Seeking summary judgment in adjudicating disability discrimination claims

The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held a federal district court improperly granted summary judgment in the instant matter for two reasons, "one of which is a logical consequence of disposing of the matter based on pre-motion letters".

First, Circuit Court said the district court improperly granted summary judgment by resolving disputed facts that related to the Petitioners claims discrimination because of his alleged disability.

The Second Circuit explained: "It is well established that a district court may grant summary judgment only where '... movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [See] Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).' A district court may not make credibility determinations, or weigh evidence in evaluating a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson  v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ('Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .'). Rather, [the Second Circuit has] long stated that '[t]he function of the district court [when] considering the motion for summary judgment is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.' Kaytor v. Elec. 20 Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010)."

Second, the Second Circuit said it had concluded that the district court further erred by not ensuring that the evidentiary material cited in the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements support their assertions.

In the words of the Second Circuit: "As this Court has explained, a district court 'may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement.' Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. BEARGRAM Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004). Instead, a district court must satisfy itself "that the citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion.": Id. But, there is nothing in the record to show that the district court possessed or reviewed the evidentiary material cited in the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements. Therefore, we cannot discern whether the district court satisfied itself that the evidence cited in the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements support their assertions, nor can we fulfill our appellate obligations given the incomplete record. This is where a substantive reason for avoiding dismissals based on counsels’ arguments at a pre-motion conference can arise: parties not having yet provided the district court with a complete record to review."

The Circuit Court vacated the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondent and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings.

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.