Plaintiff brought this action in federal district court contending her employee organization [Union] declined to demand arbitration of her workload grievances relating to the size of the office space she was required to clean but acted upon a similar grievances advanced by a coworker who was not Hispanic. Plaintiff charged the Union with "unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. ('Title VII'); the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Executive. Law §290 et seq. ('NYSHRL'); and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code §8-101 et seq. ('NYCHRL'); as well as violation of the Union’s duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act ('NLRA'), 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq."
Upon conclusion of discovery, the Union moved for, and the district court granted, summary judgment in favor of the Union, determining that Plaintiff failed to show that the reason's the Union advanced for declining to file a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff "was pretextual, arbitrary, or taken in bad faith, or that the [Union's] decision was otherwise motivated by discrimination."
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit [Circuit Court], viewing the federal district court's granting summary judgment de novo and viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff] as to 'whether genuine issues of material fact preclude judgment as a matter of law' ....” Also noting the Union withdrew the arbitration of the coworker’s grievance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Circuit Court said "To the extent that [Plaintiff] challenges the district court’s determination that her duty-of-fair-representation claims were untimely," the Circuit Court said it would resolve those claims on the merits as follows:
Addressing Plaintiff's claim of Unlawful Discrimination Under Title VII and NYSHRL, the Circuit Court opined Title VII bars a Union from discriminating against its members because of, inter alia, race or national origin citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)]. "Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792," Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination'by showing that:
"(1) she is a member of a protected class;
"(2) she is qualified for her position;
"(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
"(4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination."
Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the Union to offer “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the differing treatment. In the event the Union "offers such a reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual.
The Circuit Court ruled that the Union had satisfied this requirement.
Citing see Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217, 226 n.9, the Circuit Court noted that the Second Circuit had recognized that Title VII and NYSHRL discrimination claims are “analytically identical, applying the same standard of proof to both claims”, and that "the reasoning in this section applies to both claims". In this instance, explained the Circuit Court, no reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, find that the Union’s articulated reasoning was pretextual or that Plaintiff's race or national origin argument was a motivating factor in the Union’s decision-making.
Pointing out that Plaintiff had "acknowledged that the coworker’s floor was the largest in the building, lending support to the Union’s stated reason (supported by an affidavit from a Union attorney) for taking only the coworker’s claim to arbitration", while [Paintiff] pointed to "a troubling incident in which a Union official referred to her in a text message as a 'stupid Dominican' after a Union election", Plaintiff did not indicate how that statement was connected to the Union’s arbitration decisions.*
Further, the Circuit Court held that "the coworker was not an adequate comparator" because of the relative sizes of their respective assigned cleaning areas.
Accordingly, the Circuit Court held that "the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Union under both Title VII and NYSHRL.
Turning to Plaintiff's "Unlawful Discrimination Under NYCHRL" claim, the Circuit Court said that the Second Circuit has "recognized that courts must analyze NYCHRL discrimination claims 'separately and independently from any federal and state law claims'.” In the words of the Circuit Court, summary judgment may be appropriate under the NYCHRL “if no reasonable jury could conclude either that the defendant’s reasons were pretextual, or that the defendant’s stated reasons were not its sole basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least in part on discrimination.”
Focusing on Plaintiff's Fair Representation Under the NLRA argument, citing Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967), the Circuit Court opined that "the duty of fair representation is a 'statutory obligation,'" demanding that a union “serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination ... to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct".
The duty of fair representation, said the Circuit Court, is breached where a union’s actions “with respect to a member are arbitrary, discriminatory, or taken in bad faith.”
Finding that the Union "offered a clear explanation for why its decision was neither arbitrary nor taken in bad faith", the Circuit Court observed that Plaintiff rejected the Union’s stated reasoning, but "offered no evidence supporting her assertion that the Union pursues fewer arbitration grievances raised by Hispanic workers than it does for non-Hispanic workers."
Opining that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Union’s decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or taken in bad faith, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court ruling, holding that the lower court "did not err in granting [the Union's motion for] summary judgment".
* Plaintiff, in her deposition, "did not assert that she thought that the [Union's] arbitration decision was connected to the Union election".
Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.