In an action to recover damages for defamation,* Plaintiff appealed an order of a Supreme Court which granted that branch of the motion submitted by two Defendants [hereinafter Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 respectively] for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's causes of action to recover damages for alleged slander per se and libel per se insofar as asserted against Defendant 1.
Two defendants, Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, moved for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for slander per se and libel per se insofar as asserted against Defendant 1. Supreme Court issued an order granting that branch of the Defendants' motion. The Plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order "insofar as appealed from, with costs".
The Appellate Division's decision reports that Defendant 1 was, at relevant times, a council member for the Town and, among others, filed a complaint against Plaintiff with the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District alleging that Plaintiff represented a party in a taxpayer action commenced against Defendant 1 and the Town. Plaintiff subsequently became counsel for the Town while still representing the party in the taxpayer action. The Attorney Grievance Committee, First Judicial Department [Committee] ultimately disposed of the complaint by issuing an admonition to the Plaintiff.
In addition, the Appellate Division's ruling notes that Defendant 1, among others, released a media advisory to members of the press and to private individuals stating that Plaintiff had been "reprimanded" by the Committee. Further, during a press conference in front of the Town Hall, Defendant 1 stated, among other things, that the Plaintiff had been admonished and had engaged in "illicit quid pro quo."**
The Appellate Division noted that communications made by "individuals participating in a public function, such as judicial, legislative, or executive proceedings" are protected by an absolute privilege", citing Toker v Pollak, 44 NY2d 211. Further, said the court, "Absolute privilege is based upon the personal position or status of the speaker and is limited to the speaker's official participation in the processes of government", citing Colantonio v Mercy Med. Ctr., 135 AD3d 686'.
The Appellate Division also noted that Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for slander per se and libel per se insofar as asserted against Defendant 1 was properly granted by Supreme Court [albeit for reasons different than those relied upon by the Supreme Court].
In the words of the Appellate Division, "Assuming without deciding that the challenged statements constitute actionable defamatory statements, [Defendant 1] established, prima facie, that he published the challenged statements while acting in his role as a council member for the Town and was therefore protected by absolute privilege" citing Riggio v County of Nassau, 218 AD3d at 503 and other decisions.
In contrast, citing Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, the Court noted that Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact".
* In stating causes of action to recover damages for slander per se and libel per se Plaintiff alleged that the statements in a media advisory and at the press conference were defamatory per se.
** Illicit quid pro quo refers to illegal or unethical exchanges, usually done in secret, in order to gain an unfair advantage.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.