d Dept 2002]).[FN1] As
to the IDA's condemnation of the deed restrictions, however, although the Harts
were unable to demonstrate their status as condemnees in this regard, 1667 may
seek review of that part of the IDA's determination given its undisputed status
as an owner of property subject to said restrictions (see Matter of Faith Temple Church v Town of Brighton, 17
AD3d 1072, 1072-1073 [4th Dept 2005]; compare Matter of Allied Healthcare Prods., Inc. v
Stuyvesant Falls Hydro Corp., 30 AD3d 647, 648 [3d Dept 2006]).
Turning to the arguments remaining before us, "[t]he scope of
this Court's review of a condemnor's EDPL 204 determination is limited to
whether (1) the proceeding was constitutionally sound; (2) the condemnor* had
the requisite authority; (3) its determination complied with SEQRA and EDPL
article 2; and (4) the acquisition will serve a public use" (Matter of Hudson Val. Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc. v County of
Ulster, 183 AD3d 974, 975 [3d
Here, 1667 contends that the IDA failed to comply with the
requirements of the EDPL in condemning the deed restrictions on the basis that
the determination does not serve a legitimate public purpose. "The
principal purpose of article 2 of the EDPL is to ensure that a condemnor does
not acquire property without having made a reasoned determination that the
condemnation will serve a valid public purpose" (Matter of National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Schueckler,
35 NY3d 297, 303 [2020] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis, brackets,
emphasis and citation omitted]). What constitutes a public purpose is defined
broadly and "encompasses any use which contributes to the health, safety,
general welfare, convenience or prosperity of the community" (Matter of 225 Front St., Ltd. v City of Binghamton, 61
AD3d 1155, 1157 [3d Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks and citations
omitted]; accord Matter of Johnson v Town of Caroga, 162 AD3d 1353,
1355 [3d Dept 2018]; see Matter of Court St. Dev. Project, LLC v Utica Urban
Renewal Agency, 188 AD3d 1601, 1602-1603 [4th Dept 2020]), and
"[a]reas of economic underdevelopment and stagnation may be considered
blighted so as to support the taking of vacant and underutilized properties
located therein" (Matter of Court St. Dev. Project, LLC v Utica Urban
Renewal Agency, 188 AD3d at 1602).
Upon our review, we are constrained to find that the condemnation
of the deed restrictions was for a valid public purpose. The record
demonstrates that the single-family homes on the affected properties were
vacant and in a state of deterioration and that public roads in the project
area had been discontinued. Moreover, as a result of the Town's comprehensive
plan which established the transit district in 2018 and encouraged
redevelopment in the area, the single-family homes became nonconforming. As
such, the IDA had support for its determination that the residential deed
restrictions were "no longer consistent with the use and character of the
area." It does bear noting that, as petitioners assert, the record
reflects that the neighborhood was both occupied and well cared for as recently
as 2011. The properties were thereafter acquired by Crossgates and neglected.
Although petitioners further assert that Crossgates should have been subjected
to penalties for this apparently deliberate neglect, no such actions appear to
have been sought or undertaken — and at this juncture, there is no remedy to be
imposed; even assuming that there was a deliberate and intentional disregard of
the properties, this does not bar the application, based upon the current
conditions.
Contrary to 1667's contentions, we do not find that merely because
the condemnation of the deed restrictions directly benefits private businesses
that the project is not of public benefit (see Matter of 225 Front St., Ltd.
v City of
Finally, 1667 argues that the IDA failed to comply with SEQRA when
it relied upon the Planning Board's final environmental impact statement in
rendering its determination, as plans to condemn the deed restrictions were not
disclosed until after that SEQRA review had concluded. Initially, we reject the
IDA's contention that such claim is barred by the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel given our decisions in two prior related appeals (Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Town of Guilderland,
205 AD3d 1120; Matter of Hart v Town of Guilderland, 196 AD3d 900),
as the IDA was not a party thereto and there is no indication that it was in
privity with one, nor was the challenged determination the subject of those
proceedings (see Whitney Lane Holdings, LLC v Don Realty, LLC, 130
AD3d 1218, 1220 [3d Dept 2015]). Nevertheless, 1667's claim is without
merit. "[A]ll involved agencies must rely upon the [final environmental
impact statement] as the basis for their review of the environmental impacts
that they are required to consider in connection with subsequent permit
applications" (Matter of Guido v Town of Ulster Town Bd., 74 AD3d 1536,
1537 [3d Dept 2010]; see Troy Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Nassau,
125 AD3d 1170, 1173 [3d Dept 2015]; 6 NYCRR 617.6 [b] [3] [iii]). In its
findings, the IDA incorporated the final environmental impact statement
completed by the Planning Board, the lead agency (see 6 NYCRR 617.2
[v]; 617.6 [b] [3] [iii]), and conducted a discussion of the SEQRA record,
including the final impact statement and the effect of the project upon the
environment and residents based upon the application at issue here.
Accordingly, the IDA satisfied the requirements of SEQRA in rendering its
determination (see 6 NYCRR 617.11 [d]; Troy Sand &
Gravel Co., Inc. v Town of Nassau, 125 AD3d [*5]at 1173; Matter of Guido v Town of Ulster Town Bd., 74
AD3d at 1537).
Petitioners' remaining contentions, to the extent not expressly
addressed herein, are either not properly before us or found to be lacking in
merit.
Clark, Ceresia, Fisher and Powers, JJ., concur.
ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and
petition dismissed.
*Editor's note: Condemnor: A government or private party with the power to acquire private property for public use. Collins English Dictionary. Copyright© HarperCollins Publishers.
F00tnotes
Footnote 1: As petitioners lack standing, the arguments asserted relative to the public trust doctrine are not reached; further, this issue is not properly before us as it was not raised in the petition (see Matter of Tadasky Corp. v Village of Ellenville, 45 AD3d 1131, 1132 [3d Dept 2007]).