The Rule of Necessity is a judicial doctrine that permits a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative decision maker or body to decide a case even if he or she or it would ordinarily be disqualified due to bias or prejudice or an appearance of bias or prejudice.
In this action Petitioners brought a combined CPLR Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action against various state agencies and officials [Respondents], seeking, among other things, "to compel the performance of certain official acts and to declare unconstitutional the Ethics Commission Reform Act of 2022, the 2022-2023 state budget and that year's Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill." Petitioners subsequently sought a preliminary injunction and then filed a motion seeking, among other things, sanctions against Respondents' counsel, disqualification of Respondents' counsel, and disqualification of the assigned Justice and, or, removal of the matter to federal court.
Supreme
Court granted Respondents' cross-motion to dismiss the petition and denied Petitioners'
requests for relief. Petitioners then moved to reargue the matter. Supreme
Court denied that motion and Petitioners appealed.*
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's rulings. Noting that Petitioners contended that the assigned Justice was obligated to recuse** himself from hearing the case due to a conflict of interest as the petition raised a challenge to the Legislative/Judiciary Budget Bill, through which he, and similarly situate justices receive compensation, and the court was required to remove the case to federal court.
The Appellate
Division opined that "these claims lack merit", noting that in a
earlier case brought by these same Petitioners, "[t]he self-interest
inherent in adjudicating a dispute involving judicial compensation would
provide grounds for disqualifying not only [the assigned Justice], but every
[Justice] who might replace [him or] her" [See Center for Jud. Accountability, Inc. v Cuomo, 167 AD3d 1406, appeal
dismissed 33 NY3d 993; leave dismissed and denied 34 NY3d 961.
Pursuant
to the Rule of Necessity, the Justice assigned to this case was authorized to
preside over it (see Center for Jud. Accountability, Inc. v Cuomo, 167 AD3d at
1408). As for Petitioners' related claim that the conflict of interest divested
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Judiciary Law §14, the Appellate
Division held the Rule of Necessity provides an exception to that statute,
citing Pines v State of New York, 115 AD3d 80, appeal
dismissed 23 NY3d 982 .
With
respect to Petitioners' claim the Supreme Court should have granted their motion to
remove the matter to federal court, the Appellate Division, citing Geiger v
Arctco Enters., Inc., 910 F Supp 130, said "the right of removal is vested
exclusively in [respondents and a petitioner] simply may not remove an action
from a state court".
Further,
opined the Appellate Division, Petitioners' requests for sanctions against, and
disqualification of, the Attorney General were properly denied, explaining the
record shows that "the Attorney General made reasonable arguments which
did not in any manner justify the imposition of sanctions" (See 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]; Matter of Doe v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 172 AD3d 1691; Matter of Cobado v Benziger, 163 AD3d 1103). The Appellate Division then noted that Petitioners' contention that the Attorney General should have been disqualified "is likewise unavailing", citing Executive Law §63[1].
* Footnotes in the Appellate Divisions decision indicate:
1. "Supreme Court dismissed all claims brought by the Center for Judicial Accountability, Inc. on the ground that it was not represented by an attorney, as required for a corporation to bring a civil action;
2: As no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue, the appeal from the order denying that motion must be dismissed; and
3: With respect to Petitioners' causes of action challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provisions which created the Commission on Ethics and Lobbying in Government, the Appellate Division noted it had "recently held those provisions to be unconstitutional, albeit on different grounds than those argued by petitioners (see Cuomo v New York State Commn. on Ethics and Lobbying in Govt., ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2024 NY Slip Op 02568".
** Other rulings addressing recusal" noted in NYPPL include:
A board member’s
involvement in the disciplinary process does not automatically require recusal
of that individual [Birch v
Board members who reviewed the recommendations of the Hearing Officer and acted on the charges "were not so personally or extensively involved in the disciplinary process so as to compel the conclusion that they could not fairly consider the evidence and recommendation resulting from the hearing and, thus, that their recusal was necessary" [Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d 714].
In Opinions of the Attorney General, 92 Informal 61, the Attorney General, when asked how a member of a city council should conduct himself or herself, the opinion notes that "public officers have responsibility to exercise their official duties solely in the public interest [and] should avoid circumstances which compromise their ability to make impartial judgments." Further, public officers must avoid the appearance of impropriety in order to maintain public confidence in government.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.