In this action the
In the event a plaintiff shows
facts making out a violation of a constitutional right, the Circuit Court said a
defendant may establish the affirmative defense of qualified immunity by
demonstrating that [1] the right was not clearly established or [2] even if the
right was clearly established, it was objectively reasonable for the
[defendant] to believe the conduct at issue was lawful.”
In this action the relevant
defendants did not dispute the first requirement — that the right was clearly
established — and addressed only the second requirement, arguing that no
reasonable jury could conclude that they acted unreasonably.
Confining its review to the
question presented, the Circuit Court conclude that the federal district court
properly denied the motion seeking qualified immunity at the summary judgment
stage. The Circuit Court explained that viewing the pretrial record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, "there is a genuine factual dispute that bears on
whether it was objectively reasonable for [the relevant respondents] to believe
their actions were lawful."
In the words of the Circuit
Court, “[W]here, as here, specific intent is actually an element of the
plaintiff’s claim as defined by clearly established law, it can never be
objectively reasonable for a government official to act with the intent that is
prohibited by law.”
If the relevant defendants intended
to dismiss Plaintiff in retaliation for allegedly participating in a political campaign,
their actions were objectively unreasonable. Although the relevant defendants "argued
before the district court, and argue again on appeal," that they believed
that Plaintiff campaigned on Department time and that this was a legitimate
reason for the firing, the Circuit Court opined that "even if there were a
legitimate reason to fire [Plaintiff], in order to avoid liability for First
Amendment retaliation, [the relevant defendants] would need to “show that
[they] would have taken the same adverse action” — that is, they would have fired
[Plaintiff] "in the absence of the protected speech."
The Circuit Court concluded that the district court did not err in its determination that the relevant defendants “ha[d] not met their burden of showing that a ‘reasonable jury would have to find by a preponderance of the evidence’ that they would have terminated [Plaintiff] even absent [her] protected speech ....”
Further, the Circuit Court said "Nothing in the record suggests
that [the relevant defendants] were required to fire an employee for
campaigning during work hours; they had allegedly declined to do so on a prior
occasion", opining that the relevant defendants "could not show that
they would have taken the same decision regardless of an impermissible motive
when the [relevant defendants] had the discretion not to take an adverse action".
Accordingly, said the Circuit Court, a jury could conclude that the relevant defendants acted with retaliatory
intent and fired [Plaintiff] when they would not otherwise have done so and in such
a case, "they would not be entitled to qualified immunity."
* The Circuit Court, citing Dallas Aerospace, Inc.
v. CIS Air 4 Corp., 352 F.3d 775, also observed that "[when] ruling on a
summary judgment motion the district court must construe the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and
draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.”
Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's
decision posted on the Internet.