In an action to recover damages for alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC §1983, Plaintiff appealed Supreme Court's granting the Town's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff had contended that Plaintiff's right to equal protection was violated because Plaintiff was denied an "on-street parking permit" for a specified location in the Town on the ground that Plaintiff was not a resident at the location involved.
The Appellate Division said that the Town had established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.
With respect to Plaintiff's cause of action for recovery under 42 USC §1983 on equal protection grounds, the Appellate Division explained that recovery under 42 USC §1983 is triggered where a defendant has denied the plaintiff a constitutional or federal statutory right, and that such denial was effected under color of state law. Here, said the court, Plaintiff "is not a member of a suspect class and no fundamental right is implicated. Thus the challenged action need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."
Further, opined the Appellate Division, a local law limiting the issuance of on-street parking permits to residents of that street is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of alleviating an on-street parking shortage on that street.
Further, opined the Appellate Division, a local law limiting the issuance of on-street parking permits to residents of that street is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of alleviating an on-street parking shortage on that street.
Citing Village of Willowbrook v Olech, 528 US 562, the Appellate Division also rejected Plaintiff's claim that Plaintiff is a "class of one" for purposes of prosecuting an equal protection claim, explaining there has been no showing that Plaintiff had been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
The court also noted that the individually named Town defendants "are entitled to qualified immunity, as they are government officials performing discretionary functions, and their conduct did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Finally, the Appellate Division said it agreed with the Supreme Court's determination directing dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action alleging retaliation in connection with the issuance of a parking ticket. In the words of the court: "While retaliation claims alleging an adverse employment action because of a complaint of discrimination are actionable under 42 USC §1983 [Plaintiff] has no employment relationship with the Town and the statute does not apply in this context.
The bottom line: the Appellate Division agreed with Supreme Court's decisions [1] denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint, and [2] granting the Town's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: