In this action to recover damages for negligent supervision, hiring, and retention, the Plaintiff, a former student of the defendant school district [School District] appealed Supreme Court's decision dismissing his complaint insofar as it alleged that an employee of the School District physically and sexually assaulted him while he was attending a party at the employee's home.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling, explaining that in determining a motion to dismiss such a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion:
1. The pleadings are afforded a liberal construction;
2. The facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true; and
3. The plaintiff is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference.
However, citing Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, the Appellate Division explained that "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions ... are not entitled to any such consideration."
Here, said the court, Plaintiff has alleged a cause of action against the School District to recover damages for breach of a duty in loco parentis, and this is not a cognizable cause of action under New York law.
To the extent that the Plaintiff alleged a negligent supervision cause of action against the School District based on allegations that it failed to adequately supervise Plaintiff and, or, its employee, the Appellate Division observed that "such cause of action was legally insufficient" because Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint, if accepted as true, demonstrated that the subject incident took place when the district had no custody or control of the Plaintiff and no duty to monitor or supervise its employee's conduct.
The Appellate Division's decision also observed that Plaintiff's complaint does not include factual allegations regarding any improper interactions between him and the School District's employee "that took place on school grounds during school hours prior to the subject incident."
Addressing Plaintiff's allegation with respect to negligent hiring and, or, retention causes of action against School District, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court "properly directed dismissal of such causes of action, since the [Plaintiff] failed to sufficiently plead that the [School District] knew or should have known of [its employee's] propensity for the type of conduct at issue." In addition, the court noted that although such causes of action need not be pleaded with specificity, here the complaint contained "little more than bare legal conclusions" as to the employee's propensity for improper conduct that were entirely unsupported by the alleged facts.
Finally, the Appellate Division said that even assuming that the complaint sufficiently pleaded notice of the School District's employee's "propensity for the type of conduct at issue, the [Plaintiff's] own allegations in the complaint, if accepted as true, demonstrated that there was no nexus between [the employee's] employment with the district and the subject incident, which were separated by time, place, and the intervening independent acts of [the employee]".
The bottom line: The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court properly granted the School District's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for failure to state a cause of action.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Divisions decision posted on the Internet.